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Abstract 
 
Does past migration matter for economic development in the long-term? Does an 
area’s history in migration affect economic performance long after the initial 
migration shock has faded away? And – does it matter what type of immigrant settles 
in a territory for the economic impact of migration to persist in time? This dissertation 
examines the long-term economic impact of migration, connecting migrant settlement 
patterns at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century to present day levels of income per 
capita. It firstly estimates the effect of different compositional features of the historical 
migrant stock on long-term economic development levels in the United States (US), a 
country founded and essentially formed by migrants. Secondly, it tests whether there 
is a link between past European and recent Latin American migration to the US to 
identify whether one potential transmission mechanism could be at play in transferring 
the migrants’ economic impact across time. 
The results of the analyses conducted using a variety of methods – OLS, IV, and panel 
data estimation techniques – provide three novel insights. Firstly, historical migrant 
stock is one of the very few historical county features that still explain current levels 
of development. In contrast to other factors, such as past income and education levels 
or industry structure, the influence of past migration on economic development does 
not seem to fade over the very long-term. 
Secondly, compositional aspects related to the historical migrant stock remain highly 
decisive for economic development outcomes more than 100 years later. The diversity 
of the migrant population, the gender balance, as well as the average distance travelled 
by the migrant stock over a century earlier still influence regional economic 
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development levels today. All three features have growth-enhancing implications over 
the short as well as over the long-term.  
Lastly, past migration – irrespective of the presence of family connections, ethnic ties, 
or migration networks – shapes the geographical patterns of successive migration 
waves spanning multiple decades and even generations. An area’s migration history 
acts as a crucial pull factor for future migrants and is at the root of the formation of 
migration-prone and migration-averse regions. Consequently, previous migration 
contributes to ‘rework’ the places of destination, making them more attractive for 
future generations of migrants.  
All in all, the findings show that migration not only matters for economic 
development, but that its economic influence determines the success and prosperity of 
territories and the well-being of their inhabitants over the very long-term. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Migration is increasingly becoming the centre of policy discussions, political 
discourse, and the scientific research agenda. From prehistoric times until today, 
humans have spread across the globe. Moving to a different region, territory or country 
has always been a natural consequence of factors such as climate, violence, poverty or 
population change. Yet, in recent decades, the size of the total worldwide migrant 
community has skyrocketed to levels unknown since the beginning of recorded global 
migration numbers. During the past 55 years, worldwide migrant stock has more than 
tripled from about 72 million in 1960 to 244 million in 2015. While the number of 
migrants grew at around one percent per year between 1960 and 1985, its growth rate 
picked up speed and increased to, on average, three to five percent per year between 
1985 and 2015. A 71 million absolute increase in the size of global migrant stock was 
recorded in the 2000s alone (United Nations, 2012). Thus, the volume of international 
migration has grown faster than the world’s population as a whole, resulting in migrant 
communities representing often more than 10 percent of the population in the 
receiving countries (United Nations, 2016). Consequential to these global population 
movements across space and – more importantly – across international borders, the 
question of how inward migration affects a country’s economy has re-emerged at the 
top of the political agenda. Policy makers and scientific researchers alike have been 
prompted to react.  
A vast amount of literature has been developed to assess the economic effect of 
migration on the receiving country’s economy, responding to old-established fears that 
migration may lead to economic downturn and unemployment, and crowd-out the 
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native population from the labour market. Some voices do indeed consider migration 
as growth-deteriorating and a fiscal burden on the native population. They refer to 
increasing welfare costs, skill alterations on the labour market, lower native wages, 
rising inequality and crime (i.e. Card, 2001, 2009; Borjas, 2003; Storesletten, 2003; 
Dustman et al., 2004; Barrett and McCarthy, 2008; Alonso-Borrego, Garoupa and 
Vázquez, 2012).  
The vast majority of studies, however, tends to adopt a contrasting view. Inward 
migration is generally believed to be growth-enhancing, boosting levels of innovation, 
technology, and productivity (i.e. Clemens, 2011; Kennan, 2013; Di Giovanni, 
Levchenko and Ortega, 2015). Over the years, inward migration has been connected 
to higher total GDP levels (Ortega and Peri, 2009), rising (or unchanged) native wages 
(Dustman et al., 2004; Card, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann, Frattini and 
Preston, 2013), higher productivity (Hirschman and Mogford, 2009; Hunt and 
Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010), rising employment (Card, 1990; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Peri 
and Sparber, 2009), increased innovation (Partridge and Furtan, 2008; Özgen, 
Nijkamp and Poot, 2012), accelerated technology formation (Alesina, Harnoss and 
Rapoport, 2016; Bove and Elia, 2017), rising efficiency levels (Kennan, 2013), and 
higher entrepreneurial activity (Wadhwa et al., 2007; Clark and Drinkwater, 2010; 
Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2015). Restricting migration would therefore entail profound 
economic losses, significantly lowering the receiving region’s economic growth 
prospects. 
The aforementioned studies have one factor in common: The impact of migration on 
economic development outcomes is generally analysed over the short- to medium-
term. The economic and social consequences of inward migration on the aggregate 
production function or redistribution effects within the host country or region tend to 
15 
 
be estimated just for a few election cycles or only one generation, respectively – 
usually a maximum timeframe of 25 years. The potential far-reaching implications of 
migration over longer periods of time after the initial arrival of the migrant, are either 
completely ignored or regarded as irrelevant. 
The often-used metaphor of the melting pot in conjunction with immigration and 
assimilation in heterogeneous societies would support this lack of interest in the long-
term consequences of migration. Borjas (1992: 123) explains the melting pot theory 
in the context of immigration to the United States (US): “Over time the children and 
grandchildren of immigrants moved out of ethnic enclaves, discarded their social and 
cultural background, and […] became indistinguishable from the native population”. 
Thus, large numbers of inflowing migrants would lead to rising dynamism, increased 
economic activity, and ultimately higher growth rates only as long as they are 
significantly different from the native population. Once skill complementarities, 
different cultural perspectives, ideas and distinctive cultural identities fade away with 
time – or, in other words, once migrant groups ‘melt’ with their host society – 
migration would turn into a simple population redistribution mechanism, making the 
long-term analysis of migration meaningless. 
Contenders of the melting pot idea, however, support the view of cultural pluralism 
emphasising a multicultural, pluralistic population where each ethnic or cultural group 
preserves their culture, tradition, and national heritage forming a society embedded in 
a particular cultural mosaic (i.e. Glazer, 1970, 2000; Alba, 1999). A growing number 
of scientific studies support the idea that cultural characteristics, ethnic capital, or a 
cultural institutional framework do not fade away with time but survive over decades 
and even centuries (i.e. Borjas, 1992; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; 
Duranton, Rodríguez‐Pose and Sandall, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 
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2010). Borjas (1992: 124), for example, finds that “if the external effect of ethnicity is 
sufficiently strong, ethnic differences […] are likely to persist for many generations 
(and may never disappear)”. He estimates that they survive at least four generations 
or about 100 years (Borjas, 1994). Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Duranton et al. (2009) 
extend this time frame. They show that cultural differences established in colonial 
times (the former) or even in medieval times (the latter) persist and influence 
socioeconomic outcomes to this very day. Thus, if indeed cultural capital, ethnic 
institutions, or ancestral characteristics survive over multiple generations affecting 
socioeconomic outcomes over very long timeframes, should migrants from a 
multitude of countries not generate economic consequences that last longer than 25 
years, potentially affecting regional economic growth levels for decades to come? 
Studies on the long-term impact of migration, however, are few and far between. Only 
recently, researchers have started to analyse the impact of migration extending the 
time dimension after the initial arrival of the migrant. Rodríguez-Pose and von 
Berlepsch (2014) were the first to evaluate questions such as: Does inward migration 
entail long-term implications for future generations? Do migrant stocks generated in 
historical times explain current disparities in economic development? Evaluating the 
United States at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, they find that migrants leave 
an undeniable imprint on economic development for more than 100 years. Regions 
that received a large number of inward migrants 130 years ago are significantly more 
prosperous today than those which were largely bypassed by migration routes. These 
results are confirmed by Sequeira et al. (2017).  
The strength of these findings triggers a number of additional questions: Why and how 
does migration leave such a long-lasting, growth enhancing legacy for regional 
economic development? Does the secret lie, potentially, in the composition of the 
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migrant stock? What are the mechanisms that transfer the undeniable imprint of 
historical migration across decades? How is it possible that the migrants’ trace left in 
historical times still affects regional growth levels despite high internal migration rates 
and assimilation mechanisms within the new society? This work intends to answer 
these questions. 
The first part of this dissertation treats the composition of the regional migrant 
community and its implications for economic development over long time periods. 
Evaluating different characteristics of migrant communities in historical times, I seek 
to ascertain if a specific set-up of the migrant stock is more beneficial in terms of 
regional economic development than others. In particular, I look at three different 
compositional features: diversity, gender, and distance.  
The diversity of the migrant stock is highly likely to be a decisive element determining 
the impact of migration on economic development outcomes. A large amount of 
literature has been developed over the past decades, going back to the works by Jane 
Jacobs (1961, 1969), identifying diversity as central driver of creativity, and thus, 
innovation. With a diverse migrant stream, a multitude of ideas, abilities and 
perspectives convene, creating a fertile soil for creativity, boosting innovation levels 
and consequently, economic activity. The question that remains is if the economic 
benefits of this ‘diversity buzz’ apply only to the short-term or extend over longer time 
frames. Are high diversity levels, generated in a region’s population more than 100 
years ago, still relevant for present-day levels of economic development? 
The second compositional feature studied in this thesis is gender. When analysing the 
economic impact of migration, most academic research pools female as well and male 
migrants to form one homogenous mass of migrants. Women are assumed to be ‘tied 
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movers’ or economic dependents following their husbands’ migration decision. If 
gender enters the equation, its role is the one of a control variable, rather than a variable 
of interest (Pfeiffer et al., 2008). The fact that female migrants could possibly have a 
different macroeconomic impact on their receiving region than their male 
counterparts, is – in most cases – simply ignored. This dissertation tries to fill this gap. 
Does gender affect the long-term impact of migration? Do female migrants leave a 
different trace for long-term economic development than the migrant in general? Does 
the gender composition of migrant stocks matter? 
The last compositional aspect evaluated in this thesis is the distance travelled by 
migrants. Generally, migrant streams are made up of both foreign-born as well as 
native-born populations. While the former cross international borders, the latter cross 
provincial, state, or regional lines. As all originate from the same country, internal 
migrants, are predominantly regarded as one homogenous group. I question this fact. 
I seek to determine whether long distance internal migrants affect long-term economic 
development outcomes differently than those which travelled only over short 
distances. Does the migrants’ covered distance between outset and destination matter 
for the impact of migration on economic development over long time frames? 
In the evaluation of the different compositional features of migration and its long-term 
impact for economic development, I assume the transmission mechanism across time 
to be the very territory of the migrants’ settlement. I presume circumspectly that the 
positive impact of inward migrants created via the dynamic, creativity-sparking, risk-
seeking, and entrepreneurial characteristics generally associated to the migrant 
population have become embedded in the territory where they settled in large numbers. 
As they rework the territory itself, the growth stimulating features of the migrant 
population become part of the territory’s local institutional framework. This means 
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that territories that receive large influxes of migrants would end up incorporating a 
‘buzz’ of migration1, while others, largely bypassed by migration over time, would 
lack this feature. A clear separation of counties into migration-prone and migration-
averse regions would be the logical result. Consequently, migrant flows arriving to the 
US today would be more likely to be settling in migration-prone regions or, in other 
words, in the areas where huge numbers of migrants around the turn of the 19th to the 
20th century took up residence. This implies a path dependency between old and 
contemporary migration. The quest for evidence supporting this theory provides the 
focus of the second part of this work.  
Seemingly predestined for the analysis of the long-term impact of migration is the US 
– a country essentially founded and formed by migrants. Built by pilgrims and settlers, 
colonists and slaves, Europeans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Africans, the US is the 
country which understands itself as a nation of migrants. Millions went to the United 
States in the past, trying to make a better life for themselves and their family whilst 
escaping from war, prosecution, draught, famine or political unrest, searching for 
freedom, democracy, economic opportunity, or religious liberty. Today, “more than 
99 percent of the current U.S. population can at least theoretically trace its ancestry 
back to people who came […] from somewhere else” (Spickard, 2007: 4). Migration, 
thus, lies at the very core of the identity of the United States, shaping its past, present, 
and future.  
This dissertation is therefore placed in the US context within the era of mass migration 
to the US (around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century). Connecting the migration 
settlement pattern generated in the 19th century to current levels of economic 
                                                     
1 We use the word ‘buzz’ here in analogy to the path-breaking work by M. Storper and A. Venables 
(2004) 
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development, I seek to ascertain whether historical migration to the US in its different 
forms and compositions still impacts economic development of US counties today. 
Understanding the economic effect of large migration waves on regions 20 to 130 
years after migrants first set foot on the new grounds will complement and advance 
the current body of research on the economics of migration and lead to improvements 
in our knowledge of how migration affects the long-term economic prospects of 
territories. “Ethnicity matters and it matters for a very long time” (Borjas, 1994: 572). 
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2 STRUCTURE  
 
The research is structured in 9 chapters. Chapter 3 and 4 lay out the foundations for 
the four main parts of the thesis. While chapter 3 provides a short review of the 
literature on the economic impact of migration in the receiving country, chapter 4 
summarises the historical background of immigration to the United States covering 
the Age of Mass Migration around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, as well as 
features of contemporary migration. The bulk of the empirical analysis is spread 
between chapters 5 and 8, covering different aspects of historical migration and its 
connection to long-term economic development. While chapter 5, 6, and 7 focus on 
different compositional elements of the migrant stock (diversity, gender, and distance 
travelled) and relate these to income per capita more than 100 years later, chapter 8 
seeks to find evidence supporting the potential transmission channels of path 
dependency assumed to preserve the impact of mass migration of the 19th century 
across time. 
Chapter 5, co-authored with Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, examines the economic impact 
of population diversity on US county wealth for a time frame covering 20 to 100 years. 
Both fractionalisation and polarisation indices are incorporated into the analysis to 
create a holistic measure of population diversity. Chapter 6 is a co-authored chapter 
together with Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Neil Lee. It focuses on the gender element 
of migration flows and examines the short- and long-term economic impact of female 
migration on US county prosperity. Chapter 7, focuses on internal migrants and 
concludes the sequence of chapters treating different characteristics of the migrant 
population. It connects US born domestic migrants to long-term economic 
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development and evaluates if the distance travelled by the migrant is crucial for the 
determination of the aggregate economic returns of internal migration across a time-
frame of more than a century. In the eighth chapter the focus shifts from the migrant 
stock composition to the validation of path dependency in migration flows. This 
chapter examines whether migrant waves from different backgrounds, origins and 
ethnicities, separated by several generations, settle in the same places thereby 
establishing a permanent separation between migration-prone and migration-averse 
areas. Chapter 9 concludes and provides policy implications. 
  
2.1 POPULATION DIVERSITY AND ITS LONG-TERM IMPACT 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
With growing migrant stocks and accelerating migrant flows around the globe, 
population diversity in territories attracting large numbers of migrants is increasing 
drastically. Formerly rather homogenous societies turn ‘multicultural’ in the space of 
a few years, being confronted with issues such as new language barriers, cultural and 
ethnic differences, or religious disparities. Transforming this diversity into economic 
activity has turned into a major task for national governments. Thus, population 
diversity and its link to economic development has become a prominent field in 
scientific research. Two opposing strands dominate the debate: On the one hand, 
diversity is regarded as central driver of innovation which in turn generates 
technological progress enhancing economic growth (i.e. Jacobs, 1961, 1969; Florida, 
2002; Saxenian, 2006; Özgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2012; Bove and Elia, 2017). On the 
other hand, diversity is regarded as destabilising factor within a society creating 
societal tensions leading to social unrest and conflict undermining economic growth 
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(i.e. Esteban and Ray, 1994, 2008; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Kemeny, 2012; Gören, 2014). Studies commonly 
refer to two measures of diversity: fractionalisation, placing the emphasis on the 
number of groups in a society, and polarisation, stressing the distance between them. 
The focus of these studies, however, has generally been short-term. We simply do not 
know if population diversity levels generated in historical times have an impact on 
economic outcomes over more than a 20-year time frame. Chapter 5 intends to fill this 
gap. 
Two research questions are evaluated: Firstly, we examine if initial population 
diversity – measured as fractionalisation and polarisation – generated during the Age 
of Mass Migration across US counties, matters for economic development in the long-
run. Secondly, we evaluate whether the influence of diversity on economic 
development has changed over time. Employing US census data from 1880, 1900, and 
1910, the settlement pattern of migrants across the counties of the 48 continental states 
is mapped, building county-level indices of both population fractionalisation and 
polarisation. Employing OLS as well as IV methods, we regress current economic 
development, proxied by income per capita in 2010 on county level, on past diversity 
levels generated around the turn of the 19th to 20th century. Factors which may have 
determined the attractiveness of a county to migrants at the time as well as those that 
can impact economic development today, are controlled for. 
The results of the analysis show that strong initial levels of fractionalisation, generated 
more than one hundred years ago, leave a highly significant and positive trace for 
economic development across time. Polarisation, on the other hand, is found to 
significantly deteriorate economic development. Hence, counties with a more 
pronounced population diversity more than one century ago are significantly richer 
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today, while counties which were strongly polarised during the Age of Mass Migration 
have endured persistent negative economic implications. Despite a significantly 
stronger impact on income levels over the short- rather than the long-term, the effect 
never fades away but remains measurable in terms of higher average income levels to 
this very day. 
 
2.2 A WOMAN’S TOUCH? FEMALE MIGRATION AND LONG-
TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous findings in chapter 5 on the long-term impact of population diversity trigger 
further questions related to the structure of the migrant stream and its connection to 
long-term economic development. Does the composition of the migrant stock in a 
county matter for the preservation of the short-term impact of inward migration over 
the long term? Previous studies have looked at only one of these compositional 
characteristics, namely national origin. They confirm that the nationality of the 
migrant is unrelated to variations in long-term economic outcomes (Rodríguez-Pose 
and von Berlepsch, 2015). The long-term effect of migration seems, thus, not be linked 
to the national origin composition of the migrant stock.  
A different compositional characteristic potentially determining the economic legacy 
of mass migration to the US is the migrants’ gender and the resulting gender balance 
within the county’s migrant stock. Do migrant women trigger a different economic 
impact over the long-term than migrants in general? Gender, usually regarded purely 
as control variable, has, in recent decades, moved more closely to the core of academic 
research. The economics of migration are no exception in this regard. Studies show 
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that individual characteristics, settlement patterns, the effect on sending countries, the 
integration into the destination’s labour market, or the reasons behind the migration 
decision distinctively differ from those of their male counterparts (i.e. Ravenstein, 
1889; Pessar, 1986; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Massey;, 2001; Pessar and Mahler, 
2003; Oishi, 2005; Andall, 2013). Due to a focus on the individual migrant, 
macroeconomic approaches on an aggregated level taking the gender component into 
consideration are rare to find. In the few cases where the economic development aspect 
of female migration was investigated, studies focused on the short-term impact rather 
than looking beyond a maximum 10-year timeframe (i.e. Blau, Kahn and Moriarty, 
2003; Smith and Bailey, 2006; Riaño and Baghdadi, 2007; Collins and Low, 2010). 
Chapter 6 seeks to make up for these two shortcomings by investigating the impact of 
female migration on US economic development over both the short-term as well as a 
timeframe of more than 100 years. 
Using US census data of 1880 and 1910, we map the settlement pattern of migrant 
women across the counties of the 48 continental US states and calculate female 
migrant concentration shares. We connect these to current levels of economic 
development, proxied by GDP per capita in 2010 at county level, while controlling for 
a multitude of factors which might have influenced both the economic attractiveness 
of the county at the time of migration as well as the economic development level today. 
In a second step, we examine the indirect effect of female migrants when analysing 
the first generation born on American soil and their imprint on long-term economic 
growth. Challenging the view of the migrant mother as ‘cultural carrier’ of the 
migrants’ ethnic and institutional baggage, we seek to ascertain if the long-term 
economic impact of children born to migrant mothers differs from those born to 
migrant fathers or two American-born parents. 
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The results of the analysis, conducted using both ordinary least squares and 
instrumental variable estimations, underline that a) while large shares of migrant 
women in a county’s population have led to significantly lower levels of economic 
development in US counties both in the short- and long-term, b) immigrant women 
have left a positive trace for local economic development via their children. Counties 
with a larger share of children born to migrant mothers have been more economically 
dynamic over the long term than those with a large share of children born to either 
foreign-born fathers or both American-born parents. 
 
2.3 INTERNAL MIGRATION AND ITS LONG-TERM IMPACT 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Migration around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century within the United States did 
not solely consist of international, that is foreign-born migrants, but also American-
born, domestic migrants. Internal migration within the US led to an even larger 
population redistribution phenomenon at the time than the foreign-born inflow from 
Europe. The analysis of the internal migrant and the distance covered between outset 
and destination lies at the heart of chapter 7, treating therefore yet another 
compositional characteristic of a county’s migrant stock. 
Even though the vast majority of global geographical mobility movements is located 
within and between regions of the country of birth, a large strand of literature argues 
internal migration to have received significantly less attention in scientific research 
than its international counterpart (Skeldon, 2006; Ellis, 2012; Bell et al., 2015). 
Studies evaluating the macroeconomic effect of internal migration are therefore few 
32 
 
and far between (White and Lindstrom, 2005). Moreover, the few contemporary 
studies delving into this link deliver inconsistent results (e.g. Yap, 1976; White and 
Lindstrom, 2005; Rodríguez Vignoli, 2008; Berker, 2011; Molloy, Smith and 
Wozniak, 2011; Kuhn, 2015).  
Two dimensions that may significantly shape the returns of internal migration have, 
in particular, been overlooked: time and geographical distance. While internal 
migration research has tended to put the emphasis on the short- to medium-term 
(thereby rarely covering more than two decades), geographical distance, and its effect 
on the economic impact of internal migration does not seem to be covered by the social 
science literature at all. If anything, distance was studied in the context of long distance 
migration drawing international comparisons across countries (i.e. Long, Tucker and 
Urton, 1988) or evaluating dynamics, characteristics of migrants and causes of 
migration (i.e. Biagi, Faggian and McCann, 2011; Pendakur and Young, 2013; 
Niedomysl and Fransson, 2014). 
This chapter intends to cover both of the aforementioned shortcomings in the literature 
by first, evaluating the effect of US internal migration on long-term economic 
development and second, examining whether the distance covered by American-born 
migrants of the late 19th and early 20th centuries matters for the long-term economic 
impact of domestic migration. Do large shares of internal migrants leave a long-lasting 
trace for economic development on the territory where they settle in large numbers? 
Are internal migrants from a faraway county economically more beneficial for long-
term economic development than those from next door? Does the distance travelled 
between outset and destination matter for the impact of internal migrants on 
subsequent local economic development? 
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These research questions are analysed using US Census data from 1880 and 1910. The 
individual data are allocated to the county of residence of the migrant and subsequently 
aggregated to retrieve internal migrant shares at county level. The settlement pattern 
of domestic migrants across the 48 continental states is then linked to the average 
distance travelled by a given county’s migrant stock and to current levels of county 
development proxied by per capita GDP at county level in 2010.  
Both ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimation techniques are 
employed in order to regress income per capita levels in 2010 on, firstly, the share of 
internal migrants and secondly, on the average distance travelled by the local migrant 
stock. Factors which significantly influenced a county’s prosperity, both at the time of 
migration as well as today, are controlled for. 
Internal migrants are found to have a highly significant, positive and long-lasting 
impact on economic development at county level over the very long time frame. 
Counties which received large numbers of internal migrants in historical times are 
significantly more prosperous today than those that were largely bypassed. 
Furthermore, distance is revealed as decisive element for the relevance of internal 
migration for long-term economic outcomes. The greater the average distance 
travelled by the migrant stock of a given county, the larger the influence on the long-
term economic development outcomes. 
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2.4 MIGRATION-PRONE AND MIGRATION-AVERSE PLACES: 
PATH DEPENDENCE IN LONG-TERM MIGRATION 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 show that historical migration in its different compositional 
dimensions leaves a long-lasting legacy for economic development which can still be 
traced more than 100 years later. The transmission mechanism assumed to be at work 
for transferring the positive impact of migration across decades is the territory itself, 
or to be more exact, the institutional constructs associated to past ‘migration buzz’ 
shocks. Chapter 8 seeks to find evidence supporting this potential transmission 
channel. Connecting recent to past migration stocks, it evaluates if both migrant waves 
have settled in the same places despite having different backgrounds, origins, 
traditions, and customs, and being separated in time by at least three to five 
generations. Thus, it seeks to prove the assumption of an institutional division, 
established over a century ago, into migration-prone and migration-averse areas.  
Scientific research has identified a multitude of regional factors as decisive for a 
migrant’s settlement decision. Next to regional characteristics such as employment 
opportunities, wages, social welfare spending, public goods endowment, the 
educational system, as well as urban and natural amenities (i.e. Ritsilä and 
Ovaskainen, 2001; Zimmermann, 2005; Rappaport, 2007; Partridge, 2010; Biagi, 
Faggian and McCann, 2011; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015), the existing stock 
of migrants is considered a crucial factor in determining the attractiveness of a region 
to incoming population (i.e. Daniels, 1990; Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 
1996; McGovern, 2007; Radu, 2008; Jewell and Molina, 2009; Bodvarsson, Simpson 
and Sparber, 2014). However, previous and newly arriving migrants have often been 
connected in the literature via kinship, ethnicity, common background, or friendship 
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which, in turn, has significantly determined not only the direction of the migrant 
stream, but also its volume. A crucial factor in reaping the benefits of these migrant 
networks was sharing a common origin. As 19th century migrants (mostly Europeans) 
and current US migrant stock (mostly Latinos)2 neither share a common background 
nor ethnicity, customs, or traditions, the current academic literature seems to 
contradict the assumption of path dependency across migration waves. 
Analysing US Census data from 1880, 1910 and 1960-2010, aggregated at the county 
level, I regress current Latino migrant stock on European migrant shares within a 
county’s population generated during the Age of Mass Migration. Controlling for 
push- and pull factors determining size and direction of past and current migration 
flows, I employ ordinary least squares, instrumental variable, and panel data 
estimation methods to ascertain if historical migration created a path-dependence 
determining the direction and size of current Latino population settlement patterns in 
the US.  
The results of the analysis, underline the importance for historical migration for 
location-decisions of future migrants. Counties which attracted a large number of 
European migrants at the end of the 19th century are more appealing to migrants from 
Latin America 90 to 130 years later. Despite fundamental differences in background, 
ethnicity, origin and a separation in time of three to five generations, historical 
migration stocks act as magnet for current foreign-born population serving as an 
influential pull factor increasing a county’s attractiveness. The results therefore 
provide evidence supporting the hypothesis of the presence of a mark transferred by 
historical migrants onto their receiving territories. Their legacy created a perpetuating 
                                                     
2 I am aware of debates regarding the use of the term Latinos vs the term Hispanics (Taylor et al., 2012). 
In this thesis, I follow Sáenz and Morales (2015) and use both as synonyms. They are employed to refer 
to the population originating from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America. 
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path dependency, permanently differentiating regions into migration-prone and 
migration-averse areas. A division which seems to persist for centuries even after the 
‘original’ migrants have long gone. 
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3 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION – A BRIEF 
SKETCH 
 
The rising number of migrants and their increased visibility has triggered a shift in the 
scientific research agenda, bringing the analysis of the economic implications of 
migration into the fore. A vast amount of scientific research has since been published 
focusing on a wide variety of topics ranging from the determinants of the migration 
decision or the individual characteristics of those likely to move, to the evaluation of 
the economic effect on the host and sending regions as well as the push- and pull 
factors determining a region’s attractiveness to migrants. Within the context of this 
work, I will be focusing primarily on the economic effects of migration on the host 
economy, that is, on the region receiving the migrant. In this field, a range of studies 
has emerged systematically assessing the implications of inward migration for 
economic growth. Research fields include, among others, the labour market (e.g. 
wages, jobs, employment), public finances (e.g. welfare services, social benefits), 
innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g. patents, innovation in products and processes, 
ethnic firms, competition), and population (e.g. diversity, gender). In general, 
immigration is confirmed as a growth-enhancing factor, generating substantial 
economic gains to the global economy in general, but particularly to the receiving 
country (Ortega and Peri, 2009; Clemens, 2011; Kennan, 2013; Di Giovanni, 
Levchenko and Ortega, 2015).   
Probably the largest concern for policy makers and therefore potentially one of the 
most controversially discussed research fields, is the impact of migration on local 
incomes in the host country and the effect on the overall income distribution. 
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Triggered by the often-held opinion that immigration may reduce the wealth of local 
inhabitants, research in this area focuses on both the actual effect on native incomes 
via altering the level of labour supply and the compositional effect related to the skill-
set of migrants changing the distribution of skills among a country’s residents 
(LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Borjas et al., 1997; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005, 2009; 
Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2005; Cohen-Goldner and Paserman, 2011; Glitz, 
2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2013). While some 
find evidence of a lowering of wages and an increase in wage inequality linked to 
migrant inflows (Card, 2001, 2009; Borjas, 2003), the big majority of studies confirms 
that despite altering the skill-composition on the local labour market, neither the wages 
of local citizens nor the wage distribution are significantly negatively affected by these 
supply shocks. Whenever a negative effect was found, they were regarded as almost 
negligible (i.e. Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot, 2005; Okkerse, 
2008). In fact, a significantly positive effect on the wages of local citizens has been 
detected when using aggregate production function approaches, meta-analytic 
analysis, or evaluating cross-region/industry datasets (Card, 2005; Özgen, Nijkamp 
and Poot, 2010; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2013).3  
Migration is also believed to increase both the labour supply of local women and of 
local high-skilled labour (Furtado and Hock, 2010; Cortés and Tessada, 2011). Hence, 
the impact of migrants on the local, native labour force is not considered negative. 
Migrants were found to displace native labour, if at all, only in the short-term (Glitz, 
2012; Cattaneo, Fiorio and Peri, 2015) and do not seem to be connected to negative 
effects on the unemployment or employment rates of native labour (Altonji and Card, 
1991; Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot, 2008). If anything, migrants often lead to local 
                                                     
3 For an encompassing overview on this relationship, please refer to Blau and Kahn (2015). 
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employment booms (Card, 1990; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Peri and Sparber, 2009). 
“Even those natives who should be the closest substitutes with immigrant labour have 
not been found to suffer significantly as a result of increased immigration” (Friedberg 
and Hunt, 1995: 42). Growing unemployment or a crowding-out effect of natives due 
to increased migrant numbers has been ruled out by Ortega and Peri (2009), whose 
results show that migration causes a rise in GDP, without decreasing labour 
productivity. 
Inward migration also affects public finances4. The migrants’ usage of welfare 
services and other social benefits is a controversially discussed field within political 
science as well as economic research as it is often used as justification for tighter 
restrictions on immigration. Depending on the country, the migrant age group, their 
gender, and skill-level analysed, conclusions vary greatly (i.e. Baker and Benjamin, 
1995; Hu, 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000; Crossley, McDonald and Worswick, 
2001; Büchel and Frick, 2005; Blume and Verner, 2007; Barrett and McCarthy, 2008; 
Pedersen, 2013). Long-term immigrants, for example, were confirmed as highly 
beneficial as their life-time tax payment greatly outbalances their public sector cost 
(i.e. Ablett, 1999; Bonin, Raffelhüschen and Walliser, 2000; Moscarola, 2003). Older, 
female, and short-term immigrants, however, were shown to be a slight fiscal burden 
to their receiving country (i.e. Hu, 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000; Sinn and 
Werding, 2001). Storesletten (2000, 2003) provides an aggregate calculation of the 
total fiscal burden of a model economy. The costs of immigration are estimated to 
slightly outweigh its benefits. Similar results are reported for the Netherlands 
(Roodenburg, Euwals and TerRele, 2003) and Germany (Sinn and Werding, 2001). 
                                                     
4 For an overview, see Kerr and Kerr (2011). 
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However, Rowthorn (2008) estimates the net fiscal impact (if positive or negative) to 
be no larger than 1 percent of the respective country’s GDP.  
Migrants arriving from diverse locations are depicted as an important input factor in 
the process of technological progress. Bringing their skillsets, ideas, experiences, and 
abilities to host regions, inward international migration is more and more regarded as 
knowledge-generating and -diffusing element, raising innovation at the regional level, 
and linking it directly to higher economic growth outcomes. Özgen et al. (2012) 
evaluate the innovativeness of the European receiving regions with respect to size, 
skills, and diversity of the regional migrant stock. More than the sheer size of the 
migrant inflow, they find especially the composition in skills and backgrounds to be 
the decisive element for innovation. Skilled immigrants can boost knowledge creation, 
efficiency levels, and, therefore, productivity (Hirschman and Mogford, 2009; Hunt 
and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). A more diverse migrant base is considered to spur new 
ideas and new technology, leading to innovation (Partridge and Furtan, 2008; Lee and 
Nathan, 2010; Özgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2012, 2013; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 
2016; Bove and Elia, 2017). Moreover, according to Jacobs (1961, 1969) and Florida 
(2002), diversity in the cultural composition of the population represents a fertile soil 
for new ideas, innovation, and economic growth. Further channels generating an effect 
of migration on innovation, summarized by Özgen et al. (2013), include the positive 
self-selection of migrants (being more risk-seeking, entrepreneurial and creative), 
their youthfulness (implying higher mobility, progressivity and creativity), their 
resilience (enhancing decision making) and their volume (allowing firm expansion, 
reducing shortages or vacancies of key personnel).  
Closely linked to innovation is the migrants’ impact on entrepreneurship. Since 
migrants are perceived as more risk-seeking and entrepreneurial than the native-born 
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population, they have been shown to start a large number of new companies boosting 
economic activity in their destination areas. This has been the case, among others, in 
the UK, the US or Australia. Migrant entrepreneurs in these countries have on average 
founded more firms than locals (i.e. Borjas, 1986; Lofstrom, 2002; Wadhwa et al., 
2007; Clark and Drinkwater, 2010; Fairlie, Zissimopoulos and Krashinsky, 2010). 
They are thus vital for both new job creation as well as for the emergence of business 
start-ups. They bring vibrancy, diversity, and economic dynamism, enriching the 
neighbourhoods and benefitting the local population (Sahin, Nijkamp and Rietdijk, 
2009; Audretsch, Dohse and Niebuhr, 2010). Various empirical analyses support these 
views characterising the migrants as “a highly motivated and qualified entrepreneurial 
group” (Brunow, Nijkamp and Poot, 2015: 1065) who substantially contribute to 
knowledge formation, technological progress, business income, and employment (see 
Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2015).   
A diverse compositional structure of the migrant inflow is not solely regarded as 
growth enhancing element. Diversity in the migrant composition can also be seen as a 
destabilising factor within a society enhancing the potential for polarisation in its 
population leading to social unrest and conflict. Migrant inflows can result, under 
certain circumstances, to the formation of cultural, religious, or language barriers. This 
can generate tension, communication problems, and lower trust, which, in turn, lead 
to decreasing productivity and lower efficiency (i.e. Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Özgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 
2013; Churchill and Smyth, 2017). 
Closely connected to migrant diversity is the gender composition of the migrant inflow 
– an aspect of the economic impact of migration on the host country which has been 
analysed to a far smaller extent than cultural or ethnic diversity. Past research has 
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shown that women migrants indeed differ from their male counterparts. Not only 
individual characteristics of those who decide to migrate differ along gender lines, the 
settlement patterns, the impact on sending regions as well as the effect on host labour 
markets was shown to be significantly different for both men and women (i.e. Pessar, 
1986; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Massey;, 2001; Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Oishi, 2005; 
Andall, 2013).  
Female migration may influence economic development in a number of (sometimes 
indirect) ways, such as increasing the country’s labour force (i.e. Lechman and Kaur, 
2015; Cuberes and Teignier, 2016), improving gender equality (i.e. Berik, Rodgers 
and Seguino, 2009; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009), or via the empowerment of women 
(i.e. Duflo, 2012). Nevertheless, we still know very little about the specific direct 
effects of large numbers of female migrants on regional growth in the receiving region. 
The few studies analysing the gender effects of migration reach diverging results: 
Some studies hint at a positive economic impact of a strong presence of women 
migrants in the labour force (see Blau, Kahn and Moriarty, 2003 for the case of the 
US) and highlight their contribution to entrepreneurial activity (see Collins and Low, 
2010 for the case of Australia). Others, however, have pointed in the opposite 
direction. Female migration has been linked to negative economic outcomes when 
evaluating gender gaps in the labour market participation of natives and foreign-born 
population in the UK (Smith and Bailey, 2006). Riaño and Baghdadi (2007) link a 
potential negative economic contribution of female migrants to a poorer assimilation 
into local labour markets than men and provide evidence of their underused economic 
potential. According to their findings, most female migrants, when entering the 
receiving country’s labour market, seem to end up in jobs well below their actual skill-
level.  
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Lastly, when evaluating the composition of migrant stocks and its impact on economic 
growth in the host region, scientific research strongly differentiates migrants 
according to their birthplaces. The biggest division of inward migration by origin is 
between external (foreign-born) and internal (native-born) migrants. Whether the 
migrant crosses an international border or not puts her/him in one category or the other. 
Both groups, however, have not attracted the same attention. The analysis of 
international migrants has dominated the social sciences – in fact all of the 
aforementioned studies focus on the economic impact of this specific group. Studies 
on the economic implications of internal migration are, by contrast, few and far 
between (Skeldon, 2006; Ellis, 2012; Bell et al., 2015). Thus, existing knowledge of 
the macroeconomic consequences of internal migration from one to another place 
within the boundaries of the same country are based on a handful of studies (White 
and Lindstrom, 2005). Some find that internal migration lifts incomes, fosters 
modernization, and decreases inequality, making it a growth-enhancing factor (e.g. 
Yap, 1976; Berker, 2011; Kuhn, 2015). Conversely, other research partly blames 
regional divergence, poverty rates, and declining quality and endowments of public 
goods on internal migration (i.e. Rodríguez Vignoli, 2008; Molloy, Smith and 
Wozniak, 2011). Some simply do not find any significant connection between internal 
migration and economic growth (i.e. White and Lindstrom, 2005).  
In short, over the last decades, migration and its implications for economic growth in 
the host or receiving territory has grown to a wide and intensively analysed field in 
economic research. There is certainly no shortage of studies explaining its implications 
for the local labour market, public finances, innovation or entrepreneurial activity. 
Many insights have also been put forward about the economic effects of different 
compositional structures of the migrant population, be it diversity, gender, or 
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geographical origin. It is important, however, to stress, once again, that the 
overwhelming majority of studies only take into account the short- or medium-run 
consequences of migration. Beyond a timeframe of a maximum of 25 years, we simply 
know nothing about what long-term economic imprint, if at all, may be associated to 
past migration. 
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4 MIGRATION TO THE US 
 
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The 
wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the nameless, tempest-tost to me, I 
lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 
        ~ Emma Lazarus, 1883 
These words, written by Emma Lazarus are engraved at the foot of the Statue of 
Liberty in the harbour of New York City. No words could better describe this decisive 
element of American identity – the United States as a nation founded and formed by 
immigrants. The contribution of migrants is implicitly reflected in the nations motto: 
‘e pluribus unum’ (= ‘from many to one’). Migration is thus at the very core of 
America’s values, shaping large parts of its history (Martin and Midgley, 1999).  
Since colonial times, the US has been the prime destination for people all over the 
world wanting to build a better future for themselves and their families, have a second 
chance, or simply live ‘the American dream’. Back in the 17th and 18th century, 
thousands of migrants of mostly European origin, largely from the British Isles, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, or Scandinavia, ventured across the Atlantic. 
Today it is millions of mostly Latin Americans and Asians who cross the border in 
search of a new, different, and better life. Since the day of the first settlements to the 
present, the US have always remained the number one destination of international 
migrant flows (Migration Policy Institute, 2015).  
The United States’ attractiveness to migrants is reflected in the sheer size of its 
foreign-born population. Over the past 160 years, the absolute number of US residents 
with a non-US birthplace increased from two to around 40 million in 2010 
transforming the country into a ‘nation of immigrants’ (see Figure 4-1). Two main 
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eras of immigration can be distinguished in US history: The century of mass migration 
to the US with a peak in immigration numbers around the turn of the 19th to the 20th 
century and contemporary migration starting from 1970 onwards. In both these periods 
of time, absolute migration numbers increased year on year, growth rates of the 
immigrant population reached unprecedented levels and the size of the foreign-born 
share of the total US population reached close to 15 percent. For these reasons, both 
of these eras will be in the focus of this work. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-1 US MIGRANT POPULATION (ABSOLUTE AND SHARE OF TOTAL 
POPULATION), 1850-2010 
Source: Migration Policy Institute (2017) 
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4.1 THE AGE OF MASS MIGRATION TO THE US 
 
In colonial times – comprising the period between the beginning of the European 
settlement on the American continent around 1600 and the declaration of 
independence in 1776 – only a comparatively small absolute number of migrants made 
their way across the Atlantic Ocean.  Starting from 1820 onwards, the “century of 
immigration” (Daniels, 1990: 117) began. In times of revolutionary movements, 
religious persecution, war, famine, draught, and overpopulation on the European 
continent, millions of people left their homes in search for a better life elsewhere. 
Leaving behind low living standards, low wages, and huge competition for work, they 
hoped for economic opportunity as well as for religious and political freedom in the 
US (Hatton and Williamson, 1994; Alexander, 2007).  
Between 1850 and WWI alone, more than 40 million people from Europe moved to 
the ‘new world’, 60 percent of whom settled in the US (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2006). 
Table 4-1 displays the entry figures of immigrants on a decade-by-decade basis from 
1820 to 1924. Entry figures accelerated quickly from the beginning of the century until 
1841 and remained in the millions thereafter. Two peaks can be detected: 1881-1890 
and 1901-1910. Each of these eras marks a height of the two main migration waves 
during that period.
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TABLE 4-1 MIGRATION TO THE US, 1820-1924 
Decade 
Number of immigrants 
entering the US 
Number of Immigrants 
per thousand population 
1820-30 151.824 1,2 
1831-40 599.125 3,9 
1841-50 1.713.251 8,4 
1851-60 2.598.214 9,3 
1861-70 2.314.824 6,4 
1871-80 2.812.191 6,2 
1881-90 5.246.613 9,2 
1891-1900 3.687.564 5,3 
1901-10 8.795.386 10,4 
1911-20 5.735.811 5,7 
1921-24 2.344.599 5,3 
Total 35.999.402   
Source: Daniels (1990) 
 
The first wave of migrants, often referred to as “the pioneers of the century of 
immigration” (Daniels, 1990: 121) is dated between the pre-Civil War years and 1890. 
During these decades, main source countries of incoming migrants were in North-
Western Europe (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Scandinavia, or the German states) 
(Hatton and Williamson, 1994). 85 percent of the foreign-born population listed in the 
US Census of 1870, stated these countries as their places of origin (Alexander, 2007). 
Immigrants from the Mediterranean as well as territories within former Austria-
Hungary, Poland, and Russia dominated the second wave between 1890 and 1920. 
Rising economic development levels in combination with decelerating population 
growth in North-West Europe had altered incentive structures resulting in lower 
emigration rates from these regions. The South and East of Europe, however, now 
experienced the “disruptive impact of industrialization on rural societies, which had 
afflicted North-Western Europe earlier in the century” (Ward, 1990: 308). Thus, 
shortly before the turn of the century in 1896, Italians, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and 
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Portuguese already outnumbered first-wave migrants (Rodríguez-Pose and von 
Berlepsch, 2015).5 By 1924, the share of second-wave migrants had reached nearly 80 
percent of the total migrant inflow (Ward, 1990).  
Migrants from Europe usually entered the US via the ports of the East coast.6 New 
York – and, in particular, Ellis Island – was by far the most common entry point for 
both waves of migration. Other coastal cities also became major gateways for 
incoming population. Baltimore (especially for German migrants), Boston (dominated 
by the Irish), Philadelphia (used by British, Germans, Poles, and Russians), or New 
Orleans (mainly Italians and Greeks) served as important entry sites (Alexander, 
2007). After setting foot on US soil and having successfully passed through 
immigration processes, migrants either stayed in the port cities or moved farther 
inland. Main means of transportation were the railroad, waterways, carriages or, for 
the large poor parts of the population, their own feet. Migrants would travel hundreds 
of kilometres to join their families or relatives who had previously migrated and had 
already made a life for themselves. A distinct settlement pattern evolved. Figure 4-2 
displays the migrants’ settlement across the 48 continental states at the peak of the 
first wave of migration in 1880.  
                                                     
5 Already during these years, migration from Latin America and Asia had commenced, settling 
predominantly in the west and southwest of the country. As both of these migrant streams taken together 
did not surpass 10 percent of total migration during these times (Ward, 1990), I refrain from discussing 
these population flows in this section.  
6 Asian and Latin American migrants disembarked at western ports (such as San Francisco) or entered 
the country via the southern border with Mexico (Alexander, 2007). 
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FIGURE 4-2 MIGRANT STOCK BY COUNTY, 1880 
   Source: Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) 
 
Migrants settled predominantly in the North and West of the country (Figure 4-2). 
Large groups remained close to their ports of entry and settled in New York, New 
Jersey, and other parts of New England. Others followed old migrant routes farther 
inland. Foreign-born population flocked to the Great Lake states, such as Michigan, 
Illinois, or Wisconsin, or put down roots in rural counties in Iowa, Minnesota, and the 
Dakotas. Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska were also popular destinations, as was the 
case of the mountain states farther to the West, including Montana, Idaho, Colorado 
or Utah and of south-western states, such as Arizona, Nevada, and parts of California. 
The Old South, by contrast, remained almost untouched by the foreign-born 
population. With the exception of the southern tip of Florida and parts of Texas, the 
South with its “commercial agricultural system largely based upon the intensive use 
Migrant stock (1880) 
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of black labour and a decidedly slow rate of industrialization offered few attractions 
to foreign immigrants” (Ward, 1990: 301).  
The big majority of the first wave migrant groups settled in rural areas. Early German 
migrants, for example, wanted to toil the land and clustered in rural areas of New York, 
the Great Lakes, and the Midwest, where land was still available at the time. Swedes, 
Danes, and Norwegians had similar aspirations and colonised the upper wheat belt – 
Minnesota, the Dakotas, Wisconsin and Nebraska. The Irish, by contrast, 
predominantly stayed in the port cities where they had previously arrived. More than 
20 percent of the urban population in New England, New Jersey, and New York state 
declared Irish roots at the time (Daniels, 1990; Ward, 1990; Rodríguez-Pose and von 
Berlepsch, 2015). 
The settlement pattern associated with the second wave of migration reproduces, to a 
large extent, the map of 1880 (Figure 4-3). Once again, the main destination states 
were in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, around the Great Lakes, the northern Mid-
West, Mountain, and Western states. With the exceptions of Texas and the southern 
tip of Florida, Southern states, yet again, remained out of bounds for incoming 
migrants. Despite different national origins, the second wave thus followed in the 
footsteps of previous migrants, using established migrant routes.  
However, differences in the settlement pattern between first and second wave can be 
detected on a more granular level. Migrant groups from Southern and Eastern 
European countries tended to settle in more highly urbanized areas than northern 
Europeans did decades earlier. 88 percent of all second-wave migrants at the time lived 
in cities rather than in the countryside (Daniels, 1990). New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and Providence had massive Italian communities. The Greeks stayed in 
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the cities of New England and in areas surrounding Chicago, while the Portuguese and 
Spaniards settled in urban areas of California and Nevada. The majority of Poles and 
Russians tended to move to cities in the rust belt such as Chicago, Pittsburgh, or 
Buffalo, while significant eastern European communities also concentrated in rural 
areas of the Midwest, Texas, Iowa, and the Great Lakes regions (Rodríguez-Pose and 
von Berlepsch, 2015). 
 
 
FIGURE 4-3 MIGRANT STOCK BY COUNTY, 1910 
   Source: Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) 
 
The typical European migrant around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century was, 
independent of nationality, a young male adult (see for example Fitzpatrick, 1984 for 
an analysis of the Irish; Bodnar, 1992 for Swedish migrants). Alexander (2007) reports 
that 80 percent of the foreign-born population was between fourteen and forty-four, 
Migrant stock (1910) 
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with a majority in their twenties and thirties. Families and married men travelling on 
their own made up only small parts of the migrant streams at the time. The large bulk 
of newcomers were single men. On average, only one in three immigrants entering the 
US during these decades was a woman, although a gradually shifting gender balance 
across time can be observed. Around the turn of the century, roughly 30 percent of 
European migrants were female. By 1915 the share of women had increased to almost 
43 percent. Despite the changing gender pattern over time, the ratio of male to female 
incoming migrants highly depended on the source country. Men clearly dominated the 
migrant contingents from Italy, Greece, Croatia, Poland, and other Eastern European 
countries. More than 70 percent of these migrant groups were men. Irish and Swedish 
entrants were more gender-balanced and oftentimes dominated by female migrants. 
There were more women than men entering the US in 13 years between 1880 and 
1920, in the case of Irish migrants, and in two years, in the case of Swedish migrants 
(Alexander, 2007).  
Generally, outward migration from Europe affected every profession and all classes 
of people. However, concentration was highest in the middle and lower-middle ranks 
of society (Baines, 1994). The large majority of migrants was unskilled, showing – if 
at all – only rudiments of an education. Migrants were also generally unfamiliar with 
the English language apart from those originating from the British Isles (Daniels, 
1990). Hard physical work as common labourers or servants in the cities, as 
agricultural hands on the fields or as workers in the factories became their day to day, 
placing them at the bottom of the economic structure. Some immigrant groups, 
however, brought substantial skills and therefore managed to quickly make their way 
up the social ladder. Skilled labourers were much more common among the north-
western Europeans (especially the Germans and Swedes) than among the south-
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eastern groups. Many northern and western Europeans ended up working in skilled 
trades, including large numbers of bakers, butchers, distillers, machinists, technicians, 
tailors, or carpenters (Daniels, 1990). The English in particular did not only have 
usually higher skill levels than the average migrant, but spoke the language, knew 
local institutions, and were accustomed to the system, paving their way towards the 
higher ranks of society (Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson, 2014).  
An overwhelming majority of migrants originated from the rural and proto-industrial 
hinterlands of Europe (Kamphoefner, 1976). In rural regions of Ireland, Sweden, 
Poland, or Germany, for example, high birth rates coupled with crop failures, 
exhaustion of the soil and, in many cases, a system of partible inheritance, created a 
young generation of landless farm labourers who were forced to seek employment 
elsewhere (Fitzpatrick, 1984; Guinnane, 1992; Hatton and Williamson, 1993). In 
southern Europe, industrialisation hit later, causing regional divergence and out-
migration. In Italy, for example, the north had started to industrialise undergoing a 
wave of mechanisation of its agricultural sector. Rising productivity levels in the North 
aggravated competition for the premodern peasant agriculture of the southernmost 
provinces. Coupled with taxation policies favouring the industrial north, the south fell 
further behind and masses of Southern Italians steered their fate towards the Americas 
(Spickard, 2007). 
Many followed in the footsteps of predecessors such as family, friends, or 
acquaintances from back home who had previously undertaken the journey and were 
already settled in the US. Oftentimes, pre-paid tickets were purchased by relatives and 
sent home for the next of kin to join them in the ‘new world’. Once arrived, newcomers 
followed their country folk relying heavily on their assistance in the housing and job 
search as well as the assimilation process in the new community (Hatton and 
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Williamson, 1994). This path-dependence in migrant settlement coupled with a 
consistent migrant inflow across decades ensured the creation of significant migrant 
communities across the United States often originating from similar ethnic, national 
or even local origins (Vedder and Gallaway, 1972; Levy and Wadycki, 1973; Dunlevy 
and Gemery, 1977; Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2015). “Regardless of when 
and where they entered the country, most people knew exactly where they were going 
and most were headed for locales where kith and kin already lived and worked” 
(Alexander, 2007: 28). As a result, between autumn 1907 and summer 1910, for 
example, nearly 94% of all those arriving at US ports claimed to join either family or 
friends (Alexander, 2007). 
In these ethnic or national enclaves across the country, migrants often rebuilt the 
societal structures they were familiar with back home (Ward, 1990). Bringing their 
institutional baggage in the form of culture, traditions, and customs along with them, 
migrants “reconstitute[d] entire communities with their institutions and associations 
[…], kinship networks, religious organizations, pressure groups, political organs, […] 
ethnic press, ethnic banks and businesses” (Joly, 2000: 33). Migrants “came not to 
establish something new but to re-establish something old” (Daniels, 1990: 146). 
Thus, a heavy inflow of Germans in Wisconsin led to the creation of German 
newspapers, schools, breweries, and traditional music clubs; New York and New 
Jersey turned into southern Italian cities nearly over night, and Boston became the 
stronghold of Irish catholic communities (Daniels, 1990). 
Ever growing masses of migrants arriving predominantly in the ports of the east coast 
provoked not only the rise of population density in eastern states, but went hand in 
hand with shortages in employment and housing, increasing crime rates, and 
deteriorating economic prospects for residents (Merk, 1978). These developments 
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pushed not only the settlement of the foreign-born population further inland but 
triggered mass-movements of the native-born7. News of discoveries of mineral 
resources, vast amounts of animal stock, cheap land prices, highly fertile soils, and 
gentler climates out west further incentivised large parts of the domestic population 
all across the country to pack up their belongings and seek their fortunes elsewhere. 
In search to raise their economic opportunities, acquire cheap, good-quality land, and 
earn higher wages in better jobs, Americans “from worn-out lands in the East [were 
drawn to] virgin lands in the West” (Merk, 1978: 229). The rapid redistribution of the 
domestic population transformed vast amounts of US territory. Wheat-farmers and 
corn-producers settled predominantly in the Mid-west turning it into the ‘corn-
kingdom’ and ‘bread-basket’ of the US. Pork and cattle breeders settled in the southern 
plains, similarly to wool producers and meat packers. The mountain states attracted 
cattle farmers, trappers, hunters, and fur traders. Californian ports appealed to 
tradesmen, while the soil and climate of the state lured lumber and wool industries. In 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries almost two thirds of the male US-born population 
above the age of 30 had crossed county- or state lines in order to build a better life 
away from their birthplace (Ferrie, 2005). By 1880, more than 30 percent of the entire 
US population lived outside their state of origin (Ruggles et al., 2015, own 
calculations).  
Figure 4-4 displays the settlement pattern of domestic migrants across the continental 
US territory, measured as share of a given county’s total American-born population – 
(a) displays 1880, b) displays 1910. The drive to the West is clear: the lowest numbers 
of internal migrants were found mainly in the original thirteen states, with migrant 
                                                     
7 The term native-born refers here to individuals born on American soil, not to the tribes of native 
populations.  
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shares rising along with distance to the Atlantic coast line. In 1880 (Figure 4-4a), more 
than 55% of the native-born migrants concentrated in states of the Mid-West and 
western Mountain regions.  
In 1910 (Figure 4-4b), the drift towards the West becomes even more pronounced. 
The territory east of the Mississippi River hosted few internal migrants. The regions 
to the west of the river, however, displayed high shares within their population 
compositions. The average internal migrant in 19th century America often undertook 
multiple short distance moves from one state to the next, rarely staying in one location 
for long. The probability of an additional move increased manifold, once the 
uncertainty of the few first ones had been successfully mastered. In 1870 Trempleau 
County, Wisconsin, for instance, 68% of all farmers recorded in 1860 had left; 10 
years later, only less than 20% remained (Atack, Bateman and Parker, 2000). This 
population movement is confirmed in Figure 4-4, which depicts the settlement pattern 
of internal migrants in both years. The “American population was a restless one, 
continually uprooting and moving to a new location […] ‘every day was moving day’” 
(Atack, Jeremy and Passell, 1994: 237). 
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FIGURE 4-4 AMERICAN-BORN INTERNAL MIGRANTS BY COUNTY, 1880 AND 1910  
(% OF TOTAL AMERICAN-BORN POPULATION) 
Source: Ruggles et al., (2015), own elaboration 
 
a) 
b) 
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Both trends – the mobility of American-born US residents and the consistently high 
numbers of international migrants arriving in US ports – produced considerable 
changes in the local population composition across most US counties. Only the states 
of the ‘Old South’ remained an exception to this rule. Some areas were mainly settled 
by migrants of a particular national origin. The ‘German Triangle’ for example, 
between Saint Louis, Cincinnati, and Milwaukee evolved from having an almost 
entirely American-born population to an absolute majority of German-born residents 
in the space of just a few years. A similar situation could be found for areas in 
Minnesota, where nearly one fifth of all Swedish migrants settled forming “a nation 
within a nation” (Daniels, 1990: 173). Swedish schools, newspapers and community 
centres were built, giving the region a distinctively Swedish character. Parts of Iowa, 
turned Norwegian establishing ethnic press as the Decorah-Posten with more than 
forty thousand subscribers at the time. However, many counties in the US attracted a 
large variety of different nationalities as well as American-born population from all 
over the country. New York City, for example, lured a multitude of different 
nationalities from all over Europe, including Scandinavians, French, Germans, Irish, 
Italians, Hungarians, Russians, and Greeks. With the largest minorities even 
establishing ethnic neighbourhoods such as Kleindeutschland (little Germany) or 
Little Italy, New York City – as other major cities like Chicago, Boston, New Orleans, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, or Baltimore – became a hub of population diversity 
(Daniels, 1990; Spickard, 2007). 
Figure 4-5 displays the level of population diversity at county level across the 48 
continental US states for the peaks of the two waves of migration, 1880 (a) and 1910 
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(b) respectively.8 Despite lower diversity levels in large parts of the Midwest in 1910, 
the situation in both years is similar: Apart from New Mexico, parts of Utah, and 
Texas, high diversity levels dominate especially the west of the country. Long-
established routes of migration in combination with the shift of the Western border 
resulted in high levels of population redistribution across the US. The East, in 
comparison, had a far greater population homogeneity, with the exception of the urban 
centres in the north and Florida in the south. While counties along the shores of the 
Great Lakes or within the corn and wheat belt were largely dominated by only very 
few population groupings, urban areas, such as New York City, Boston or Miami, 
were vibrant and buzzing migrant concentrations, attracting a large variety of 
nationalities. The states of the ‘Old South’, as expected, had the lowest diversity levels.  
                                                     
8 In order to depict diversity, a widely-used fractionalisation index (Alesina et al., 2003) is employed, 
placing the focus on the number of groups in one county. The higher the index, the higher the 
fractionalisation, or diversity, within the population of the respective county. 
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FIGURE 4-5 POPULATION DIVERSITY BY COUNTY, 1880 AND 19109 
Source: Ruggles et al., (2015), own elaboration 
                                                     
9 The calculation of the fractionalisation index will be explained in detail in section 5.4. 
a) 
b) 
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With increasing migrant numbers and population diversity in the US, public opinion 
towards immigration started to shift. The laissez-faire policy towards immigration of 
the first century after independence had allowed nearly all migrants, regardless of 
nationality to enter the country and roam freely in search of a place to settle down. 
However, towards the end of the 19th century, voices of fear and concern started to 
break out among the American population (Carter and Sutch, 2006). While 
Scandinavians, Germans, Irish, and other western Europeans of the first wave 
seemingly ‘blended in’ with the white population of British, Welsh, and Scottish 
origin, “now there came multitudes of men of lowest class from the south of Italy and 
men of the meanest sort out of Hungary and Poland, men out of the ranks where there 
was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence; and they came in 
numbers which increased from year to year, as if the countries of the south of Europe 
were disburdening themselves of the more sordid and hapless elements of their 
population” (Wilson, 1901). Greater diversity and, specifically, being seen as different 
from the ‘pioneers of the century of immigration’ became problematic.  
The first to suffer from racial prejudice and economic concerns by – in this case – the 
predominantly white working-class population were the Chinese. In 1882, Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which became “the hinge on which American 
immigration policy turned” (Daniels, 1990: 271). It was the first immigration law 
passed by congress excluding a single ethnic group from immigration to the US, 
thereby actively regulating immigration. 
Further concerns about the standard of living of American workers in combination 
with theories postulating superior innate characteristics associated with Anglo-Saxon 
and Nordic peoples (largely proclaimed by interest groups such as the Immigration 
Restriction League) led to growing support of further restrictions to the immigration 
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flow. The first significant general restriction was passed in 1917, when a literacy test 
for all immigrants arriving on the shores of the US was declared mandatory. Targeted 
to limit migrant numbers from especially the Southern and Eastern parts of Europe, 
this law was ultimately designed to hand-pick those who arrived and select based on 
skill-levels (Daniels, 1990). 
The final closure of the doors to US immigration came into effect in 1924, when a 
quota system based on the National Origin Formula was introduced. A maximum 
quota was set for each sending country equivalent to 2 percent of the country’s 
population living in the US at the time of the 1890 census (Snyderman and Herrnstein, 
1983; Daniels, 1990). With the goal of proactively lowering immigration numbers 
while simultaneously “preserving racial homogeneity” (Snyderman and Herrnstein, 
1983: 993), this law effectively restricted immigration by Southern and Eastern 
Europeans, while de facto banning immigration from other parts of the world. With 
the Immigration Act of 1924, the century of immigration had come to an end. The 
formerly wide open doors were now firmly shut. 
 
4.2 CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION - THE LATINOS’ CASE 
 
The Great Depression and World War II in combination with the restrictive 
immigration legislation of the 1920s resulted in a significant drop of annual 
immigration numbers to the US. It was not until the 1950s when immigration picked 
up speed again. This time however, migration came from ‘new world’ destinations, to 
a large extent incentivised by the recruitment of guest workers which had already 
started during war times (Daniels, 1990).  
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With the US intervention in WWII, thousands of men headed off to Europe, leaving 
women to join the labour force, filling in for their husbands, brothers, uncles, or 
cousins. However, labour shortages, especially in the agricultural sector, were so 
extreme that business leaders mounted efforts to recruit guest workers from elsewhere. 
Mexico became the main country for additional labour supply. In 1942, for example, 
the Bracero Program was launched, allowing US employers to hire Mexican labourers 
to work in the US for a designated time, at a fixed minimum wage and decent living 
conditions (Sáenz and Morales, 2015). Over the program’s 22 years of existence, more 
than 5 million Mexicans received employment contracts in more than 20 US states 
(Calavita, 1992; Spickard, 2007). By 1960, around 30 percent of the seasonal 
agricultural workers in the US were Mexican braceros (Daniels, 1990). 
Simultaneously, the number of Mexican immigrants receiving permanent resident 
status increased. The more information on the US way of life, wages, employment, 
and economic conditions braceros brought home, the more individuals felt the urge to 
move north of the Mexican border. While “nearly 60.000 came in the 1940s, almost 
275.000 in the 1950s, more than 440.000 in the 1960s and almost 640.000 [entered the 
United States as resident aliens with permanent status] in the 1970s” (Daniels, 1990: 
311). Unintentionally, the programme also attracted large numbers of illegal or 
‘undocumented’ immigrants during its lifetime, enlarging the Latino, and especially 
Mexican, community in the US (Gann, 1986).  
Further guest workers, albeit recruited to a far smaller extent than their Mexican 
counterparts, were Filipinos and Puerto Ricans. Working predominantly in agriculture 
in the East and Midwest or filling positions in the factories or service industry in large 
cities, the share of population from these ‘new world’ countries increased significantly 
(Spickard, 2007).  
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However, it was not until the 1960s that annual immigration numbers to the US grew 
exponentially. The trigger for this mass movement of Latinos and, to a lesser extent, 
Asians was a change in the immigration legislature. In 1965, the implementation of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act abolished the national quota system of the 1920s 
putting an end to favouritism of northern and western Europeans and repealed limits 
and entry barriers for other nationalities (e.g. southern, eastern Europeans and Asians). 
A complex regulatory system replaced the old restrictions, setting upper ceilings for 
immigration numbers to “170.000 for eastern hemisphere with a maximum of 20.000 
for a given country […] and 120.000 for western hemisphere with no limit imposed 
on any country” (Sáenz and Morales, 2015: 37). Three groups, however, were exempt 
from these restrictions and given preferential entry to the country: (1) Foreigners who 
had immediate relatives in the US, (2) refugees and (3) individuals who had special 
skills and were needed to fill essential job vacancies (Martin and Midgley, 1999). 
Neither Asians nor Latinos, were believed to benefit greatly from this policy, primarily 
intended to boost immigration numbers from western economies. Mexican 
immigration was thought to be subject to the cap for the western hemisphere and 
Asians did not constitute large parts of the population at the time (Sáenz and Morales, 
2015). Yet, what was intended as accelerator of European immigration, turned out, 
rather unexpectedly, to change the entire composition of the US immigrant 
community.  
While historically Europeans had been the largest group arriving in the US, after 1965, 
the main sending regions shifted to Asia and especially to Latin America (Martin and 
Midgley, 1999). The newly implemented policy’s focus on family reunifications 
benefited Mexicans with permanent residence in the US. Political unrest after Castro’s 
revolution or the Mariel Crisis, granted Cubans refugee status which allowed 
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preferential entry. By 1980, almost 10 percent of Cuba’s total population lived in the 
US (Gann, 1986; Bergad and Klein, 2010). Asians entered either as skilled workers 
or, in the case of the Vietnamese, Cambodians, or Lao, as refugees from the Vietnam 
war (Sáenz and Morales, 2015).  
Figure 4-6 displays the shift in major sending regions covering more than a century of 
US immigration history. While the first two columns portray the Age of Mass 
Migration with its two peaks in 1880 (first-wave) and 1910 (second-wave), the latter 
two highlight the changing demographic makeup of the immigrant population in the 
second half of the 20th century. As expected, Europeans constituted around 80 to 90 
percent of individuals obtaining permanent resident status in the US in historical times. 
Incoming population from Latin America, Asia, Africa, Oceania, or other North 
American regions represented mere minorities within the stock of immigrants at the 
time. By 2000, however, the European share of migrants had decreased drastically 
making room for two ‘new’ major sending regions: Asia and, fundamentally, Latin 
America. Today, migrants from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South 
America make up more than 50 percent of all individuals who have been granted 
permanent residence in the US. Despite a significant growth of Asian immigration 
over time, the analysis in this dissertation will focus solely on the foreign-born 
communities from Latin America, the largest sending region for US immigration. 
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FIGURE 4-6 PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, 1880-1999  
 Source: United States, Department of Homeland Security (2011), own elaboration 
 
The Latinos arriving in the US were by no means a homogenous mass. Table 4-2 
displays their composition at two different points in time.10 In the 1960s, the large 
majority immigrated from Mexico, while further sizable groups originated from Cuba, 
Puerto Rico,11 Columbia, and the Dominican Republic. While all sought economic 
opportunity and a better quality of life in the US, the reasons to leave their home 
countries varied by nationality. Cuban migration surged in the aftermath of the Cuban 
revolution (Massey, 2008). Puerto Ricans escaped overpopulation and mass 
unemployment, following the transition from a monocultural plantation economy to a 
                                                     
10 Table 4-2 only captures the official extent of legal immigration. Undocumented migrants to the US 
are not included in these numbers, even though they became increasingly relevant from the 1960s 
onwards. 
11 The Puerto Ricans are not shown in Table 4-2, as they are considered American-born since the Jones-
Shafroth Act of 1917 (Bergad and Klein, 2010). 
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focus on manufacturing and exports. Political violence and rural unrest gave 
Colombians reason to leave their home country in the 1950s and 1960s. Later, 
widespread unemployment due to rapid industrialisation and the mechanisation of 
agriculture grew into main engines of Colombian immigration to the US. Political 
turmoil in the 1950s and 1960s was the main factor behind emigration from the 
Dominican Republic. In the 1980s, the reasons for Dominicans to leave their home 
country shifted due to the disastrous economic conditions following the fall in the 
price of their main export goods, sugar and rum (Gann, 1986).  
Over time, other Latin American countries turned into additional significant sources 
of immigrants. By 2000, Central and South America represented around 40 percent of 
the Latin American immigrant community in the US. Peruvians, Salvadorians, 
Hondurans, Ecuadorians, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans created sizeable 
communities in the US, as did immigrants from other Caribbean countries (especially 
Haiti and Jamaica). “Social problems connected with civil liberty and land” (Gann, 
1986: 118), but also internal dissensions and ultimately guerrilla wars led to massive 
outmigration of these countries. Mexicans, however, kept their overwhelming 
dominance over incoming migrant flows and have remained the largest Latino 
community across the US since. 
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TABLE 4-2 LATIN AMERICANS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, 
1960-69, 2000-09 
 BY COUNTRY OF LAST RESIDENCE 
Region and country of last residence 
1960 to 1969 2000 to 2009 
Total number Share Total number Share 
Latin America 1.241.044 100% 4.205.877 100% 
Mexico 441.824 36% 1.704.166 41% 
Caribbean 427.235 34% 1.053.969 25% 
Cuba  202.030 16% 271.742 6% 
Dominican Republic  83.552 7% 291.492 7% 
Haiti  28.992 2% 203.827 5% 
Jamaica 62.218 5% 172.523 4% 
Other Caribbean 50.443 4% 114.385 3% 
Central America 98.560 8% 591.130 14% 
Belize  4.185 0% 9.682 0% 
Costa Rica  17.975 1% 21.571 1% 
El Salvador  14.405 1% 251.237 6% 
Guatemala  14.357 1% 156.992 4% 
Honduras  15.078 1% 63.513 2% 
Nicaragua  10.383 1% 70.015 2% 
Panama 1 22.177 2% 18.120 0% 
Other Central America - - - - 
South America 250.754 20% 856.593 20% 
Argentina  49.384 4% 47.955 1% 
Bolivia  6.205 0% 21.921 1% 
Brazil  29.238 2% 115.404 3% 
Chile  12.384 1% 19.792 0% 
Colombia  68.371 6% 236.570 6% 
Ecuador  34.107 3% 107.977 3% 
Guyana  4.546 0% 70.373 2% 
Paraguay  1.249 0% 4.623 0% 
Peru  19.783 2% 137.614 3% 
Suriname  612 0% 2.363 0% 
Uruguay  4.089 0% 9.827 0% 
Venezuela  20.758 2% 82.087 2% 
Other South America  28 0% 87 0% 
Other America 22.671 2% 19 0% 
Data source: United States, Department of Homeland Security (2011) 
 
Despite this heterogeneity in nationalities, Latin American immigrants clustered in 
just a few distinctive areas of the US. Figure 4-7 displays the settlement pattern of 
Latin-American-born population across the 48 continental states. Figure 4-7 a), 
represents the Latino stock in 1980, while Figure 4-7 b), displays Latino settlement in 
2010.  
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a)  
 
 
b) 
 
FIGURE 4-7 LATINO FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 
1980 AND 2010 
Data source: Minnesota Population Center (2016); own elaboration 
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Latinos usually entered the US either via Florida or the border with Mexico. Prior to 
2000, the vast majority concentrated in the Western and Southwestern states, such as 
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Further clusters of Hispanics included 
Florida, New York, but also parts of Illinois, Nevada, Washington, and Idaho. In 1980, 
over half of the entire Latino population resided in Texas and California alone. 
Another 17 percent lived in New York (primarily Puerto Ricans) and Florida 
(especially Cubans) (Bergad and Klein, 2010). Thirty years later, the large majority of 
Hispanics still lived in this handful of states, however, the overall settlement pattern 
had evolved.  
Apart from traditional Latino destinations such as Texas, Florida, California, New 
York, and Illinois, Figure 4-7 unveils the presence of large Latino communities in so-
called ‘new-destination states’ such as Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, or the Midwest, 
including Oklahoma and Kansas, in 2010. Similarly, states such as Georgia, Virginia, 
or North Carolina – which had traditionally been avoided by international immigrants 
– start attracting a significant number of Latinos (Bailey, 2005; Bump, 2005; Hansen, 
2005). This change in settlement pattern was largely a result of changes in industry 
structure, amendments to immigration as well as border policies and alterations in the 
geography of the labour demand. The combination of all three factors incentivised 
Latinos to establish themselves in regions beyond their traditional settlement pattern 
(Donato et al., 2008). Thus, while in the 1960s through to the 1990s, growing Hispanic 
communities were regionally concentrated in only a handful of states, shortly after the 
turn of the century, Latin Americans turned “from a regional to a national 
phenomenon” (Massey and Capoferro, 2008: 47), spreading out across the entire US 
territory. The areas of the Midwest and South, for example, suddenly attracted masses 
of Southern and Central Americans. This was predominantly due to the strategic 
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decision of the meat and poultry industries to vertically integrate, deskill and move 
production facilities from urban into rural areas. Attracted by tax incentives, 
exemptions from restrictive business policies and lucrative environments, the industry 
started recruiting especially Latino migrants who were willing to take the low-paying 
positions with limited benefits and sometimes even dangerous working conditions the 
local population refused to fill (Kandel and Parrado, 2005; Zúñiga and Hernández-
León, 2005).  
Their settlement pattern was split between rural areas, on the one hand, where Latinos 
worked predominantly in the agricultural sector, and a handful of ‘gateway’ 
metropolitan areas of the US, on the other. Miami (FL), Los Angeles (CA), New York 
City (NY), Houston (TX), or Chicago (IL) became key hubs of Latino settlement 
(Massey, 2008).  
Among Latinos different nationalities have tended, to cluster in different areas of the 
country. New York and New Jersey have been most appealing to Puerto Ricans and 
Dominicans. Two-thirds of the entire Dominican population in the US lives in these 
states. Puerto Ricans form the single largest Latino group in New York. Cubans are 
concentrated predominantly in Florida where they represent the largest Latino 
community. Central Americans have converged towards the south west (especially 
California and Texas), Florida, and New York. South Americans have clustered in 
New York and New Jersey, but live also in Florida and California. More than half of 
the entire Colombian population in the US, for example, lives in these states (Bergad 
and Klein, 2010; Sáenz and Morales, 2015). Mexicans constitute the most 
geographically outspread group. Even though 60 percent of the Mexican population 
in the US live in California and Texas (Los Angeles being the main centre), a large 
part of the remaining 40 percent has fanned out beyond the historically inhabited 
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Latino regions and is living in ‘new-destination areas’, such as North and South 
Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, or Alabama (Bergad and Klein, 2010; Sáenz and Morales, 
2015).  
Even though the Latino immigrants to the US originate from a multitude of countries 
bringing a variety of customs, traditions, and backgrounds along with them, a rough 
profile of the ‘average Latino’ in the US can be drawn. Generally, at arrival in the 
United States, the foreign-born population originating from Mexico, the Caribbean, 
Southern and Central America are young, relatively unskilled, from impoverished 
rural environments, very religious, and, with the exception of immigrants from some 
Caribbean countries and Brazil, Spanish-speaking.  
Apart from post-Castro Cuban exiles, who predominantly stemmed from the highest 
ranks of society, the big majority of Latino migrants are of low social rank (Gann, 
1986; Sáenz and Morales, 2015). With lowest tertiary education rates and the highest 
drop-out numbers from high-school compared to all other ethnic groups, Latinos make 
up the lowest part of the educational spectrum (Bergad and Klein, 2010). Accordingly, 
only very few Hispanics fill higher-status professional positions. The big majority 
works in low-paying jobs within “the Latino immigrant occupational niche” (Sáenz 
and Morales, 2015: 109) such as “agriculture labour, meat, and poultry, and seafood 
processing; construction; waiters/waitresses; cooks; maids and housekeeping cleaners; 
and janitors and building cleaners” (Douglas and Sáenz, 2008: 169). Thus, Latino 
median personal incomes are lowest compared to all other ethnic groups (Bergad and 
Klein, 2010). 
At a median age of around 30, the Latino population is significantly younger than the 
median white non-Hispanic (42 years of age) (Sáenz and Morales, 2015). In contrast 
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to their European predecessors one century earlier, women are more strongly 
represented, resulting into an almost gender-balanced immigrant population, 
especially from Southern and Central American countries. The majority, roughly 75 
percent of Hispanic population above the age of 15 is married and lives mostly in 
families with more children than the average American one. Latino households consist 
of an average of 4.3 people. This is significantly higher than for the non-Hispanic 
white population (3.0 people per household). The Latino foreign-born population 
constitutes the ethnic group with the largest share of big family households. 33 percent 
of the foreign-born Latino population lives in families of 5 persons or more (Bergad 
and Klein, 2010).  
The Hispanic community within the US has grown massively over the last four 
decades. Including second and third generations, it has grown from “14.6 million in 
1980 to 22.4 million in 1990 to 35.5 million in 2000 and to 50.5 million in 2010 […] 
In fact, if the US Latino population were a country in 2010, it would be the 25th largest 
country in the world” (Sáenz and Morales, 2015: 49). Both natural increase as well as 
immigration resulted in an average population growth rate of 3.5 percent per year over 
the last three decades – a growth rate significantly higher than the one of any other 
ethnic group or the entire US population. In the 2000s alone, Latinos accounted for 
more than 50 percent of the total US population’s growth rate. While in 1980, every 
16th US resident had a Hispanic background, by 2010, one in six people did (Sáenz 
and Morales, 2015). In parallel to their European predecessors more than a century 
earlier, with the turn of the 20th to the 21st century, Latinos became the single largest 
minority within the US. Projections estimate that by 2050 the Latino population of the 
US will increase threefold to represent at that point more than 30 percent of the entire 
nation’s population.  
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It is crucial to understand these features of US immigration history in order to put the analysis 
of the long-term economic impact of migration within the remaining part of this dissertation 
into context. Both the time around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century as well as more recent 
migration from 1970 onwards, depict crucial eras in US migration history. In both these 
periods immigration – either in absolute or in relative numbers – rose to unprecedented levels: 
inward migrant numbers grew almost exponentially and the share of foreign-born in the US 
population increased to close to 15 percent of the total. As a consequence, the composition of 
local communities changed markedly. Immigration shaped public opinion, altered the political 
agenda and eventually affected US immigration policy. Both eras therefore represent key 
periods for the analysis of the long-term economic impact of migration.  
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5 POPULATION DIVERSITY AND ITS LONG-TERM 
IMPACT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, worldwide migration numbers exceeded expectations and rose to 244 million 
(UNDESA, 2016). These growing population flows have contributed to a shift both in 
the political discourse and in the scientific research agenda, bringing the analysis of 
the economic implications of migration into the fore.  
Over the past few decades, a vast amount of new scientific research has led to 
considerable progress in our understanding of the economic implications of migration. 
The economic impact of migrants on both their own futures and those of locals (i.e. 
Borjas, 1994; Card, 2005), on the local labour market and its dynamics (i.e. Altonji 
and Card, 1991; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Bijak et al., 2007), and on public finances 
(i.e. Kerr and Kerr, 2011) has been extensively analysed. Transmission channels – 
such as increasing returns to scale (i.e. Borjas, 1995), alterations to the ratio of skilled 
to unskilled labour (Lundborg and Segerström, 2002), wages (Ottaviano and Peri, 
2006), or the stimulation of productivity by means of innovation and specialisation 
(i.e. Gordon and McCann, 2005; Partridge and Furtan, 2008) – have also been objects 
of greater scrutiny. The focus of these studies, however, has generally been short-term. 
Our understanding of the economic implications of migration has commonly been 
limited to the first five to 10 years after the initial migration wave took place. Analysis 
of the medium- to long-term impact of migration on economic prosperity has been 
mostly neglected. Only in recent years have researchers started to address this gap. In 
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particular, recent work by Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) has 
demonstrated how current levels of economic development across the US still depend 
on migration settlement patterns that took place over 100 years ago. Sequeira et al. 
(2017) recently confirmed the significance of this relationship. This long-term impact 
of migration holds in time regardless of the national origin of migrants settling in 
different territories (Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2015). 
Despite this progress in research, one important demographic aspect related to 
migration has remained firmly anchored in short-term scrutiny: diversity. As formerly 
homogeneous communities become more diverse by accommodating new individuals 
bringing their customs, traditions, ideas, abilities and experiences with them, the 
question of whether more diverse societies facilitate or deter growth has become more 
prominent. Research on the economic impact of population diversity has flourished, 
focusing on a multitude of transmission channels ranging from skill variety, social 
interaction, innovative networks, institutions and the provision of public goods to trust, 
social participation, social unrest and conflict (i.e. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Gören, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016; 
Bove and Elia, 2017; Kemeny and Cooke, 2017). Most of this research unveiled a 
considerable effect of diversity on growth over the short-term. However, our 
knowledge about whether population diversity levels generated by past migration 
waves still affect economic outcomes over the medium- and long-term remains an 
almost untouched area within the scientific literature. This chapter intends to fill this 
gap. 
We seek to ascertain whether areas that were characterised by a large degree of 
population diversity more than a century ago are wealthier today than those that 
remained more homogenous in their population composition. Does having a very 
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diverse population at one point in time lead to persistently higher levels of economic 
growth? Or is the economic impact of diversity only evident in the short-term, 
vanishing once the different population groups become part of the society’s ‘melting 
pot’? 
In this chapter, we assess the extent to which the high degree of cultural diversity in 
US counties generated during the Era of Mass Migration of the late 19th and early 
20th century has left an enduring impact on the economic development of those US 
areas that witnessed the greatest heterogeneity in population. Incorporating a two-fold 
definition of the notion of diversity, encompassing two distinct dimensions of the term 
(fractionalisation and polarisation), we undertake a decade-by-decade analysis for the 
US at the subnational level covering the period between 1880 and 2010. We posit that 
a vibrant, highly diverse population, stemming from a multitude of different 
backgrounds, nationalities, and cultures, bringing along the risk-seeking and 
entrepreneurial character of the migrant has the capacity to leave a long-lasting 
economic impact. We speculate the economic dynamism created by high levels of 
population diversity to have become embedded not only in local institutions but in the 
very core of a territory, affecting the subsequent economic development path of the 
region not only over the short-, but also over the medium- and long-term.  
In order to test whether this is the case, the chapter adopts the following structure: 
Section 5.2 gives an overview of the historical background of the Age of Mass 
Migration. Section 5.3 summarises previous approaches to the link between diversity 
and economic development in the literature. In section 5.4, we describe the model, 
methodological aspects, and the data adopted for our research. We also explain the 
calculations of the various indices used in the chapter as main variables of interest. 
Section 5.5 reports the results of our estimation, and section 5.6 concludes. 
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5.2 MASS MIGRATION TO AND WITHIN AMERICA – A SHORT 
OVERVIEW 
 
When speaking of the Age of Mass Migration to the US, historians refer to the period 
between the pre-Civil War years and the mid-1920s. Within this time span more than 
40 million Europeans left their homelands as a result of varying degrees of political 
disturbances, famine, and religious persecution in search of a new and better life. The 
large majority of these migrants chose the US as their final destination (Hatton and 
Williamson, 1994; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2006). With an average annual immigration 
inflow rate of about 0.75 percent of the total US population at the time (Hatton and 
Williamson, 1998), the US experienced a population increase of an extent that had 
been unheard of in modern history.12 During this period, total US population increased 
six-fold, from about 17 to 105 million. Meanwhile, the proportion of the foreign-born 
white population grew from 13 percent in 1850 to approximately 18 percent in 1910 
(Table 5-1). Most importantly, “the proportion of people of foreign birth and parentage 
together reached its maximum level of 45 percent in 1920” (Ward, 1990: 299). 
At the time, no legislation existed which restricted migrants from entering the country. 
Migrants – no matter which nationality – could roam freely and settle wherever they 
wished.13 The introduction of the literacy test in the Immigration Act of 1917 led to 
the first serious restriction to immigration. Quotas for incoming migrants followed in 
                                                     
12 In peak years, the annual inflow rate of immigrants reached heights of around 1.5% of the total 
population at the time (Kim, 2007). 
13 With the notable exception of the Chinese after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Frazier and 
Margai, 2010). 
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1921 (Emergency Quota Act of 1921). By 1924 entry restrictions for all foreigners 
were passed (Goldin, 1994; Alexander, 2007). 
TABLE 5-1 US POPULATION COMPOSITION (IN % OF TOTAL POPULATION), 1840 – 1920 
 
Most newcomers settled where relatives and friends had already settled (e.g. Vedder 
and Gallaway, 1972; Levy and Wadycki, 1973; Dentlevy and Gemery, 1977), creating 
distinct migrant communities across the country. Hence, regions with large migrant 
networks attracted further newcomers while others remained nearly untouched by this 
mass movement of population. The resulting settlement pattern in 1910 is depicted in 
Figure 5-1.14  
The north and west of the country attracted the most migrants. Southern states 
remained, by contrast, largely inhabited by American-born residents. Migrants 
established themselves in the rural areas of Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin (Figure 5-1) and further to the west in sparsely populated areas, as well as 
in southern Texas and the southern tip of Florida in the south. Cities, especially in 
New England and the Atlantic states as well as Chicago, became big magnets for 
                                                     
14 The situation in 1880 and 1900 was roughly similar. Maps are available upon request. 
Year 
Population 
(millions) Black (%) 
Foreign 
parentage (%) Foreign-born (%) 
1840 17.1 16.8 n.d. n.d. 
1850 23.2 15.7 n.d. 12.9 
1860 31.4 14.1 n.d. 17.9 
1870 39.8 13.5 19.0 19.6 
1880 50.2 13.1 22.5 17.8 
1890 62.9 11.9 25.0 19.9 
1900 76.0 11.6 27.6 18.1 
1910 92.0 10.7 27.8 18.0 
1920 105.7 9.9 28.0 16.9 
n.d. = no data                                                                                        Source: Ward, 1990 
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migrants, especially for those entering the country during the second migration wave 
between 1890 and 1920. 
 
FIGURE 5-1 INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, 1910  
(AS SHARE OF POPULATION BY COUNTY)  
Source: Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) 
 
While migration from abroad rose rapidly, changing the population composition of 
large parts of the US, internal migration also picked up speed, reaching exceptionally 
high geographical population mobility levels. At the end of the 19th century, almost 
60 percent of the male US population above the age of 30 had moved across county 
or state lines and almost a third of those born in the US lived outside their place of 
birth (Haines, 2000; Ferrie, 2005). Similar to international migrants, American-born 
individuals moved westwards in search of land to expand wheat, corn, wool, and meat 
production (Atack et al., 2000).  
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Most internal migrants of the late 19th century, however, travelled only short distances, 
with the majority remaining within their state of birth. Twenty percent, however, 
covered much larger distances, in some cases up to 4,500 km (own calculations). 
Figure 5-2 depicts their settlement pattern in 1910. The resulting map reveals a 
different pattern of American-born internal migration than that of international 
migration. Internal migrants mainly moved from east to west, settling in many states 
west of the Mississippi (with the exception of Utah, New Mexico, Texas, and parts of 
California). The majority of the population of mid-western states, such as Oklahoma, 
Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona, was thus made up of internal 
migrants. The entire eastern and southern part of the country (including the growing 
migrant agglomerations in the eastern cities) remained, with the exception of Florida, 
outside of internal migration routes. 
 
 
FIGURE 5-2 AMERICAN-BORN INTERNAL MIGRANTS AS SHARE OF POPULATION BY 
COUNTY, 1910 
Data source:  Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration 
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Both international as well as internal migration movements drastically affected the 
population composition of the US. In parts of the north-western states, for example, 
within a few years the population changed from being almost entirely local-born to 
rates of 90 percent or more having been born in other US states or abroad. Internal 
migrants originating from locations often thousands of kilometres away were as 
foreign to the local population as the Germans, Irish, Italians, or Poles settling within 
the same county. Whilst their language was the same – as was the case for migrants 
from the British Isles – internal migrants brought habits, customs, traditions, and a 
lifestyle which was regarded as outlandish and strange by the local population (Merck, 
1978). 
Some areas of the US were predominantly settled by one or two specific nationalities 
(Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2015), whereas other regions attracted a 
multitude of migrants stemming from all over the US as well as from a variety of 
different countries, leading to high levels of population diversity. Figure 5-3 displays 
the levels of population diversity – proxied by the widely-used index of 
fractionalisation, which emphasises the number of different groups within a 
population – across US counties in both 1880 (a) and 1910 (b).15 High levels of 
population diversity became the norm primarily in the west of the country (with the 
exception of parts of New Mexico, Texas, and Utah), while huge swaths of the old 
South remained demographically homogeneous. Cities in the North East, such as New 
York City and Boston, hosted vibrant, mixed migrant communities. By contrast, other 
areas in the North East, such as Maine, Vermont, or parts of upstate New York, were 
characterised by low population diversity levels generally ranging between 0 and 0.3.  
                                                     
15 The calculation of the fractionalisation index will be explained in detail in section 5.4. 
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FIGURE 5-3 DIVERSITY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION BY COUNTY, 1880 
AND 1910 
Data source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration
a) 
b) 
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5.3 DIVERSITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
With both international as well as internal migrants arriving and moving around the 
country, population diversity across the US drastically changed (Collier, 2013). How 
such a rapid shock to diversity levels has affected ensuing economic development is 
therefore a highly relevant question. Whether population diversity leads to higher or 
lower growth has turned into a widely discussed and often controversial topic in the 
theoretical and empirical literature across a wide range of disciplines, ranging from 
sociology and anthropology to political science, demography, geography, and 
economics. Overall, conclusions are far from clear cut due to a mixture of different 
indices, changing geographical units, and varying aggregation levels. 
Two opposing strands dominate the debate – one depicting diversity as growth 
enhancing, the other as growth reducing. As the definition of diversity is far from 
straightforward, the strongly differing views primarily result from the respective 
dimension of diversity examined. Both strands choose entirely different angles from 
which to evaluate the link between diversity and economic development. 
Consequently, a variety of indices are used as a proxy of diversity, with each indicator 
measuring a different aspect of the notion. The most popular proxies used are measures 
of population fractionalisation on the one hand, and polarization and segregation on 
the other. Hence, whether diversity fosters or deters growth strongly hinges on the 
indicator employed. 
The strand of research which views diversity as growth enhancing generally regards it 
as the central driver of innovation and creativity, which in turn fosters technological 
progress and growth. Migrants arriving from diverse locations are depicted as an 
important input factor in the process of technological progress. They bring in different 
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skills, ideas, experiences, and abilities to their places of destination. However, the 
speed of technological progress fuelled by the inflowing population does not depend 
on the size of the influx but on their composition, transforming diversity into a 
productivity enhancing and innovation initiating factor (Bove and Elia, 2017). 
The connection between diversity and innovation dates back at least to Jacobs (1961, 
1969). For her, environments which are characterised by the presence of a large variety 
of cultural groups provide more fertile soil for new ideas. Within these idea breeding 
grounds, new innovative concepts can spread more easily to different areas compared 
to more homogenous places, thereby fostering innovation and growth. Florida’s 
creative class model (2002) supports this line of argument. As skilled, liberal people 
prefer to live in diverse regions, skilled jobs and innovation will cluster in these same 
areas. The ‘New Argonauts’ theory developed by Saxenian (2006) is yet another 
example of diversity leading to innovation. The concept revolves around foreign-born, 
technically high-skilled entrepreneurs, travelling back and forth between their home 
countries and Silicon Valley, boosting economic activity both in the once peripheral 
regions of their home countries, as well as in the US. Lazear (1999) draws a parallel 
to a firm context analysing the globalisation of firms. He finds that skill 
complementarity in a team spanning multiple cultures is key to not only offset the 
potential costs of diversity, but to significantly raise overall firm productivity. The 
interaction of a multitude of people with different abilities, ideas, and experiences 
triggers innovation, technological process, and hence growth. 
Empirical research has tended to validate this view. Niebuhr (2010) shows that across 
Germany patent applications increase in proportion to labour force diversity. Özgen et 
al. (2011a) find that levels of innovation rise with the degree of diversity in the migrant 
community across European countries. A diverse labour force and immigrants 
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originating from a wide range of countries “not only contribute to innovation by means 
of their high skills and innate abilities, but […] they also bring into firms and host 
countries new ideas and perspectives from their different cultural backgrounds” 
(Özgen et al, 2011b: 1). An enlarged diversity of national origins is also linked to 
improvements in problem-solving, new combinations of ideas, and innovation (i.e. 
Hong and Page 2001, 2004), while inter-ethnic ties contribute to increased 
socioeconomic status of migrants (Riedel, 2015). Alesina et al. (2016) report that the 
productive effects of increasing population diversity are largest for high-skilled 
migrants and for migrants stemming from wealthier and more culturally similar source 
countries. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) demonstrate a significant positive and robust correlation 
between both wages and rents with regional immigrant diversity in US metropolitan 
areas, emphasising that a more multicultural environment increases the productivity 
level of US-born citizens. From a slightly different angle, other studies portray 
diversity as productivity enhancing not only in regions or cities but also in work 
establishments. The enlarged skillset of the workforce as well as the interaction of 
diverse work teams with each other facilitate the production of a larger variety of 
goods and services and raises labour productivity levels, even when holding average 
ability constant (i.e. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Hamilton et al., 2003; Trax et al., 
2015; Kemeny and Cooke, 2017).  
Two common denominators link the above diversity promoting studies. Firstly, the 
majority place emphasis on the subnational, granular level, evaluating either the 
impact of diversity at a regional, city, or even individual level. Secondly, and more 
importantly, this strand of research generally considers diversity on the basis of the 
number of different population groups – varying by language, religion, or ethnicity – 
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within a territory. They tend to use an index of fractionalisation – such as Alesina et 
al.’s (2003) – as the measure of population diversity. This type of index presupposes 
that the greater the number of groups, the higher the assumed diversity in a society, 
positively influencing the potential for growth. The groups’ size or the distance 
between them does not enter the calculation of the most frequently used indices. 
The strand of research positing that diversity has a negative influence on economic 
development follows a different line of thought. Rather than considering the positive 
influence of diversity on idea generation, innovation and productivity, it views the 
presence of diverse groups as a destabilising factor within a society, enhancing the 
potential for social unrest and conflict. This body of thought not only takes into 
account fractionalisation as a proxy for diversity but also increasingly utilises indices 
of segregation and polarisation.  
“When the society is divided by religious, ethnolinguistic, or race differences, tensions 
emerge along these divisions” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a: 308). Ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation has thus been inversely linked to per capita GDP and 
growth in large cross-country samples (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al. 
2003; Churchill and Smyth, 2017). Alesina et al. (2003), for example, found that a 
difference in economic growth of 1.9 percentage points between a wholly homogenous 
and a wholly heterogeneous society. The poor economic performance of African 
countries has been, for example, blamed on ethnic conflict resulting from high levels 
of national or ethnic polarisation (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
Various channels have been identified as vehicles through which diversity hinders 
economic development. Gören (2014) emphasises the negative direct effect of 
diversity on economic growth and considers polarisation as having indirect negative 
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economic effects via human capital, investment, openness, and civil war. Easterly and 
Levine (1997) argue there is a reduced probability of adopting ‘good policies’ in more 
polarised societies. According to their study, low school attainment, high financial 
debt and low infrastructure quality are all consequences of high segregation levels. 
Moreover, diversity is believed to foster rent seeking behaviour by different groups, 
further undermining the potential for adopting sound public policies. Overall, high 
polarisation triggers “positive incentives for growth reducing policies, such as 
financial repression and overvalued exchange rates, that create rents for the groups in 
power at the expense of society at large” (Easterly and Levine, 1997: 1206).  
More fragmented societies are found to curb public sector performance and to generate 
poor institutions (La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Easterly et al., 2006), leading to 
regional disparities (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), an inefficient provision of 
public goods and services, a reduction in government transfers and distortionary 
taxation (Desmet et al. 2009; Azzimonti, 2011), political instability (Alesina et al., 
1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Baldwin and Huber 2010), as well as reduced property 
rights security (Keefer and Knack, 2002), and low quality of government (Alesina and 
Zhuravskaya, 2011). Enhanced heterogeneity may even lead to the formation of 
xenophobic political parties (ibid), undermine collective action, and reduce the 
efficiency of regulation (Baland and Platteau, 2003; Platteau and Seki, 2007).  
Diversity is further shown to impact political rights, adversely affecting economic 
growth (Collier, 2001). Particularly in less democratic societies, polarisation can 
curtail individual rights and limit overall economic performance (Bluedorn, 2001; 
Alesina et al., 2003). Further consequences of highly diverse and polarised societies 
are a reduction of trust and social participation, inefficient communication, less 
economic integration, lower voting turnout, and a rise in transaction costs for bridging 
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cultural differences (i.e. Ancona and Caldwell, 1992, Alesina et al., 1999, Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2000, Richard et al., 2002; Van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007; Alesina 
and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Uslaner, 2011; Mavridis, 2015; Martinez i Coma and Nai, 
2017). The resulting rent seeking behaviour leads to slower growth, lower production, 
reduced investment, and diminished prosperity (Rodrik, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005b). “In extreme cases, diversity can prompt 
large scale social and economic collapse, sometimes with horrific consequences, as 
has occurred in recent years in parts of Central Africa, the Balkans, and elsewhere” 
(Kemeny, 2012: 2136). Highly fragmented societies have been deemed prone to 
moderate intensity conflict. In highly polarised societies, conflict can be less frequent 
but of higher intensity (Esteban and Ray, 2008). The likelihood and frequency of civil 
wars – an extreme example of social collapse – have been associated with high 
population diversity in terms of polarisation (i.e. Horowitz, 1985; Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b).  
Focusing on regional data, these results have been held up by a number of studies 
analysing the case of the US. High diversity in US communities has been connected 
to a less efficient provision of public goods, lower trust, and less social participation 
(i.e. Alesina, et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Luttmer, 2001; Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2002). Diversity has also been considered a strong and persisting barrier 
to developing trust across racial, ethnic, or national origins (Glaeser et al., 2000). 
Again, a string of common denominators links the above studies. Firstly, within this 
strand of the literature and with few exceptions, studies tend to use nations as the unit 
of analysis. Secondly, diversity is increasingly referred to as triggering the negative 
effects of polarisation and segregation. Different indices have been employed by the 
literature in order to capture this effect. One of the most commonly used indices, 
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proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994), finds its roots in the social tension literature. 
Here, indices measure entirely different aspects of diversity than fractionalisation. 
Rather than focusing on the number of groups within a population, polarisation indices 
emphasise their relative size to one another and the distance separating them. The 
bigger the distance among groups, the more similar their size, and the stronger the 
lines separating them – the smaller the capacity to communicate and hence the larger 
the negative impact of diversity on economic development. According to Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005a), social unrest is further aggravated if the population is 
distributed into two separate groups of similar size. Examples of this latter 
phenomenon would be, amongst others, Northern Ireland or the Basque Autonomous 
Community. 
In short, cultural diversity affects trust among the inhabitants of primarily 
multinational, multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. It upsets the coordination of 
actors and their communication, generating animosity, enlarging differences in 
preferences and creating situations of conflict. Simultaneously, however, this 
multitude of ideas, experiences, skills, and abilities can foster technological 
innovation, create a fertile soil for new ideas, increase productivity levels, and 
therefore enhance the supply and the quality of goods and services. By influencing 
both human capital and the process of technological progress, diversity has an 
undeniable impact on economic growth, although its net effect remains unclear (Bove 
and Elia, 2017). 
One aspect has, however, been largely neglected in all of the aforementioned literature 
and still needs to be evaluated: the dynamic economic impact of diversity over time. 
Hence, while there is significant controversy about how fractionalisation and/or 
polarisation matter for economic growth, to the best of our knowledge, we know only 
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very little about whether higher or lower initial levels of diversity – regardless of 
measurement – affect growth differently in the short, medium or very long-term.  
Research that examines the time dimension of diversity is limited. Campos and 
Kuzeyev, (2007) or Campos et al. (2011) analyse changing levels of polarisation over 
time and evaluate their short-term impact on growth. Both find a negative effect of 
polarisation. Alesina et al. (2016) and Ager and Brückner (2013a) consider timeframes 
of 10 and 50 years respectively, evaluating a sample of 120 countries with panel data 
between 1990 and 2000 (the former) or use a within-county estimation approach for 
US counties that evaluates the impact of the change in cultural composition over the 
course of 50 years (1870-1920) on economic growth (the latter). Both find 
fractionalisation to be positively related to economic prosperity, while polarisation has 
the opposite effect. However, neither assesses the impact of a fixed initial level of 
diversity on economic performance across alternating time horizons. Furthermore, 
while Ager and Brückner (2013a) base their study on the same historical timeframe as 
used in this chapter, they do not extend their analysis to present levels of economic 
development.  
Studies that come closest to analysing a dynamic effect of diversity over longer time 
horizons are rare. They include Ager and Brückner (2013b) and Bove and Elia (2017). 
The former report a significant short- and long-term impact of initial diversity levels 
on economic development in the US. However, they refer to the use of genetic 
diversity based on Ashraf and Galor (2013), rather than including the two most 
frequently discussed proxies of diversity: fractionalisation and polarisation. Bove and 
Elia (2017) identify a positive association of both fractionalisation and polarisation 
with real GDP per capita when evaluating a 135 country sample over a 50 year 
timeframe. The positive link of both indicators – consecutively added to their model 
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– is significant over the long-term, but fails to retrieve consistent results over the short, 
10-20 year, timeframe.  
In short, to the best of our knowledge, there is no scientific research treating both 
dimensions of diversity – fractionalisation and polarisation – which links historical 
population diversity levels to current economic development and covers a period 
longer than 50 years. Thus, some key questions remain unanswered: Does diversity, 
in its two fundamental dimensions of fractionalisation and polarisation, affect growth 
– if at all – differently in the short- than in the medium- and long-term? Does a high 
degree of fractionalisation and/or polarisation generated more than a century ago 
promote growth in the short-run but limit it in the long-term? Or is it vice versa? 
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
The aim of this chapter is precisely to fill this important gap in the literature by 
examining the extent to which the levels of initial diversity, defined by both 
fractionalisation and polarisation, generated during the Age of Mass Migration across 
US counties a) have left a long-lasting economic legacy that can still be identified in 
the economic development of US counties today and b) whether any positive or 
negative influence of initial diversity on economic development has waxed or waned 
with time. 
Based on the previous discussion, we adopt two econometric models in order to test 
our two research questions: one focusing on population heterogeneity, the other on 
population homogeneity. Following the relevant literature, we employ place-of-origin 
fractionalisation and polarisation – the two most commonly used indices – to depict 
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population diversity in Model 1. Its almost opposite, place-of-origin concentration, is 
used to reflect population homogeneity in Model 2.  
We expect both dimensions of diversity – fractionalisation and polarisation – to matter 
for economic development over very long timeframes. We not only assume that the 
growth influencing traits of diversity become embedded in the local mentality, 
traditions, and customs – in short, in local institutions – but also that big diversity 
shocks in a given period of time can become etched in the core characteristics of a 
territory and thus persist over extended timeframes. 
The implications of this assumption are twofold. First, US counties having received 
large inflows of both international and internal migrants stemming from a multitude 
of different origins more than a century ago should be significantly more prosperous 
today than those which displayed a more homogeneous population composition at the 
time. Second, we expect US counties marked by a highly polarised population 
composition during the Age of Mass Migration to have faced considerable barriers to 
the development of economic activity, deeply limiting their growth potential. 
Consequently, we assume historical fractionalisation to be positively connected to 
current income levels across US counties, while historical degrees of polarisation are 
likely to be negatively and significantly associated to them. 
Moreover, in line with Ager and Brückner (2013b), we hypothesise that time will not 
significantly alter the impact of diversity on economic development. We assume a 
highly fragmented (highly polarized) society to retain its positive (negative) impact 
consistently over the short-, the medium- and the long-term. Despite the fact that 
international migrants become American and internal migrants adopt local traits over 
time, their cultural baggage brought from their place of origin remains with them and 
is passed not just to the following generations, but especially to their chosen place of 
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residence. As diversity becomes embedded in the core character of the county, it 
permanently influences its subsequent economic development path for decades. 
5.4.1 MODEL 1 – POPULATION HETEROGENEITY: THE CASE FOR 
DIVERSITY  
 
Model 1 is concerned with diversity measured as fractionalisation and polarisation. 
The model adopts the following form: 
 
istiktitititi stateZXPolFracty    000 ,,,,,  
 
where y represents the income per capita of county i in period t (t=2010, 2000, ..., 
1900); Fract is the level of fractionalisation in a given county i in t0, which 
corresponds to either 1880, 1900, or 1910; Pol is the degree of polarisation in a given 
county i in t0; X is a vector of variables which are assumed to influence the level of 
development of any given county at time t-k (k=10); Z represents a similar vector of 
factors which may have influenced the development of the county at time t0.
16 Lastly, 
state depicts state controls taking into account unobservable state specific effects and 
ε represents the error term clustered to the state level s to ensure robustness to arbitrary 
spatial correlation within one state. Our main coefficients of interest are 𝛽and 𝜆 
describing the relationship of the two dimensions of diversity with economic 
development.  
                                                     
16 In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, this vector is only included when analysing the long-
term. For the short-term regression analysis, this vector is excluded. 
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5.4.2 MODEL 2 – POPULATION HOMOGENEITY: THE CASE FOR 
CONCENTRATION 
 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, Model 2 resorts to an index of 
concentration to reflect population homogeneity as the main independent variable of 
interest. All other variables remain the same as in Model 1. In this alternative setup, 
the model adopts the following form: 
istiktititi stateZXConcy    00 ,,,,  
where Conc is defined as the level of concentration within the population of any given 
county i in t0 corresponding to either 1880, 1900, or 1910 and ω represents the error 
term clustered to the state level s. All other input variables refer to those presented in 
Model 1. 
 
5.4.3 VARIABLES OF INTEREST – MEASURES OF DIVERSITY AND 
CONCENTRATION 
 
Diversity: Following the two opposing strands of literature dealing with the link 
between diversity and economic growth, we resort to the two most commonly 
employed diversity indices to proxy population heterogeneity: fractionalisation and 
polarisation.   
Fractionalisation (i.e. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003) emphasises the 
number of different groups within a population. It goes back to the work by the Soviet 
researchers Bruk and Apenchenko (1964) who crafted an index of ethnic-linguistic 
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fractionalisation in the Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of the peoples of the world) based 
on the shares in total population of ethno-linguistic groups. The modified version of 
this index by Alesina et al. (2003) is used in this chapter as our first indicator of 
diversity:  
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑔,𝑖,𝑡0
2
𝑛
𝑔=1
 
where 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡0  is the degree of fractionalisation in county 𝑖 at time 𝑡0 where  𝑠  
depicts the share of total population of origin group 𝑔 in county 𝑖 at time 𝑡0. This index 
“captures the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different 
groups” (Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007: 622). Hence, 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡0 increases with the 
number of groups, taking on values between 0 and 1, with 1 − 𝜎 reflecting a highly 
fractionalised and 0 + 𝜎 a strongly homogeneous society, with 𝜎 → 0.17 If each person 
in a territory belongs to a different group, the index reaches its theoretical maximum. 
Polarisation aims to capture the social tension and conflict dimension linked to a 
heterogeneous population. Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) from a theoretical, and 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) from an empirical standpoint, argue that a 
highly polarised environment maximises the risk of conflict. The measure of 
polarisation is based on the family of indices developed by Esteban and Ray (1994, 
1999), considering not only the number of ethnic groups within a society, but also the 
distances separating them and their individual size. According to this index type, the 
degree of polarisation within a population increases as the distance between groups 
rises, but also when the number of groups increase or when there is convergence in 
                                                     
17 𝜎 represents any small positive number so that 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡0  becomes arbitrarily close to 1 or 0 
respectively. 
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group size. As the calculation of distance between ethnic groups is highly 
controversial, we follow Reynal-Querol (2002) for our index, assuming the absolute 
distance between two groups to be equal and discrete.18 The polarisation index in this 
case “measures the normalised distance of a particular distribution of ethnic […] 
groups from a bimodal distribution” (ibid: 301) and is maximised when two highly 
distinguishable groups of equal size coexist within the same population. 
The polarisation index takes on the following form: 





n
g
tig
tig
ti s
s
Pol
1
,,
2,,
, 0
0
0
)
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where 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡0  is the degree of polarisation in county 𝑖 at time 𝑡0 and  𝑠  depicts the 
share of total population of origin group 𝑔 in county 𝑖 at time 𝑡0. Within this particular 
specification, it is the size of the groups relative to each other that is of particular 
importance. 
Both indices used in the analysis are aligned to the specifications of our dataset. 
Instead of ethnic groups as generally used in the literature, we consider the birthplaces 
of individuals – as defined by the US Census – living in a given county at 𝑡0 as an 
indicator for different cultural groups. Birthplaces include both European countries as 
well as American states in order to properly account for international as well as for the 
high degree of internal migration prevailing at the time. As the historical US Census 
did not record the county of birth, but solely the state, our indicator does not pick up 
the bulk of the short distance, intra-state internal migration. Only population groups 
of internal migrants which travelled large distances leaving their home state are 
                                                     
18 One of the few papers estimating the distance between ethnic groups is Fearon (2003). Language is 
used as a proxy of cultural distance. 
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therefore included into the calculation of the index. We therefore take into 
consideration only the fraction of internal migrants which were identified to be 
significantly different to the local population (i.e. Merck, 1978).  
Figure 5-4 plots the relationship between fractionalisation and polarisation in US 
counties for all three base years: 1880, 1900, and 1910. It is important to note that 
varying the size of both indices does not reveal a consistent interdependency. 
Conditional on the degree of fractionalisation, the extent of the correlation with 
polarisation varies. Both indices are highly positively correlated at low levels of 
societal diversity, indicating that adding a further cultural group to an otherwise 
perfectly homogenous population increases the risk of polarisation and conflict. 
However, as cultural heterogeneity increases, the positive relationship wanes and 
becomes irrelevant at medium levels of both fractionalisation and polarisation. The 
more a population becomes fragmented, the lower the societal standing and influence 
of a single population group, which reduces the societal polarisation within a given 
county. At highest levels of fractionalisation, the relationship between both indices 
turns strongly negative. Once above a certain fractionalisation threshold, the addition 
of further cultural groups to a population significantly decreases the risk of 
polarisation. This relationship is consistent across all three base years and in line with 
previous findings by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, b), Ager and Brückner 
(2013a), or Bove and Elia (2017), underlining the validity of the data.
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FIGURE 5-4 FRACTIONALISATION VERSUS POLARISATION FOR ALL THREE BASE 
YEARS 
Data source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration 
 
It is important to stress once again that both indices measure entirely different 
dimensions of diversity. While one focuses on the number of cultural groups leading 
to innovation, the other stresses their relative size to another, both provoking social 
unrest and conflict. Based on these highly distinct theoretical concepts, both indices 
thus identify independent and distinguishable effects of diversity on economic growth. 
From a theoretical standpoint, their joint inclusion in our empirical model minimises 
the risk of omitted variable bias and allows us to capture a more accurate and 
encompassing effect of the multidimensional notion of diversity on economic growth. 
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Concerns about the joint inclusion of both variables are addressed from an empirical 
standpoint in Figure 5-4, which rules out the risk of biased results due to correlation 
issues. Following Ager and Brückner (2013a), Alesina et al. (2003), Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005a), and Gören (2014), we include both indices of fractionalisation 
and polarisation in our model, as both indices capture a different aspect of diversity. 
Concentration: The opposite of diversity is concentration, understood as the marked 
dominance of one group (based on place of origin) in a given territory. We employ 
this alternative variable of interest to assess the robustness of the results when 
analysing the diversity indices. The concentration index is defined as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡0 = max( 𝑠𝑔,𝑖,𝑡0) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡0 is the degree of concentration within the population of county 𝑖 at time 
𝑡0 and  𝑠  depicts the share of total population of origin group 𝑔  in county 𝑖 at time 𝑡0. 
According to this definition, the index always takes on the population share of the 
largest represented birthplace group within the population of the particular county 𝑖, 
thereby indicating the degree of concentration within a territory.  
 
5.4.4 CONTROLS – FACTORS INFLUENCING COUNTY DEVELOPMENT  
 
We introduce two sets of control variables into our model. The first group of control 
variables included is vector 𝑍 dating from the time of migration – 1880, 1900, and 
1910 – and consists of factors which influenced a county’s development at the time of 
the big migration waves. The controls comprise mean income (as natural log), total 
population (as natural log), literacy rate, unemployment rate, female participation rate 
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in the labour force, share of black population, and the percentage of workers employed 
in agriculture. As these parameters are bound to have influenced the settlement 
decision of the individual migrants (see i.e. Jennissen, 2003), we can assume they 
would also have exerted a strong impact on fractionalisation and polarisation at county 
level in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Furthermore, if certain population groups 
predominantly settled in wealthy regions and if this initial prosperity persisted over 
time, excluding the initial endowment factors of a county would lead to omitted 
variables and therefore biased estimates.  
The second set of control variables in our model, vector 𝑋, represents the t-k time 
dimension, which corresponds to 10 years prior to the period considered in the 
dependent variable. Again, we control for factors influencing the economic 
development of the county, such as population size (as natural log), educational 
attainment, female participation in the labour force, unemployment, the share of black 
population, infant mortality, and the share of the labour force employed in agriculture. 
We shift 𝑋 by 10 years in order to reduce the risk of reverse causality between the 
control variables and income per capita. As we will show later within this chapter, the 
results prove to be robust and stable throughout. 
 
5.4.5 THE DATA 
 
For the construction of the dependent variable, we employ income per capita data 
extracted from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database and the Current 
Population Survey tables (CPS) of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), measured 
in US dollars. As income per capita was only available for the years 1950 onwards, 
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we resorted to a proxy for the years 1900 to 1940 and used either the salary income 
(1940) or calculated an aggregated mean income at county level constructed using the 
median total income per occupation in 1950 dollars (1880-1930). The construction of 
these variables uses the total population including all non-participants within the 
labour force as base in order to remain as comparable as possible with the income per 
capita variable of later years. The necessary input data for these proxies was extracted 
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series USA database (IPUMS) Version 6.0 
(Ruggles et al., 2015). This database provides US microdata covering the censuses and 
American Community Surveys between 1790 and 2010.19 We use the natural log of 
income as the dependent variable. 
The main independent variables of interest, fractionalisation and polarisation as well 
as concentration, were built using the birthplace data at county level of the years 1880, 
1900, and 1910, extracted from the IPUMS USA database. The birthplaces of a 
weighted population sample of 5,791,531 individuals in 1880, 3,852,852 individuals 
in 1900, and 923,153 individuals in 1910 were aggregated and allocated to the counties 
of residence of the individual. As the number and size of US counties changed over 
the period of analysis (2,875 counties in 1880, 3,090 in 1900 and 3,123 in 1910), we 
matched counties at the time of migration to their 2010 equivalent using US Census 
Bureau cartographic boundary files of the 48 continental states for each decade 
included in the analysis.   
Data for the control variables were extracted from the IPUMS USA, the US BEA, the 
US BLS, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 
database, as well as from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
                                                     
19 The American Community Survey was only initiated in 2005. 
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databases. In cases involving microdata, the data for individuals was aggregated at the 
county level. With the exception of mean income and educational attainment, all 
variables followed the same calculation method based on the same available data 
points across all years in question. The variable expressing the aggregated mean 
income at county level in the late 19th and early 20th century is constructed similarly 
to our dependent variable on the basis of the median total income per occupation (in 
1950 dollars). Educational attainment is proxied by the percentage of people 
completing their college education for the years 1940 to 2000. From 1880 to 1930 we 
used the literacy rate per county as educational variable. A description of all variables 
is given in Appendix 5A. 
  
5.4.6 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
 
Several endogeneity issues may arise when dealing with long-term migration data. 
While diversity may affect local GDP per capita, it is also likely that a higher GDP 
itself attracts more migrants, thereby increasing the level of diversity in the region. 
Consequently, the direction of causality remains ambiguous: GDP per capita on a 
regional level may be a function of diversity just as local diversity may be a 
consequence of local wealth. Moreover, when working with migration data, non-
random spatial patterns in the distribution of migrants across space are likely to appear. 
Regional spillovers in migration may therefore generate clusters of counties with high 
levels of diversity. This spatial sorting would lead to endogeneity issues in our OLS 
regressions due to omitted variables. In order to address these endogeneity issues, we 
resort to instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods with the aim of revealing the 
true underlying effect of past diversity levels on income levels over time and to ensure 
121 
 
the validity of the least-squares estimations. We employ a shift-share methodology 
following Card (1999), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Saiz (2007). This instrument 
computes the estimated population composition of a county in 1880, 1900, and 1910 
based on the population composition in a previous base year20 and the US growth rate 
per population group between base and target year. This implies using the share of 
inhabitants per birthplace within the population of a county in the base year and 
multiplying this share by the growth rate of that particular group within the US 
population for the timeframe between base year and 1880, 1900, or 1910. Hence, we 
extrapolate predicted population shares under the assumption that migrants settle in 
areas where their predecessors had already established themselves. With these 
calculated predicted population shares, we then estimate an imputed fractionalisation, 
polarisation, and concentration index for each county in the respective target year. 
The use of the shift-share instrument is based on the assumption that highly diverse 
counties in the earlier years of the big migration waves developed a diversity buzz 
which became a pull factor for new migrants. With the use of the shift-share 
instrument, we assume these highly diverse counties to have remained attractive to 
incoming migrants in the following decades, also implying that any changes in the 
degree of diversity at county level would have been independent of county specific 
shocks that may have taken place within the timeframe in question.  
The results of the Staiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments using the first 
stage F-statistic of joint significance confirm that the shift-share variables for 
fractionalisation, polarisation, and concentration are all strong instruments. The 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics, in combination with the Stock and Yogo (2005) 
                                                     
20 Diversity levels in 1880 are instrumented by the shiftshare using the population composition in 1870 
as base. For 1900 and 1910 values, we used 1880 base values due to the significantly larger data sample 
available. 
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critical values for tests of weak instruments, further support the validity of the 
instruments. The instruments reject the null of weak identification when testing at a 
nominal 5% significance level. Both the imputed polarisation and fractionalisation 
indices as well as the shift-share instrument for concentration are identified as strong 
across the three base years and the various time shifts of the dependent variable.  
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5.5 ANALYSIS 
 
5.5.1 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF DIVERSITY 
 
The analysis starts with an evaluation of the long-term impact of diversity. Our first 
research question – whether population diversity levels generated in 1880, 1900, and 
1910 are connected to county-level income per capita 100 to 130 years later – is first 
assessed by means of an ordinary least squares regression. As mentioned in the 
empirical approach, the model controls for wealth influencing factors both at the time 
of migration and in recent years and includes state controls in order to control for state 
specific unobserved factors influencing the counties’ prosperity. Table 5-2 reports the 
results of Model 1 for our two main variables of interest, fractionalisation and 
polarisation, for 1880, 1900, and 1910 with respect to income per capita levels in 2010.  
The results in Table 5-2 unveil a positive long-term connection of country-level 
population diversity with current GDP per capita. The fractionalisation index displays 
positive coefficients with significance levels below 1% across all three base years. The 
presence of large numbers of different groups according to place of origin in one 
county during the age of mass migration is strongly associated with higher levels of 
income in that county 100 to 130 years later. Polarisation, by contrast, remains 
insignificant across all three base years. Hence, polarisation at the height of the big 
migration waves appears unassociated with current levels of county wealth.  
The signs and significance of the coefficients of the control variables reinforce the 
validity of the model, as they are in line with traditional studies on the determinants 
of growth. A good educational endowment in 2000 is connected to higher levels of 
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income per capita in 2010. Conversely, levels of unemployment and the percentage of 
black population – a proxy for poverty – in 2000 are linked to lower county wealth.  
Of the factors that may have affected decisions to migrate more than a century ago, 
few are still connected to county levels of development in recent years. The one 
exception is the share of black population in 1880, 1900, and 1910. In all cases, 
counties with a higher percentage of black people at the turn of the century have 
significantly higher levels of income per head today. We assume this variable to serve 
as proxy for the economic structure of these largely agrarian counties back at the time 
of migration rather than indicating the effect of a divided county population into black 
and white. The coefficient of the share of black population is highly likely to capture 
the path to convergence of the poor regions of the South to the richer regions in the 
North (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990, 1995). The total population of 
a county in 1880, the level of unemployment in 1900, the proportion of agricultural 
employment in 1910, and the mean income in 1910 are negatively associated with 
income per head in 2010, while literacy in 1880 displays a positive and significant 
sign. Population diversity – measured as fractionalisation – hence proves to have a 
considerably stronger association with future income levels than the large majority of 
other base year controls. Put differently, the results suggest that a highly diverse 
population is a better indicator of future regional wealth than, in particular, county 
wealth at the time of migration.  
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TABLE 5-2 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF DIVERSITY, OLS 1880, 1900, AND 1910 
Dep. variable: Income p.c. 2010 (ln) 1880 OLS 1900 OLS 1910 OLS 
Fractionalisation ~ 0.144*** 0.176*** 0.155*** 
  (0.0501) (0.0474) (0.0323) 
Polarisation~ -0.0365 -0.0470 -0.0301 
  (0.0411) (0.0376) (0.0308) 
Education 2000 0.0125*** 0.0125*** 0.0123*** 
  (0.000782) (0.000826) (0.000822) 
Total population 2000 (ln) 0.00145 0.00296 -0.00257 
  (0.00566) (0.00560) (0.00562) 
Share of black population 2000 -0.00133*** -0.000912* -0.00141*** 
  (0.000462) (0.000489) (0.000493) 
Female participation 2000 -0.000141 0.000245 0.000563 
  (0.00117) (0.00110) (0.00107) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0247*** -0.0264*** -0.0246*** 
  (0.00461) (0.00421) (0.00452) 
Infant mortality 2000 -8.41e-05 -0.000161 -0.000126 
  (0.000322) (0.000288) (0.000286) 
Agriculture 2000 -0.000330 -0.000405 -0.000333 
  (0.00208) (0.00224) (0.00226) 
Mean income (ln)~ -0.000603 -0.000442 -0.00535* 
  (0.00333) (0.00407) (0.00285) 
Literacy~ 0.0976** 0.0368 0.0679 
  (0.0395) (0.0850) (0.0499) 
Total population (ln)~ -0.0120** -0.0125 -0.00806 
  (0.00498) (0.00761) (0.00834) 
Share of black population~ 0.219*** 0.173*** 0.209*** 
  (0.0459) (0.0375) (0.0435) 
Female participation~ 0.0319 -0.0287 0.000231 
  (0.0895) (0.0910) (0.0513) 
Unemployment ~ -0.00865 -0.0468** -0.207 
  (0.00959) (0.0189) (0.161) 
Agriculture~ -0.0687 0.000508 -0.0963*** 
  (0.0531) (0.0675) (0.0204) 
State controls yes yes yes 
Observations 2,825 3,024 3,094 
R-squared 0.642 0.637 0.642 
~ Variables date from respective year of migration 1880, 1900, or 1910 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results prove to be robust to the replacement of the diversity variables by a 
measure of group concentration, as indicated in Model 2 (Table 5-3). The 
concentration index is significant at the 1% level – as was the case of the 
fractionalisation index in Table 5-2 – although the association with income per capita 
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in 2010 is, as expected, negative. Hence, US counties with a more homogeneous 
population composition (dominated by one large group, regardless of whether the 
group originates from abroad or from a different American state) more than a century 
ago seem to have endured a substantially worse economic trajectory over the last 100 
to 130 years than those which attracted a large number of people stemming from 
different birthplaces. In line with the relevant literature, one could speculate the largely 
homogenous population composition to have hampered the emergence of innovation 
boosting conditions linked to the buzz of diversity. 
As far as both sets of control variables are concerned, there is nearly no change in 
either the significance levels or in the signs of the coefficients compared to those 
reported in Table 5-2.
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TABLE 5-3 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF CONCENTRATION, OLS 1880, 1900, 1910 
Dep. variable: Income p.c. 2010 (ln) 1880 OLS 1900 OLS 1910 OLS 
Concentration ~ -0.158*** -0.175*** -0.149*** 
  (0.0486) (0.0467) (0.0329) 
Education 2000 0.0125*** 0.0125*** 0.0123*** 
  (0.000777) (0.000831) (0.000822) 
Total population 2000 (ln) 0.00196 0.00284 -0.00251 
  (0.00572) (0.00569) (0.00576) 
Share of black population 2000 -0.00133*** -0.000857* -0.00141*** 
  (0.000458) (0.000492) (0.000496) 
Female participation 2000 -0.000129 0.000223 0.000535 
  (0.00115) (0.00110) (0.00108) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0249*** -0.0268*** -0.0247*** 
  (0.00476) (0.00428) (0.00462) 
Infant mortality 2000 -4.60e-05 -0.000160 -0.000127 
  (0.000320) (0.000293) (0.000290) 
Agriculture 2000 -0.000157 -0.000259 -0.000287 
  (0.00207) (0.00227) (0.00223) 
Mean income (ln)~ -0.00108 -0.000371 -0.00504* 
  (0.00342) (0.00408) (0.00289) 
Literacy~ 0.104** 0.0522 0.0754 
  (0.0393) (0.0926) (0.0531) 
Total population (ln)~ -0.0116** -0.0111 -0.00585 
  (0.00470) (0.00758) (0.00816) 
Share of black population~ 0.224*** 0.172*** 0.208*** 
  (0.0441) (0.0389) (0.0427) 
Female participation~ 0.0339 -0.0308 -0.00295 
  (0.0927) (0.0888) (0.0514) 
Unemployment ~ -0.00965 -0.0463** -0.207 
  (0.00924) (0.0193) (0.167) 
Agriculture~ -0.0743 -0.00275 -0.0974*** 
  (0.0525) (0.0614) (0.0199) 
State controls yes yes yes 
Observations 2,826 3,024 3,094 
R-squared 0.643 0.636 0.641 
~ Variables date from respective year of migration 1880, 1900, or 1910 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to address potential endogeneity issues due to the risk of omitted variable bias 
as a result of spatial sorting, reverse causality, or unaccounted economic shocks, an 
instrumental variable estimation is performed using the aforementioned shift-share 
methodology for all three main variables of interest: fractionalisation, polarisation 
(Table 5-4, columns 1, 2, and 3) and concentration (Table 5-4, columns 4, 5, and 6).  
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Table 5-4 reports a positive and strongly significant impact of high levels of 
fractionalisation in all three base years on income per capita levels in 2010, supporting 
the validity of previous results. In contrast to the OLS regressions, the polarisation 
index, while remaining negative, becomes significant at the 5% level for 1880 and the 
10% level for 1900 and 1910 respectively. This proves that once we control for 
endogeneity issues and correct potentially biased estimators, diversity reveals its true 
underlying two dimensional long-term impact on income per capita levels. On the one 
hand, the presence of a large number of groups and, thus, considerable population 
diversity (high fractionalisation) is an important factor behind the long-term economic 
dynamism of places in the US, provided the diverse groups are not too polarized and, 
therefore, able to communicate with one another (low polarisation). By contrast, 
highly homogeneous societies have experienced much lower economic dynamism 
over the long-term (Table 5-4, regressions 4, 5, and 6). The signs and level of 
significance of the control variables remain virtually unchanged from those reported 
in Tables 5-2 and 5-3. 
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TABLE 5-4 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF DIVERSITY AND CONCENTRATION, IV 1880, 
1900, 1910 
Variables date from respective year of migration: 1880, 1900, or 1910 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.5.2 THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF DIVERSITY  
The second part of the analysis is dedicated to examining the dynamic impact of 
diversity on income levels. Starting with income levels in 1900, the dependent variable 
in Model 1 is changed each time by 10 years in order to account for potential changes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: Inc. p.c. 2010 (ln) 1880 IV 1900 IV 1910 IV 1880 IV  1900 IV  1910 IV  
Fractionalisation~ 0.371*** 0.391*** 0.271***    
 (0.0997) (0.123) (0.0810)    
Polarisation~ -0.175** -0.165* -0.100*    
 (0.0784) (0.0941) (0.0570)    
Concentration~    -0.375*** -0.389*** -0.261*** 
    (0.102) (0.115) (0.0683) 
Education 2000 0.0125*** 0.0126*** 0.0123*** 0.0124*** 0.0126*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.000782) (0.000857) (0.000806) (0.000767) (0.000880) (0.000811) 
Total population 2000 (ln) 0.00265 0.00107 -0.00327 0.00272 0.000932 -0.00302 
 (0.00518) (0.00594) (0.00510) (0.00532) (0.00623) (0.00540) 
Black population 2000 -0.00160*** -0.00116** -0.00145*** -0.00156*** -0.00106** -0.00146*** 
 (0.000451) (0.000479) (0.000456) (0.000437) (0.000502) (0.000467) 
Female participation 2000 -4.24e-05 0.000852 0.000747 9.59e-05 0.000814 0.000752 
 (0.00115) (0.000995) (0.000993) (0.00111) (0.00102) (0.00100) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0227*** -0.0243*** -0.0248*** -0.0242*** -0.0255*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.00472) (0.00390) (0.00440) (0.00480) (0.00427) (0.00461) 
Infant mortality 2000 -0.000113 -3.90e-05 -0.000212 -1.49e-05 -5.21e-05 -0.000216 
 (0.000336) (0.000303) (0.000287) (0.000317) (0.000308) (0.000293) 
Agriculture 2000 9.45e-05 -0.00109 -0.000798 0.000716 -0.000661 -0.000415 
 (0.00220) (0.00212) (0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00235) (0.00232) 
Income (ln) ~ -0.00337 -0.00617 -0.00764** -0.00367 -0.00634 -0.00749** 
 (0.00364) (0.00431) (0.00333) (0.00382) (0.00448) (0.00337) 
Literacy~ 0.0451 0.0221 0.0302 0.0694 0.0476 0.0523 
 (0.0537) (0.0783) (0.0499) (0.0492) (0.0939) (0.0536) 
Total population (ln)~ -0.0171*** -0.0106 -0.0112 -0.0150*** -0.00818 -0.00769 
 (0.00522) (0.00929) (0.00880) (0.00496) (0.00908) (0.00822) 
Black population ~ 0.226*** 0.196*** 0.212*** 0.254*** 0.204*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0362) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0380) (0.0394) 
Female participation ~ 0.0533 -0.0315 0.0115 0.0278 -0.0338 0.00928 
 (0.0875) (0.0929) (0.0519) (0.0924) (0.0903) (0.0513) 
Unemployment~ -0.00115 -0.0486** -0.225 -0.00603 -0.0456** -0.218 
 (0.0128) (0.0214) (0.150) (0.0105) (0.0221) (0.158) 
Agriculture~ -0.0650 0.0238 -0.0958*** -0.0716 0.0344 -0.0913*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0763) (0.0196) (0.0545) (0.0667) (0.0189) 
State Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,817 2,826 3,067 2,820 2,827 3,069 
First-stage F-statistic 22.63 36.95 99.28 87.19 74.10 213.74 
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in the influence of original population diversity on income per head. For this part of 
the analysis, however, vector 𝑍, including the base year controls, is dropped from the 
estimation in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity in the earlier years considered. 
By means of an ordinary least squares regression, followed again by two rounds of 
robustness checks, we seek to analyse if the impact of diversity on county-level 
income per head varies over time. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 5-
5. 
The results point towards an enduring and positive association between population 
diversity and local income levels in the US. With the exception of the 1920s to 40s, 
heavily affected by the great depression and both world wars21, the link between 
fractionalisation and income per capita at the county-level remains positive and strong, 
with no evidence of a waning or shifting connection over time. As in Table 5-2, with 
the exception of one year in the 1900 base year regression, there is no significant 
connection between population polarisation and income levels.  
To test the validity of these results, we conduct the same exercise substituting 
fractionalisation and polarisation by concentration levels within the county population 
(Table 5-5). In line with the previous long-term results (Table 5-3), a strong negative 
association between high levels of concentration and regional income levels emerges 
not only in the long-, but also in the short- and medium-term. Similarly, the effect of 
concentration is negative and significant over the whole 100-year timeframe 
considered, with the exception of 1920 to 1940 (see footnote 21).  
                                                     
21 The 1920s to 1940s were heavily influenced by the Great Depression and both world wars. These 
macroeconomic shocks seem to have dominated the diversity effect to such an extent that the 
significance levels are lost during these years. Normal economic rules were suspended during these 
years with an economy more and more nationalised focusing on the production of war supplies and the 
arms and defence industry. Later, starting with the 1950s, with an economy slowly back to ‘normal’ 
times, the diversity variables pick up their significance levels again. 
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Both OLS regressions emphasise the importance of a county’s population composition 
at the time of the great migration waves to the US for its subsequent economic 
development. The results suggest that counties which failed to attract a large variety 
of groups from different origins – both international as well as national – seem to have 
suffered negative economic consequences for more than a century, as indicated by the 
significantly lower income levels, than those counties that succeeded in establishing 
vibrant and diverse communities.  
Is this dynamic connection purely an association or is there a causal relationship? To 
answer this question, we resort to the use of an instrumental variable estimation, using, 
once again, a shift-share instrument. The results for both Model 1 and 2 are displayed 
in Table 5-6. 
Again, and with the exception of the period between 1920 and 1940 (see footnote 21 
for a potential explanation), the results depict a strong and robust association across 
time between population diversity and regional income levels. As in the OLS 
estimations, the coefficient for the fractionalisation index remains, across all three 
base years, positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast to the OLS 
regressions, the use of an IV estimation makes the coefficient of polarisation 
significant for the early (1900-1910) and later years (1960-2000) of the analysis. 
Polarisation has, as expected, a negative influence on county-level economic 
development in line with Alesina et al. (2003), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 
b), or Ager and Brückner (2013a). Wherever strong barriers across place-of-birth 
origins were evident among population groups at the time of the great migration, local 
development has lagged behind.  
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Moreover, we now find a dynamic effect related to the size of the coefficients. This is 
particularly evident in the case of the 1880 and 1900 base year regressions. Columns 
1 and 2 (income in 1900 and 1910 as dependent variables) in Table 5-6 display 
coefficients up to almost 5 times larger than those presented in columns 10 or 11 (1990 
and 2000). The results indicate that high levels of fractionalisation and polarisation in 
the composition of a population had a more powerful effect on income levels within 
the first 10 to 30 years, while, in the longer term, despite remaining significant, the 
extent of this effect becomes significantly smaller (Figure 5-5). Hence, a high degree 
of population diversity, generated by mass internal and international migration at the 
turn of the 20th century, seems to be at the origin of some sort of diversity buzz. We 
presume such local buzz to have produced fertile grounds for long-term increases in 
productivity and innovation (Jacobs 1961, 1969). But the impact of population 
diversity has not been constant over time. There are many possible ways to explain 
this result. We find the influence of diversity on county-level wealth to be particularly 
strong during the years when migrants were still economically active and kept the local 
population culturally diverse. We assume that as long as the different population 
groups remained clearly distinct from one another and immersed in the culture of their 
home countries and home regions, the economic impact of diversity remained high. 
We argue the assimilation of migrants and, especially, of their children into the 
American melting pot to have reduced population diversity and, consequently, 
attenuated its positive economic effects. As the cultural distance between previously 
highly different population groups might have decreased with adaptation to the 
American way of life, the economic premium linked to past local diversity seems to 
have waned.  However, the positive effect of past diversity buzz did not disappear 
completely: formerly diverse counties remained more dynamic over time than counties 
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that had, by and large, stayed mostly homogeneous in their population composition. 
Hence, diversity shocks at local level seem to have triggered economic mechanisms 
that – one might argue - became engraved in the territory and have proved enduring – 
leaving traces that can still be detected more than a century after the initial shock took 
place. In spite of the assimilation of former migrants into American culture, the rapid 
‘Americanisation’ of their children and the loss of local diversity over successive 
generations, high historical population diversity levels in the late 19th and early 20th 
century still affect current local economic development across the US. Diversity linked 
to migration has left a very long-lasting trace on local wealth which is still measurable 
in terms of higher average income levels today.  
 
 
FIGURE 5-5 EVOLUTION OF COEFFICIENTS FOR FRACTIONALISATION, POLARISATION 
AND CONCENTRATION OVER TIME (IV, BASE YEAR 1880) 
Source: Own elaboration 
  
Insignificant 
 period 
134 
 
TABLE 5-5 THE DYNAMIC EFFECT OF DIVERSITY AND CONCENTRATION, OLS22 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Var. of interest Base year Dep Var.: Income 1900  1910  1920  1930  1940  1950 1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diversity 
 
 
1880 
Fractionalisation 0.247*** 0.199* 0.087 0.012 0.0042 0.161*** 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.300*** 0.282*** 0.322*** 
 (0.057) (0.114) (0.073) (0.064) (0.069) (0.0555) (0.0477) (0.0510) (0.0668) (0.0605) (0.0691) 
Polarisation -0.078 -0.028 -0.054 -0.046 -0.059 -0.0269 -0.0864** -0.106* -0.164** -0.123* -0.132* 
 (0.054) (0.073) (0.042) (0.037) (0.048) (0.0430) (0.0393) (0.0541) (0.0614) (0.0673) (0.0712) 
Observations 2,835 2,848 2,858 2,844 2,561 2,817 2,870 2,857 2,865 2,865 2,871 
R-squared 0.571 0.551 0.587 0.624 0.626 0.844 0.802 0.634 0.490 0.432 0.303 
 
 
1900 
Fractionalisation  0.474*** -0.036 -0.0155 -0.068 0.185** 0.273*** 0.289*** 0.244** 0.254** 0.274*** 
  (0.081) (0.069) (0.071) (0.076) (0.0802) (0.0864) (0.0969) (0.102) (0.116) (0.101) 
Polarisation  -0.126* -0.015 -0.058 -0.048 0.0161 -0.0243 -0.0855 -0.102 -0.0704 -0.0704 
  (0.069) (0.052) (0.047) (0.057) (0.0537) (0.0533) (0.0667) (0.0847) (0.0933) (0.0879) 
Observations  3,046 3,094 3,070 2,750 3,046 3,103 3,085 3,098 3,098 3,103 
R-squared  0.542 0.589 0.628 0.627 0.835 0.794 0.606 0.476 0.405 0.300 
 
 
1910 
Fractionalisation   -0.049 0.0053 -0.016 0.160** 0.159*** 0.157** 0.198*** 0.215*** 0.283*** 
   (0.058) (0.055) (0.070) (0.0630) (0.0580) (0.0724) (0.0641) (0.0721) (0.0602) 
Polarisation   -0.019 -0.054 -0.095* 0.0162 0.0133 -0.000155 -0.0365 -0.0354 -0.0569 
   (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.0633) (0.0574) (0.0739) (0.0617) (0.0671) (0.0555) 
Observations   3,117 3,089 2,757 3,071 3,128 3,111 3,123 3,123 3,128 
R-squared   0.591 0.628 0.628 0.833 0.788 0.600 0.474 0.400 0. 305 
 
 
 
 
 
Concentration 
 
 
1880 
Concentration -0.250*** -0.209** -0.054 0.022 0.025 -0.158*** -0.204*** -0.199*** -0.219*** -0.205*** -0.218*** 
 (0.069) (0.102) (0.068) (0.059) (0.062) (0.0578) (0.0476) (0.0471) (0.0605) (0.0601) (0.0647) 
Observations 2,836 2,849 2,859 2,845 2,561 2,818 2,872 2,859 2,867 2,867 2,873 
R-squared 0.565 0.551 0.587 0.624 0.625 0.844 0.800 0.631 0.482 0.423 0.292 
 
1900 
Concentration  -0.471*** 0.075 0.065 0.135 -0.236*** -0.319*** -0.306*** -0.183** -0.200** -0.195** 
  (0.067) (0.075) (0.079) (0.081) (0.0829) (0.0730) (0.0872) (0.0786) (0.0831) (0.0779) 
Observations  3,046 3,094 3,070 2,750 3,046 3,104 3,086 3,099 3,099 3,104 
R-squared  0.541 0.590 0.628 0.627 0.835 0.793 0.606 0.471 0.398 0.291 
 
1910 
Concentration   0.086 0.035 0.098 -0.209*** -0.203*** -0.184*** -0.180*** -0.196*** -0.240*** 
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.069) (0.0500) (0.0420) (0.0486) (0.0564) (0.0513) (0.0545) 
Observations   3,117 3,090 2,757 3,072 3,129 3,112 3,124 3,124 3,129 
R-squared   0.591 0.628 0.626 0.833 0.788 0.599 0.471 0.396 0.296 
  Lag. contr. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  Base year contr. no no no no no no no no no no no 
  State controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
                                                     
22 Detailed estimation results including control variable coefficients can be made available upon request 
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TABLE 5-6 THE DYNAMIC EFFECT OF DIVERSITY AND CONCENTRATION, IV23 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Var. of interest Base year Dep Var.: Income 1900  1910  1920  1930  1940  1950 1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diversity 
 
 
1880 
Fractionalisation 1.961*** 0.899*** -0.081 -0.050 -0.118 0.227*** 0.425*** 0.450*** 0.396*** 0.414*** 0.553*** 
 (0.181) (0114) (0.1005) (0.095) (0.110) (0.0708) (0.0663) (0.0727) (0.0798) (0.0848) (0.0914) 
Polarisation -0.893*** -0.407*** -0.023 -0.073 -0.053 0.0593 -0.0849 -0.188*** -0.221*** -0.214** -0.296*** 
 (0.172) (0.110) (0.092) (0.086) (0.104) (0.0679) (0.0665) (0.0729) (0.0805) (0.0835) (0.0858) 
Observations 2,831 2,844 2,849 2,832 2,553 2,806 2,857 2,845 2,852 2,852 2,858 
First-stage F-stat 73.55 78.41 70.38 87.16 61.99 72.93 82.92 82.88 76.85 77.17 74.78 
 
 
1900 
Fractionalisation  0.661*** 0.129 0.0332 0.054 0.327*** 0.417*** 0.451*** 0.553*** 0.463*** 0.539*** 
  (0.119) (0.107) (0. 099) (0.101) (0.0792) (0.0683) (0.0745) (0.0829) (0.0825) (0.0916) 
Polarisation  -0.332*** -0.062 -0.065 -0.104 -0.105 -0.106* -0.191*** -0.297*** -0.198*** -0.236*** 
  (0.095) (0.087) (0.0802) (0.085) (0.0674) (0.0579) (0.0636) (0.0708) (0.0726) (0.0791) 
Observations  2,848 2,853 2,836 2,557 2,810 2,861 2,849 2,856 2,856 2,862 
First-stage F-stat  135.81 136.13 145.29 123.39 153.70 151.99 156.91 142.44 144.29 137.57 
 
 
1910 
Fractionalisation   -0.060 -0.018 -0.075 0.220*** 0.378*** 0.409*** 0.355*** 0.349*** 0.358*** 
   (0.072) (0.067) (0. 072) (0.0499) (0.0511) (0.0570) (0.0594) (0.0611) (0.0607) 
Polarisation   -0.019 -0.064 -0.058 0.0194 -0.0675 -0.151*** -0.185*** -0.150*** -0.140** 
   (0. 061) (0.057) (0.060) (0.0454) (0.0446) (0.0502) (0.0553) (0.0559) (0.0555) 
Observations   3,090 3,064 2,744 3,041 3,096 3,079 3,091 3,091 3,096 
First-stage F-stat   246.59 261.98 255.31 282.16 279.32 279.97 286.17 293.68 309.42 
 
 
 
 
 
Concentration 
 
 
1880 
Concentration -1.895*** -0.868*** 0.223 0.188 0.259* -0.330** -0.456*** -0.425*** -0.245* -0.249* -0.318** 
 (0.272) (0.154) (0.148) (0.150) (0.147) (0.145) (0.120) (0.129) (0.141) (0.136) (0.154) 
Observations 2,836 2,849 2,854 2,837 2,557 2,811 2,862 2,850 2,857 2,857 2,863 
First-stage F-stat 85.22 80.40 81.84 94.15 95.99 93.91 101.21 111.46 106.47 104.99 98.26 
 
1900 
Concentration  -0.618*** -0.066 0.041 0.042 -0.356*** -0.429*** -0.408*** -0.407*** -0.355*** -0.398*** 
  (0.194) (0.144) (0.124) (0.125) (0.131) (0.0974) (0.106) (0.125) (0.109) (0.133) 
Observations  2,849 2,854 2,837 2,557 2,811 2,862 2,850 2,857 2,857 2,863 
First-stage F-stat  63.38 65.03 72.04 70.39 76.30 73.25 79.03 70.62 69.16 65.78 
 
1910 
Concentration   0.157 0.123 0.190* -0.297*** -0.410*** -0.380*** -0.227** -0.235** -0.218** 
   (0.098) (0.100) (0.1003) (0.114) (0.0992) (0.110) (0.105) (0.109) (0.102) 
Observations   3,094 3,069 2,748 3,046 3,101 3,084 3,096 3,096 3,101 
First-stage F-stat   238.21 307.38 235.88 298.02 254.42 281.25 300.42   293.77 293.81 
  Lag. contr. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  Base year contr. no no no no no no no no no no no 
  State controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
                                                     
23 Detailed estimation results including control variable coefficients can be made available upon request 
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Replacing fractionalisation and polarisation with concentration yields results which 
are almost the reverse carbon copy of the fractionalisation coefficients. Concentration 
proves yet again to have a negative, enduring, and strongly robust impact on local 
economic development. Just like the indexes of fractionalisation and polarisation, high 
levels of concentration within a county’s population reveal a dynamic impact on 
income levels over time. The large coefficients in the short-term decrease over time, 
despite keeping strong significance levels throughout. 
The above findings reinforce and extend the findings of Hong and Page (2001), Florida 
(2002), and Niebuhr (2010) that more diverse places, measured by the number of 
population groups, are more economically dynamic and productive than more 
homogeneous places. Diversity fosters economic growth – not only in the short-, but 
also in the medium- and even in the very long-term. However, there seems to be a 
strong need for channels of dialogue between the different groups, as the relative size 
and distance between groups of different origins interacting in a territory proves to be 
detrimental for sustainable economic development. If the lines separating groups are 
too deep and insuperable, communication lines fail, bridging between groups becomes 
difficult, resulting in social unrest and conflict, highly polarised societies, and thus 
low economic growth for decades to come.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The question of whether and how population diversity impacts the economic trajectory 
of territories has recently attracted increasing attention (i.e. Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Gören, 2014; Alesina et al., 
2016; Bove and Elia, 2017). The literature dealing with the topic has focused on a 
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multitude of factors, ranging from the labour force setup and skill endowments to the 
provision of public goods. Two opposing views have emerged – one referring to 
diversity as growth enhancing, the other as growth reducing. Each view is to some 
extent dependent on the respective diversity indicator employed. The most frequently 
used are population fractionalisation and measures of polarisation and segregation.  
Most analyses have, however, typically considered the short-term economic impact of 
diversity rather than evaluating its effects over longer timeframes. Despite an 
undeniable effect on growth over the short-term, whether past population diversity 
levels still affect economic outcomes over the medium- or long-term and whether there 
is a time varying impact on regional economic prosperity remains an almost untouched 
area within the scientific literature. This chapter has aimed to fill in the gap. The 
objective has been to assess the extent to which diversity, measured as two 
dimensional notion of fractionalisation and polarisation, in the population composition 
of US counties during the Age of Mass Migration between 1880 and 1910 has left an 
imprint on the region’s economic development and whether that potential imprint can 
still be felt today, more than 130 years later. It also evaluates if the dimension and the 
direction of the impact of diversity on economic development trends over time by 
considering the impact of diversity over a time span of 130 years, shifting the focus of 
the analysis 10 years at a time between 1900 and 2000. 
The results of the analysis identify the presence of a strong and very long-lasting 
impact of diversity on county-level economic development. Counties that attracted 
migrants from very diverse national and international origins over a century ago are 
significantly richer today than those that were marked by a more homogeneous 
population at the time. Highly diverse counties after the big migration waves of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries strongly benefited from the enlarged skillset, the 
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different perspectives and experiences, the dynamic and risk-seeking character of the 
arriving migrants and from the interaction among those different groups. The result 
seems to have been a surge of new ideas and of a newfound dynamism that was quickly 
translated into lofty short-term economic gains. These gains proved durable and, albeit 
in a reduced way, can still be felt today.  
Yet the benefits of diversity come with a strong caveat: our retrieved results indicate 
the gains of having a large number of groups from different origins within a territory 
(fractionalisation) only to materialise if the diverse groups are able to communicate 
with one another (low polarisation). Deep cut lines separating the groups (high 
polarisation) emerge as an important barrier for economic development. Hence, 
diversity becomes a double-edged sword: One might argue that it works only if the 
different groups can interact, that is, if the ‘melting pot’ really happens. Where it is 
not possible to build a dialogue between the different groups, where bridging does not 
occur, groups and communities remain in their own physical or mental ghettoes, 
undermining any economic benefits from a diverse environment. 
In the US context, the benefits from diversity have remained over time. Where high 
levels of diversity are coupled with ‘bridging’ across groups – high population 
fractionalisation with low polarisation – economic gains were generated that were felt 
in the short-, medium-, and long-term. With the exception of the highly turbulent 
1920s to 1940s, a strongly positive and robust association between fractionalisation 
and regional income levels, as well as a negative association of polarisation, is evident 
in the analysis. The only change in this enduring relationship is that both connections, 
while remaining strongly statistically significant, become weaker after the 1920s. 
While the initial spark of diversity at the turn of the 20th century is revealed a strong 
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booster of economic dynamism for a period of between 10 to 30 years, its impact, 
albeit decreasing, has not yet faded entirely.  
We can only speculate cautiously about the reasons as to why this is the case. Among 
the many different possible views on the mechanisms at work, we assume that as 
successive generations of migrants have blended into the American ‘melting pot’ and 
often moved away from where their ancestors settled, the seeds of diversity coupled 
with the risk-seeking and entrepreneurial character of the migrant may have grown 
roots not only in local institutions, but also in places. Diversity in those places where 
it facilitated the bridging among groups more than a century ago has, in all likelihood, 
generated more welcoming, vibrant, entrepreneurial, and economically dynamic 
territories. This vibrancy has, in a way, together with the mentality of the migrant 
become embedded in the very core of the territory, a factor which guarantees that 
transformations which took place a very long time ago are still felt today. However, 
further case study based anthropological research will be needed in order to firmly 
prove this point.  
The results of the analysis also have implications for policy. Even though the 
conditions and circumstances today do not correspond to those in the US in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, our results appeal for pause and thought in a period when 
migration policies are fast changing and have often become driven by extreme parties 
and the tabloid press. At a time when many developed countries are rapidly closing 
down their borders to immigration (Beine et al., 2016), trying to shield what – 
particularly in the case of Europe and Japan – are still rather homogeneous populations 
from external influences and the perceived security, economic, and welfare threats 
often unjustly associated with migrants, restricting migration will limit diversity and 
is bound to have important and long-lasting economic consequences. By foregoing 
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new migration, wealthy societies may be jeopardising, as our research shows, not only 
the short-term positive impact associated with greater diversity, but also the enduring 
positive influence of diversity on economic development. The large, positive, and 
persistent impact of societal diversity on economic development seen in the US would 
therefore be difficult to replicate – something that ageing and lethargic societies across 
the world cannot relinquish. However, if migration is to be encouraged, it is of utmost 
importance that mechanisms facilitating the dialogue across groups and hence the 
integration of migrants are in place to guarantee that diversity is transformed into 
higher and durable economic activity over the short-, medium- and long-term. 
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5.8 APPENDIX 5A  
 
TABLE 5-7 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
Main variables of interest   
Dependent variable:   
 
Income (ln) 
Natural log of average income 
aggregated at county level in county i 
in year t and t0 respectively* 
• 1950-2010: Income per capita in 
current dollars - not adjusted for 
inflation 
• 1940: Family wage and salary 
income in current dollars – not 
adjusted for inflation. Calculation 
based on size of total population 
• 1880-1930: aggregated mean 
income constructed on the basis of 
median total income score per 
occupation in hundreds of 1950 
dollars. Calculation based on size 
of total population 
 
US BEA, US BLS 
 
IPUMS USA 
 
IPUMS USA 
 
Independent variables (Model 1):  
Fractionalisation Level of fractionalisation in 
population of county i in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
Polarisation Level of polarisation in population of 
county i in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
 
Independent variables (Model 2):  
   
Concentration Level of concentration in county i in 
year t0 
 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
 
Instruments   
Shiftshare_diversity* Fractionalisation index based 
shiftshare in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
Shiftshare_polarisation* Polarisation index based shiftshare in 
year t0 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
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Variable Description Source 
Shiftshare_concentration* Concentration index based shiftshare 
in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
own construction 
   
Controls included in X and Z  
Education 
 
1940-2000: Percentage of population 
of county i with college degree 
relative to total population above 25 
years in year t-k 
ICPSR 
 
Literacy 1880-1930: Literacy rate in county i 
relative to total population in year t0  
IPUMS USA 
Total population (ln) Natural log of total population in 
county i in year t-k and t0 respectively 
ICPSR and US BLS 
Share of black population 
 
Percentage of black population of 
county i relative to total population in 
year t-k and t0 respectively 
ICPSR and IPUMS USA 
Female participation 
 
Female participation rate in the labour 
force in county i in year t-k and t0 
respectively 
ICPSR and IPUMS USA 
Unemployment 
 
Unemployment rate in county i in 
year t-k and t0 respectively 
ICPSR, US BEA and US BLS 
Infant mortality 
 
Infant mortality rate in county i in t-k 
measured as number of deaths among 
infants aged <1 year per 1,000 live 
births 
CDC and ICPSR 
Agriculture 
 
Percentage of the labour force 
employed in agriculture in county i in 
year t-k and t0 respectively 
ICPSR, US BEA and US BLS 
Mean income (ln) Initial mean income in county i in 
1880, 1900 and 1910 constructed on 
the basis of median total income score 
per occupation in hundreds of 1950 
dollars based on individual 
occupational data, as natural log    
ICPSR and IPUMS USA 
State controls State dummies Own construction 
* Base years: 1870 for 1880 and 1880 for subsequent years  | t0 refers to the years of migration either 1880, 
1900 or 1910  |  t-k  refers to the time period 10 years prior to the dependent variable 
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6 A WOMAN’S TOUCH? FEMALE MIGRATION AND 
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, 244 million people globally lived outside their countries of origin. Women 
represented almost half of this, that is 48 percent or 117 million of total migrants 
worldwide (United Nations, 2016). The salience of women migrants has led to the 
development of a large literature focusing on female migrants, how their experience 
differs from their male coutnerparts, and how they are differentially embedded in 
family and social structures (e.g. Chant and Radcliffe, 2003; Kofman et al., 2011). 
Similarly, the economic impact of migration has been thoroughly researched and, 
more recently, studies have begun to consider its long-term economic impact, finding 
that it has a significant and positive economic effect on the places of destination and 
that the positive implications endure more than a century later (Rodríguez-Pose and 
von Berlepsch, 2014, 2015). Yet, despite the growing literature on gender and 
incipient research into the long-term economic impact of migration, the interaction 
between these two factors has largely been ignored. Migration economics has too often 
considered the migrant as ‘genderless’ and assumed that the dominant – e.g. ‘male’ – 
perspective of the migrant experience was identical for women. Hence, the question 
of whether there is a gender specific dimension to the long-term macroeconomic 
impact of migration remains unanswered. 
This chapter intends to tackle this gap in our knowledge. Focusing on the United States 
during the Age of Mass Migration around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century – a 
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time when millions of people left their homelands and established themselves on 
American soil – we assess the link between female migration and economic 
development. We assume that women migrants have a two-fold economic impact: A 
direct effect via territorial concentrations of female migration and a second, indirect 
one via their children. These two influences may affect economic development 
differently in the short- and long-term. In line with the relevant literature, we assume 
migrant women to have played an essential role in migrant communities. While we 
speculate the migrant woman’s role in the short-term to be predominantly connected 
to an enlargement of the labour force, we assume them to have acted as ‘cultural 
carriers’ of the mentality, customs, traditions, and social capital associated to the risk-
seeking and economically dynamic character of the migrant over the long-term. In this 
role, we suspect them to have positively shaped the economic development of the 
places where they settled. Following our line of thought, one might argue that the 
institutional constructs brought to the US by migrants in connection to their migrant 
mentality transferred from mother to child left a territorial imprint on their settlement 
regions and that this imprint still affects the economic wellbeing of communities and 
territories in the US today. 
In order to test whether this is the case, this chapter adopts the following structure: 
Section 6.2 provides a historical overview of women migrant settlement patterns in 
the US at the turn of the 20th century. Section 6.3 summarises the literature linking 
female migration and economic development. In Section 6.4, we explain the 
methodology and the data employed in our analysis. Section 6.5 presents the results, 
while Section 6.6 concludes. 
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6.2 MIGRANT WOMEN DURING THE AGE OF MASS 
MIGRATION 
 
The period between the mid-19th century and World War I is commonly referred to as 
the ‘Age of Mass Migration’ – a time where population movements reached an 
unprecedented level in modern history. More than 40 million people left Europe in 
search of better lives elsewhere. The large majority of these migrants headed towards 
the Americas and, in particular, to the US (Hatton and Williamson, 1994, 1998; 
Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2006). 
Between 1860 and 1920, the stock of foreign-born population in the US multiplied by 
more than a factor of three, from roughly 4 million in 1860 to nearly 14 million in 
1920 (Gibson and Jung, 2006). During this time, migration to the US was strongly 
gendered: only one in three migrants was a woman. However, despite a higher male 
entry rate, greater male return rates and higher male mortality resulted in a relatively 
equal gender balance of the US foreign-born population with a gender ratio close to 1 
over the entire period (Figure 6-1) (Gabaccia, 1994). 
 
FIGURE 6-1 US FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY GENDER, 1870-1930 
Data source: Gibson and Jung, 2006; own elaboration 
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Women often shared the same motives as men for leaving Europe: poverty, population 
increase, food shortages, drought, political upheaval, and economic and religious 
oppression. They, however, also escaped other “forms of oppression unique to them 
as women” (Schwartz Seller, 1981: 6): unwanted arranged marriages, unequal wages 
and working conditions, discrimination, sexual harassment, and the restrictiveness of 
female domestic roles. At that time, “daughters without dowries faced declining social 
status at best, hunger at worst” (Schwartz Seller, 1981: 16). 
Entering the US as migrants proved more difficult for women than men. Although US 
immigration practices were gender neutral in theory, in practice they effectively 
hindered the unrestricted entry of women into the country. US law made entry difficult 
for those ‘likely to become a public charge’. Particularly when travelling 
unaccompanied, women were scrutinised far more than men, especially regarding their 
marital status, intended residence, and financial situation. The absence of a male 
‘provider’ often meant that women were viewed as economic dependents and sent 
back home (Friedman-Kasaba, 1996). 
In spite of this, many foreign-born women made it to the US. The origin of these 
women was highly diverse in terms of social class, age, national origin, religion, and 
education. However, a series of common traits can be identified. Most women 
migrants were young, generally between 25 and 44 (Gibson and Jung, 2006). In 1900, 
over 70 percent of them stemmed from north western Europe – mainly Germany, 
Ireland, or the United Kingdom. After 1900, the share of southern and eastern 
European women – mainly from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy – grew (Table 6-
1). 
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TABLE 6-1 US FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY GENDER AND NATIONAL ORIGIN  
(IN %)  
 1900*  1910 
 Men Women 
 Men Women 
      
North-western Europe  65,6 70,5   46,5 54,3 
    Great Britain1  11,3 11,3  8,7 9,5 
     Ireland 13,2 18,5  8,0 12,7 
     Germany  26,8 27,7  17,4 19,9 
     Scandinavian countries2  10,7 10,0  9,2 9,3 
     Others3 3,6 3,1  3,1 3,0 
Southern & Eastern Europe  19,6 15,5   40,9 32,7 
     Italy 5,6 3,6  11,5 7,9 
     Russia & Finland  6,6 5,3  13,1 12,4 
     Austria-Hungary 6,6 5,6  13,3 11,1 
     Others4  0,8 1,0  3,0 1,2 
Europe "not specified" 0,2 0,2   0,0 0,0 
            
Totals           
Europe 85,5 86,2   87,4 87,0 
Asia  2,0 0,2  2,1 0,5 
Americas 12,2 13,4  10,1 12,2 
All other5  0,3 0,3   0,3 0,3 
      
* Gender split unavailable for earlier years     
1 Including England, Wales and Scotland     
2 Including Norway, Sweden and Denmark     
3 Including the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and 
Switzerland  
4 Including the Balkan Peninsula, Portugal and Spain    
5 Including Africa, Australia, Atlantic Islands, born at sea and unspecified country 
 
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1910); own calculations  
The large majority of migrant women originated from agrarian and extractive regions, 
such as the potato and wheat fields of Ireland, the orchards of southern Italy, or the 
mining towns of the UK. Most were poor, unskilled, and could neither read nor write, 
having worked either as farmhands or domestic servants in addition to their duties 
within the home. For those from outside the British Isles, familiarity with the English 
language was rare (Schwartz Seller, 1981).  
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In 1900, close to 70 percent of women migrants living in the US were married while 
only 20 percent were single (US Bureau of the Census, 1900a). The latter was 
considered a great disadvantage at the time. Being part of a family meant not only 
support in the new unknown country but, most importantly, financial security. Only 
very few women had enough savings to pay for the journey and to survive on their 
own after arrival. Unmarried women travelling alone generally did so to re-join 
parents, siblings, or other relatives (Weatherford, 1986). Thus, as a way to survive in 
the unknown, most women migrants became wives or mothers shortly after arrival. 
The marital age for foreign-born women (around 20-21) was significantly lower than 
that of American-born women (usually 24-25) (US Bureau of the Census, 1900a). 
While 70 percent of foreign-born women chose a partner from the same home country, 
those marrying outside their national origin tended to remain within their cultural 
group (e.g. an Irish woman marrying a Scot) or chose American-born men (Carpenter, 
1927). 
Migrant families were usually larger than American ones. Foreign-born women had 
on average, one child every 3.2 years, while the figure for American women was one 
child every 5.3 years (US Immigration Commission, 1911). The younger the mother, 
the higher the likelihood of one pregnancy per year. “[…] The child of a German 
migrant was three times as likely to be the tenth child in its family as the American 
baby” (Weatherford, 1986: 2).  
Most migrant women at first received support from relatives and kinfolk already 
settled in the US. “Kinship became the single most important link in the construction 
of migration ‘chains’ from specific locations [back in Europe] to specific locations 
within the United States” (Gabaccia, 1994: 62). After arriving in the US, migrant 
women followed in their relatives’ footsteps and joined them in their area of 
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settlement. Figure 6-2 shows their settlement pattern based on 1880 Census data. High 
shares of female migrants were the norm in the north east of the country. In contrast 
to men, women tended to settle in the highly urbanised arc, extending from Maine to 
Minnesota and, in particular, in New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Outside this belt, Utah and parts of 
southern Texas also had high concentrations of migrant women.  
 
 
FIGURE 6-2 SETTLEMENT PATTERN OF MIGRANT WOMEN (% OF TOTAL FOREIGN 
STOCK), 1880 
Source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration 
 
In contrast, migrant men largely outnumbered women in the west and in agricultural 
regions (Figure 6-3). Urban and industrial areas had a more balanced migrant gender 
ratio than rural ones – predominantly those in the east (see Appendix 6A). This bias 
was mostly due to the availability of ‘female jobs’ in these areas. The combination of 
domestic services and a concentration of female worker dominated industries, such as 
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the textile and garment industry in New England and the Mid-Atlantic States, drew 
migrant women in large numbers. Sixty-two percent of white foreign-born women 
gainfully employed around the turn of the century were located in these regions of the 
country (Hill, 1929). These settlement patterns for both female and male migrants 
remained similar over time, as displayed in Appendix 6B.  
 
 
FIGURE 6-3 SETTLEMENT PATTERN OF MIGRANT MEN (% OF TOTAL FOREIGN 
STOCK), 1880 
Data source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration 
 
Job opportunities affected female foreign-born settlement, yet, only around one in five 
migrant women were gainfully employed and therefore active in the official labour 
market. In 1900, a mere 19 percent of the total adult – 15 years and above – female, 
white, foreign-born population was an ‘active breadwinner’ (US Bureau of the Census, 
1900a, Table 6-2). Migrant female labour force participation also had a very 
distinctive structure. Predominantly young women – aged under 24 – were in 
employment. Marriage and the birth of children marked a watershed, as migrant wives 
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and mothers generally stayed out of the official labour force. Return to official gainful 
employment was mainly associated with the loss of a husband as a consequence of 
separation, divorce, or death (Figure 6-4).  
 
TABLE 6-2 FOREIGN-BORN WHITE FEMALES IN GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT BY AGE (IN 
%), 1890, 1900  
  1890   1900 
    
Share of total 15+  19,8  19,4 
15 to 24 years 50,4  48,9 
25 to 34 years 19,8  19,8 
35 to 44 years 12,0  13,0 
45 to 54 years 10,5  11,7 
55 to 64 years 9,4  9,8 
65+ 6,1  6,2 
Age unknown 37,5   26,3 
Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1900a; own calculations 
 
This implies that the family and the rearing of children, in particular, were at the heart 
of the life of most migrant, adult women, above 25 years. The tasks all were clearly 
divided: wives worked inside the home, providing childcare, food, shelter, and 
clothing while the husbands worked outside, earning the family income. Oftentimes, 
it was the mother who managed the family finances, making the decisions on how to 
allocate the family budget. It was commonplace for “the workman to turn over his 
wages to his wife on pay day and to ask no questions as to what it goes for” 
(Weatherford, 1986: 104). 
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FIGURE 6-4 OFFICIAL EMPLOYMENT FEMALE POPULATION 15 YEARS+ BY MARITAL 
STATUS, 1900  
Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1900a; own elaboration 
 
Officially employed women were concentrated in so called ‘female industries’, such 
as domestic services, manufacturing, textiles, fabric mills, tobacco, or artificial flower 
making. While foreign-born men were employed in more skilled, higher paying jobs, 
the wide range of foreign-born female occupations was at the low end of the 
occupational ladder and hence low skilled and low paying. Many of the ‘female 
industries’, such as domestic services and manufacturing, were largely dominated by 
migrant women (Table 6-3). In 1905, 84 percent of migrant women arriving at the port 
of New York named domestic occupations, such as servant girls, maids or cooks, as 
their profession (Kellor, 1907). Employment often helped migrant women to become 
assimilated into the American society much more than it did for migrant men. Young 
girls in particular, often hired at very young age of 11 or 12 and who worked as 
domestic servants, cooks, or maids within American households, integrated quickly. 
“Domestic service not only augmented family incomes […], but it brought an 
important segment of the migrant population – the future mothers of the second and 
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third generations – into intimate contact with middle-class American home life” 
(Conzen, 1976: 93). 
 
TABLE 6-3 WHITE FEMALE FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL 
CATEGORIES, 1900 AND 1910 
          
Major occupational category  1900 (%)*  1910 (%)* 
     
Agriculture  10,7  7,8 
Professional Services  6,3  8,3 
Domestic & Personal Service  33,1  33,5 
Trade & Transportation (inc. Clerks)  12,6  10,3 
Manufacturing & mechanical  22,1  24,3 
          
     
*Numbers in % of total white females (100%) all nativities gainfully employed in 
sector 
 
Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1900b; US Bureau of the Census, 1940; own elaboration 
 
Occupational structure, however, varied with age and marital status. While young 
migrant women largely worked in the domestic service and manufacturing industry, 
older women, if and when re-entering the labour force, tended to work at night in order 
to combine employment and child rearing responsibilities. They often undertook 
unofficial wage earning activities inside their home, commonly including their 
children as helpers. These homeworkers typically “[packed] food into jars, stripped 
feathers, basted pants, made buttonholes, crocheted slippers, assembled toys” 
(Gabaccia, 1994: 50), rolled cigars, or made artificial flowers. Sometimes migrant 
women within a neighbourhood formed informal cooperatives in order to maximise 
their work output and support each other (Weatherford, 1986). This contribution to the 
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family income, however, was often acquired unofficially and thus remained excluded 
from official records. 
 
6.3 MIGRANT WOMEN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
The wide literature on the economics of international migration largely views an influx 
of migrants as positive for economic development (i.e. Borjas, 1994; Card, 2005). 
Transmission mechanisms, such as increasing returns to scale (i.e. Borjas, 1995), 
alterations to the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour (Lundborg and Segerström, 2002), 
increasing wages (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006), and the stimulation of productivity by 
means of innovation and specialisation (i.e. Gordon and McCann, 2005; Partridge and 
Furtan, 2008), are considered important drivers of economic growth in the receiving 
country. In the case of the US, 19th century migration was behind an increase of 13 to 
42 percent in capital stock (Neal and Uselding 1972), making migration essential for 
the take-off of the US economy (Hirschman and Mogford, 2009). 
These findings have, in our opinion, two key drawbacks. First, economic research has 
tended to downplay the gender dimension of the economic impact of migration, and, 
second, studies have focused on the short-term, largely ignoring the long-term 
economic impact. 
 
6.3.1 GENDER AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION 
 
There is growing literature across the social sciences that considers the gender 
dimension of migration. Prevailing topics have been, for example, income differentials 
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between husband and wife (Cooke, 2003); differences in remittance patterns and 
specific household compositions (i.e. Cerrutti and Massey, 2001; de la Brière et al., 
2002); working habits and hours, education and brain drain (i.e. Edwards and Ureta, 
2003; Özden and Schiff, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006); or comparisons of 
women and men migrant social capital and how these affected individual employment 
opportunities and settlement patterns (i.e. Davis and Winters, 2001; Curran and 
Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Linvingston, 2006). This research has shown that the specific 
characteristics of women, the reasons behind their migration decision, their migratory 
patterns, the impact on their places of origin, and their assimilation and participation 
at their places of destination differ from those of men (i.e. Ravenstein, 1889; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Cerrutti and Massey, 2001; Mahler and Pessar 2003; Oishi, 
2005; Andall, 2013).  
While the majority of this gender based research has focused on the individual, 
macroeconomic approaches differentiating along gender lines have been neglected 
almost entirely. Although female migration has been shown to strongly influence 
factors behind economic development, such as an increase in the country’s labour 
force (i.e. Cuberes and Teignier, 2012; Lechman and Kaur, 2015), improvements to 
gender equality (i.e. Berik et al, 2009; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009), and the 
empowerment of women (i.e. Duflo, 2012), we know little about the specific effect of 
migrant women on regional growth. Studies analysing the macroeconomic impact of 
migration have tended to simply pool male and female migrants together to form ‘the 
migrant’ – one homogenous group. Women migrants are considered ‘tied movers’, 
naturally perceived within the family frame, economic dependents following the male 
head of the household. In many studies, gender is simply relegated to a control 
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variable, if considered at all (Pfeiffer et al., 2008). There is an implicit assumption that 
men and women play equal roles in shaping the economic outcomes of migration.  
Of the literature, which does investigate the macroeconomic influence of female 
migrants, some studies have hinted at a positive economic impact of a strong presence 
of women migrants in the labour force (Blau et al., 2003, evaluating the US) or of the 
incidence of foreign women entrepreneurs (Collins and Low, 2010, analysing 
Australia). Others, however, have pointed in the opposite direction. Smith and Bailey 
(2006) show a negative economic impact associated to a gender gap between native-
born and foreign-born families. Poor integration of migrant women into the labour 
market and a tendency to end up in occupations below their skill levels also indicate 
an unused economic potential linked to migrant women (Riaño and Baghdadi, 2007). 
In short, the limited research on the macroeconomic impact of female migrants goes 
in different directions, providing no clear answers as to how female migrants shape 
the economy wherever they settle. 
 
6.3.2 MIGRANT WOMEN AND THEIR LONG-TERM IMPACT FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Most studies on the macroeconomic impact of migration have focused on the relatively 
short-term. In general, these analyses have found that migration is economically 
beneficial, improving economic dynamism in the receiving area. The long-term 
economic effect of migration has, by contrast, been almost entirely neglected. The 
exceptions are Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014, 2015), who analysed the 
effect of 19th century migration on US economic development today. Their findings, 
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robust across different migration waves, underline that the effect of migration is very 
long-lasting, with positive effects detected at local level long after the first generation 
of migrants became assimilated into US society: areas of the US where migrants 
settled in large numbers at the turn of the 20th century are considerably more 
prosperous today than those largely bypassed by migration. Sequeira et al. (2017) 
support these results.  
 One possible line of argumentation among a range of potential explanations for the 
persistence of a positive economic effect of migration is linked to the institutional 
‘constructs’ built by migrants in their places of destination (Rodríguez-Pose and von 
Berlepsch, 2014). Higher levels of economic development linked to migration are 
contingent on the cultural institutions brought and developed by migrants from their 
places of origin, such as inherited traditions, habits, trust, or customs within the 
community (Tabellini, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) coupled with the migrant’s 
character being more risk-seeking, entrepreneurial and economically dynamic than its 
native-born counterpart. Studies by Acemoglu et al. (2001) have underlined the role 
cultural institutions play for economic development, as the institutions connected to 
different European colonial powers have significantly shaped the economic trajectory 
of countries on the American continent.  
Similar mechanisms may have been at play during the Age of Mass Migration. 
Migrants not only brought their skills, labour, and work ethics, but also their “baggage 
[…] in the way of culture, religion, social networks and links with the society of 
origin” (Joly, 2000: 30), which helped them model entire institutional structures 
according to the “national blueprint” (Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2015: 399) 
they left behind. Not only was language preserved, so too were customs, habits, 
mentality, and traditions imported (Rice and Feldman; 1997). “[Immigrants] came not 
168 
 
to establish something new but to re-establish something old” (Daniels, 1990: 146). 
Hence, it is logical to speculate cautiously that the migrants and the institutional 
frameworks they established have transformed the territories where they settled. 
Eventually, “as migrants settle, they rework the destination itself” (Silvey and Lawson, 
1999: 125). 
Institutional constructs have been shown to persist over very long time frames. Putnam 
(1993), studying social capital, and Duranton et al. (2009), focusing on family 
structures, have demonstrated that institutional structures built in the Middle Ages still 
shape regional development today. Algan and Cahuc (2010) also find that values, 
norms, and beliefs of second and third generation migrants are highly correlated to 
those of their country of origin. Mass migration has led to the formation of ‘ethnic 
landscapes’ (i.e. Conzen 2001; Nostrand and Estaville, 2001), where economic 
success is a consequence of “the cohesive bond provided by shared values and 
common backgrounds [of migrants, which] took root and remain strong to this day” 
(Harwick, 2009: 237). Given the spatial clustering of 19th century migrants arriving in 
the US, their sheer volume, and the strong migrant networks across the country, it 
could be assumed that the institutional mechanisms developed during the Age of Mass 
Migration resulted in the formation of institutional constructs that might still shape 
current economic development. 
But do women play a distinctive role in the transfer of habits and institutional traits 
from one generation to another? There are a multitude of views on this issue. One 
argument, for example, builds on the positioning of the woman within the family 
construct (Zlotnik, 1995). According to Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989), women are 
the “ideological reproducers, [...] the ‘cultural carriers’ of the ethnic group” (p. 9). In 
their role as mothers, women transmit the cultural heritage, way of life, and history of 
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their ancestors to the next generation. Within this line of argumentation, tit is mainly 
the migrant woman who conveys traditions, customs and habits, establishes strong ties 
within the ethnic community, and plays an essential role in preserving the native 
culture (i.e. Yuval-Davis, 1993; Pettman, 1996). Migrant women thus bear “the 
responsibility for the maintenance and generational transmission of culture” (Gray, 
2003: 34). Studies across a wide array of disciplines, ranging from economics (i.e. 
Schüller, 2015) and sociology (i.e. Killian and Hegtvedt, 2003) to psychology (i.e. 
Sabatier, 2008), have confirmed the role of the mother as cultural carrier and show 
that the role of the mother in the transmission of ethnic and cultural identity as well as 
cultural habits to the next generation is significantly stronger than that of the father. 
If one evaluates history following this theory, many of the traits of the life of migrant 
women during the Age of Mass Migration seem to support this theory. While fathers 
were mostly absent from their children’s lives due to long working hours and leisure 
activities outside the home, mothers were seen as the “guardian of the family” 
(Friedman-Kasaba, 1996: 130). Mothers taught their children the language of their 
country of origin and transmitted their way of life, customs, and traditions. Children 
learned from their mothers about the hardships of an migrant’s life, thus contributing 
to the diffusion of the ‘spirit of a migrant’ – being more risk-seeking, entrepreneurial 
and dynamic than their American counterparts – to the second generation. 
Furthermore, migrant women, far more than their male counterparts or native-born 
Americans, cultivated strong bonds within the migrant community. Reaching out to 
neighbours, distant kin, their ethnic group, and their church or synagogue community, 
foreign-born women created large and dense cultural networks (Gabaccia, 1994). As 
Ryan (2011) argues, immigrant women often formed localised networks which are 
different from those of men but no less important in passing on cultural norms. This 
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was particularly the case with immigrant mothers who often formed networks based 
on mutual support rather than economic production (Ryan et al., 2008). Within these 
networks, traditions and cultural festivities were kept alive. Solidarity, support, and 
cooperation across generations, social class or gender, sharing of information, 
household equipment, or food within community networks helped in withstanding the 
hardships of migrant life (Garbaccia, 1994).  
In this chapter, we hypothesise that the institutional constructs formed within the 
period of mass migration have left a territorial imprint that can still be felt in the 
economic development of US counties today. We speculate that this effect was 
stronger in areas with higher concentrations of migrant women, possibly acting as 
‘cultural carriers’ of ethnic identity and behaviours to the next generation. According 
to our theory, large clusters of female migrants are assumed to have fostered the ‘spirit 
of the migrant’ to become embedded into the character of the territory, transforming 
the institutional constructs at the destination areas to become more dynamic, 
entrepreneurial, and economically active. In line with our hypothesis, these conditions 
would have been likely to have resulted in an enduring economic dynamism, translated 
in a greater level of development of those territories that attracted more migrant 
women and where second generation migrant children born to migrant mothers 
became prevalent. 
 
6.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
In order to assess whether migrant women settling in the US during the Age of Mass 
Migration left a trace on the subsequent county level economic development, we 
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estimate two different econometric models. Model 1 focuses on the direct impact of 
migrant women. We seek to determine whether a large share of female migrants in a 
given US county affects its economic growth in the short-term and whether this 
potential impact shifts over time. We also consider the ratio of female to male 
migrants, inquiring whether a greater migrant gender balance in a county has left a 
significantly different imprint on the county’s economic trajectory than in counties 
where migrant men predominated.  
Model 2 evaluates the indirect effect of migrant women over the long-term, focusing 
on their children. We analyse the first generation born to migrants on American soil 
and their imprint on economic growth. We test the notion of the migrant mother as 
potential ‘cultural carrier’ and compare the impact on economic development of a 
large share of children born to migrant mothers, relative to those born to migrant 
fathers and two American parents.24 
Our hypothesis is that larger shares of migrant women in a given US county during 
the Age of Mass Migration will have had a significant and positive impact on the 
growth trajectory of the county, both directly and indirectly. Following the literature 
on gender equality, women empowerment, and female participation in the labour force 
(i.e. Berik et al, 2009; Duflo, 2012), a large share of migrant women could have acted 
as a driver of regional growth in the short- and long-term. In the short-term, women 
migrants expanded the labour force, especially in traditional ‘female’ industries, such 
as the textile or garment industry, possibly contributing a non-negligible share to the 
US GDP in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Their manpower might have boosted 
                                                     
24 We use the notion of American or ‘native-born’ to refer to people born on US soil. ‘Foreign-born’ 
refers to a birthplace outside of the US.  
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economic activity shortly after their arrival in the US and served as an important fillip 
for the receiving region’s economy. 
In the long-term, the impact of migrant women on economic growth would have 
adopted a more indirect form via their children. We follow one possible explanation 
and hypothesise that the role of migrant mothers as carriers of culture and harbingers 
of the mentality of the migrant (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989) would have made 
their children and the territories where they settled more dynamic than those where 
women migrants were absent or in a minority. We speculate the cultural institutions 
passed on by migrant mothers to their children over 100 years ago to have therefore 
left an indelible territorial impression on US counties which is still evident today. 
According to this hypothesis, the migrant women’s institutional baggage would have 
affected the counties’ territory in a way that part of the migrants’ mentality – being 
more dynamic, more risk-seeking and entrepreneurial – might have become engraved 
into the territory's very own character leaving a long-lasting trace for economic 
development.  
 
6.4.1 MODEL 1: THE DIRECT IMPACT  
 
Model 1 evaluates the direct impact of women migrants on their areas of settlement. 
It adopts the following form: 
tsitiktititititi stateZXRatioMigFemigy ,,,,,,,, 0000     (1) 
where y represents the natural log of income per capita in county i at period t (t = 2010, 
1910, 1880); Femig depicts the share of female migrants in the total population of 
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county i at time t0 (t0 = 1880, 1910); Mig is the percentage of foreign-born relative to 
the total population of county i at time t0; Ratio depicts the ratio of female to male 
migrants in county i at time t0
25; X is a vector of variables associated with the level of 
economic development of county i at time t-k (k =10);26 Z represents a similar vector 
of factors considered to have had an effect on the county’s economic development at 
time t0  and that may also have influenced its attractiveness to migrants; State 
represents state fixed effects controlling for any unobserved factors at state level, while 
ε depicts the county specific error term, clustered at state level s, ensuring robustness 
to arbitrary spatial correlation within one state. The correlation coefficient between 
Femig and Mig and Mig and Ratio is, respectively, below 0.1 and below 0.4, implying 
a very limited risk of multicollinearity. All three variables are thus included in the 
regression analysis. 
 
6.4.2 MODEL 2: THE INDIRECT IMPACT  
 
Model 2 estimates the indirect long-term impact of female migration at the turn of the 
20th century on regional economic growth in 2010, focusing on children below the age 
of 16 born to migrant women. While the dependent and control variables remain the 
same as in Model 1, we exchange the variables of interest for different combinations 
of parentage. The model takes the following form: 
                                                     
25 Using a single measure of migration provides analytical clarity, but may fail to reflect the significant 
diversity between and within different migrant groups. While we cannot fully address this challenge in 
this chapter; this represents an important strand for further research. We are grateful to a reviewer for 
raising this point.  
26 In order to avoid issues with multicollinearity, X is included only in the long-term analysis. 
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𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡0 +  𝛾𝐹𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡0 + 𝛿𝐴𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡0 + 𝜕𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜃𝑍𝑖,𝑡0 +
 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡    (2) 
where Mforeign is defined as the share of children born in a given county i to a foreign-
born mother and an American-born father relative to the total number of children in 
the same county at time t0; Fforeign represents the share of American-born children 
with a foreign-born father and an American-born mother in a given county i; and 
Aparents corresponds to the share of children with both American-born parents. The 
base category in this second model is the share of children with both foreign-born 
parents. Children are defined as all individuals in a county below the age of 16. 
 
6.4.3 THE DATA 
 
The dependent variable – the natural log of income per capita at county level – was 
extracted for 2010 from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database, 
measured in US dollars. As income per capita data more than a century ago are 
unavailable, we referred to the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series USA database 
(IPUMS) Version 6.0 (Ruggles et al. 2015) for the construction of the 1880 and 1910 
income variables. This database provides US microdata covering the censuses and 
American Community Surveys between 1790 and 2010.27 A proxy, aggregated at 
county level and based on individual data of median total income scores per 
occupation in 1950 dollars (as natural log), is used. The construction uses the size of 
the total population including all non-participants within the labour force as base in 
                                                     
27 The American Community Survey was only initiated in 2005. 
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order to remain as comparable as possible with the income per capita variable of later 
years. 
Migration and parentage variables in both models were generated using the IPUMS 
database. A weighted sample of the US population of 5,791,531 individuals in 1880, 
covering 11 percent of the total US population at the time, and 923,153 individuals in 
1910, representing one percent of the population, was employed to construct the main 
variables of interest. All data were allocated to the individuals’ county of residence 
and aggregated at county level. All residents with a non-US birthplace were classified 
as ‘migrants’. 
As US county size, quantity, and geography changed over the period of analysis (2,875 
counties or equivalent territorial units in the 48 contiguous states in 1880; 3,123 in 
1910; 3,109 in 2010), counties in 1880 and 1910 were matched to their regional 
equivalent in 2010. Using cartographic boundary files of the 48 continental states 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii) for every decade of analysis provided by the US 
Census Bureau, we normalized county boundaries to the 2010 situation and calculated 
historical county averages, weighted by the population density during the boundary 
change. 1880 and 1910 were chosen as reference years for our regression analysis, as 
both represent a peak in foreign-born population stock – 1880 covering the first 
migration wave; 1910 covering the second. 
Two differentiated sets of control variables are included in the model (vectors X and 
Z). Vector X comprises factors dating from period t-k (year 2000). All variables in 
vector Z date from the time of the two historic censuses, 1880 and 1910 respectively. 
Vector X accounts for variables directly determining the current income per capita 
levels across US counties. Vector Z is incorporated to consider factors that may have 
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influenced the level of economic activity and therefore growth in a given US county 
at the time of migration, but also to control for variables that served as pull factors, 
affecting the initial settlement decision of the migrant women. 
Both vectors contain, wherever possible, the same variables measured at county level: 
educational attainment, unemployment rate, share of black population, urban share, 
percentage of the labour force employed in manufacturing, and female participation 
rate in the labour force. While educational attainment is measured as the literacy rate 
for the historical years, for the t-k dimension we resort to the share of people with 
tertiary education. The share of women in the total county population is included in 
the model as a way to prevent the main variable of interest, female migration, from 
picking up effects related to the size of the overall female population in a county.28 
Furthermore, in the long-term analysis, we control for the initial average income at 
county level at the time of migration by incorporating an income proxy based on 
individual data reflecting the median total income per occupation in 1950 dollars 
(IPUMS USA database). All 2000 controls were extracted from the US BEA, the 
Current Population Survey tables of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the 
2000 Census Summary files. The IPUMS USA database and the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research database (ICPSR) were used as sources 
for the historical variables. In cases where data were only available at the individual 
level, the same method as for the migration and parentage variables was used for the 
construction of new variables. A detailed description of all variables and sources can 
be found in Appendix 6C.  
 
                                                     
28 As the share of female population in t0 is highly correlated with the stock of migrant women in 1880 
and 1910, this variable is discarded from the analysis in the early years. Only the size of the female 
population in time dimension t-k is included. 
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6.4.4 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) ESTIMATION 
 
Any analysis involving income and migration data over long timeframes is prone to 
potential endogeneity issues. Prosperous counties may have attracted large numbers 
of migrant women, but a large share of migrant women, in turn, can be behind the 
economic dynamism and GDP of these counties. The direction of causality is therefore 
difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, immigrant women might have purely settled in 
counties which either had higher income levels or showed good growth prospects, 
resulting in spatial sorting. Lastly, any model analysing data spanning more than 100 
years is highly likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. In order to address these 
concerns, factor out the true underlying impact of migrant women on economic 
development, and ensure the validity of our least squares estimates, we refer to 
instrumental variable estimation methods (IV). Two different types of instruments are 
proposed for estimating the direct and indirect effect of female migration: 
Socioeconomic factors and the path dependency of migrant women.  
In the case of the direct effect of women migrants, we differentiate in Model 1 
instruments by time horizon. For the short-term analysis, we employ the share of 
married individuals and the mean number of distinct generations living in the same 
household to instrument for the share of migrant women in a given county. Both 
socioeconomic instruments are taken from the respective year in question (1880 or 
1910) and were extracted from the IPUMS USA and ICPSR databases. For the long-
term analysis, we add the share of population in urban areas in 1910.  
These instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance term and explain the variation 
in settlement choice by women migrants. Spinsterhood was considered a great 
disadvantage at the time, meaning that migrant women to the US either were already 
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married upon arrival or married shortly thereafter. The outlook “to a land where they 
could marry quickly and relatively well, and where they could exercise more choice 
in acquiring a spouse” (Gabaccia, 1994: 34) encouraged many women who had few 
hopes of a favourable marriage in their places of origin to cross the Atlantic. Marriage 
rates among the migrant population were distinctly higher than among the American-
born population, just as foreign-born women married at a significantly younger age – 
women migrants married, on average, five years earlier than American-born women 
(Dickinson, 1980). This implies that marriage rates are likely to be correlated with the 
presence of women migrants, without simultaneously being correlated with the error 
term.  
On average, migrant women were also younger when they had their first child than 
their American counterparts. “An annual pregnancy was a fact of life for a great many 
immigrant women” (Weatherford, 1986: 2). Children were considered an economic 
asset. They worked for the family from an early age and helped make ends meet. To 
save money, the large majority of children remained part of their parents’ household 
long after they had grown up. Migrant women also generally moved with their in-laws 
upon marriage. As migrant women were frequently responsible for establishing and 
maintaining migrant social networks, their ‘kinship-work’ often involved taking care 
of the older generation in their own homes (Weatherford, 1986; Gabaccia, 1994). 
Consequently, migrant women tended to end up living with their children, their 
children’s children, and their parents, making the average number of generations under 
one roof a suitable instrument to assess endogeneity. As family structure and living 
arrangements in the US drastically evolved over the past 130 years, the number of 
distinct generations in one household more than a century ago does not have any 
independent influence on income per capita levels in 2010. 
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By adding the urbanisation level 1910 as instrument for the share of migrant women 
in the long-term analysis, we exploit the distinct settlement pattern of migrant women 
depicted in Figure 6-1. Women migrants clustered predominantly in the highly 
urbanised areas of the northeast, where ‘female industries’ concentrated. As many 
current major urban clusters were merely small towns 100 years ago, the share of urban 
population at the turn of the 20th century is uncorrelated to county GDP levels in 2010, 
meaning that the instrument does not violate the exogeneity condition. 
For the indirect effect of migrant women on economic development, a third type of 
instrument is used in Model 2. Exploiting the fact that migrant women followed the 
footsteps of their next of kin, creating a path-dependency in migration patterns 
(Gabaccia, 1994), we use the supply-push component of children with foreign-born 
mothers and native-born fathers (see also Card and DiNardo, 2000; Ager and 
Brückner, 2013). This instrument assumes that migrant women in 1880 and 1910 
respectively a) follow the same settlement patterns as their average female predecessor 
and b) integrate in society in a similar manner and frequency (i.e. marrying American 
men) as migrant women had done in the past.  
The supply-push instrument is calculated using the US growth rate of the share of 
children born to foreign-born mothers and American-born fathers between a base year 
and the target year 1880 (1910) multiplied by the initial share of this population group 
in the base year in a given county i.29 As initial base year population shares are used 
in the computation, the instrument is exogenous to any county specific shocks that 
                                                     
29 The supply-push component of children with foreign-born mothers for target year 1880 is computed 
using initial shares in 1870. For 1910, we use 1880 initial base year values due to the significantly larger 
data sample. 
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may have affected the share of children born to foreign-born mothers in any given 
county between 1870 and 1910. 
The Staiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments and Kleibergen-Paap Wald F 
statistics, in combination with Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, are used in order 
to make sure that all chosen instruments are non-weak instruments. In almost all cases 
the weak instrument hypothesis is rejected. The only exception is the number of 
distinct generations per household when used in the long-term analysis of Model 1. 
We therefore limit the use of this instrument to the short-term analysis. 
 
6.5 ANALYSIS 
 
6.5.1 THE DIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN 
The first part of the analysis focuses on whether large shares of migrant women 
settling in the US around the turn of the 20th century had a significant direct impact on 
economic development both in the short- and long-term. We first assess Model 1 for 
the short-term using ordinary least squares (OLS), followed by an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation controlling for wealth influencing factors at the time of 
migration and including state fixed effects in order to minimise potential issues of 
spatial correlation and control for unobserved state specific factors. Standard errors 
are clustered at state level to control for arbitrary spatial correlation within a given 
state. As instruments, we employ the share of married individuals in a county and the 
mean number of distinct generations living in a household. Table 6-4 reports the short-
term results for our main variable of interest – female migrants – with respect to 
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income per capita in 1880 and 1910 respectively. Columns (1) through (3) display the 
results with base year 1880, while columns (4) through (6) cover the year 1910. 
Contrary to expectations, Table 6-4 reveals a negative association between higher 
shares of women migrants and economic development across both base years. For the 
1880 regressions, negative and strongly significant (at the 1% level) coefficients for 
OLS regressions are estimated. While high concentrations of migrants, regardless of 
gender, emerge as an important growth enhancing factor, a higher share of women 
migrants in a county’s population is connected to significantly lower short-term levels 
of economic development. This result is corroborated and strengthened when 
correcting for potential endogeneity issues using IV estimation methods. Both 
instruments retrieve highly significant and negative coefficients for both base years. 
The ratio of women to men migrants, however, displays a positive sign across OLS 
and IV 1880 regressions at levels of significance below 5% in the majority of cases. 
Hence, while migration was a strong driver of economic development, both a large 
presence of migrant women or a high imbalance between men and women at the turn 
of the 20th century led to lower levels of economic growth in the short-term. Results 
for the 1910 regressions, albeit displaying slightly weaker coefficients, point in the 
same direction.  
The validity of these results is reinforced by the significance levels and coefficients of 
the control variables across both base years and OLS as well as IV regression results. 
With the exception of the unemployment rate, all controls show the expected signs. A 
better educated, more urbanised county with a higher share of manufacturing 
employment, a larger black population, and a strong female labour force participation 
was significantly richer 100 years ago than a more rural one with lower literacy, less 
manufacturing, less black population, and fewer women in employment. We assume 
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the black population variable to serve as proxy for the economic structure of the 
largely agrarian counties of the South, rather than indicating the effect of a polarised 
county population into black and white. The coefficient of the share of black 
population is highly likely to capture the path to convergence of the poor regions of 
the South to the richer regions in the North (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1990, 1995). 
One variable which may potentially explain the – at first rather perplexing – result of 
a seemingly negative impact of women migrants on economic development is female 
participation in the labour force, which is both positive and statistically significant. 
During the Age of Mass Migration, only around 19 percent of the total female, white, 
foreign-born adult population was active in the official labour market (US Bureau of 
the Census, 1900a). Most foreign-born women were ‘homemakers’ or worked in the 
shadow economy. Hence, the yield of the average migrant woman’s work was often 
not recorded in traditional measures of economic activity, such as mean income. 
Moreover, ‘success’ for women migrants at the time was often linked to marriage and 
bearing children. This type of success generally implied leaving the labour force and 
making a less measurable contribution – at least in official records – to the economy. 
In any case, the positive and significant coefficient of the female participation in the 
labour force variable might display that, once gainfully employed, even if in the low 
skill and low pay ‘female jobs’ dominant at the time, women migrants made a positive 
contribution to regional economic growth by enlarging the labour force in the region 
and boosting economic activity.
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TABLE 6-4 THE DIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE SHORT-TERM, OLS 1880 
AND 1910 
Dep. Var:  
Mean income per 
capita 1880/1910 (ln) 
1880 1910 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS  IV  
Married 
IV 
Generations 
OLS  IV  
Married 
IV 
Generations 
       
Female Migrants ~ -0.395*** -0.448*** -4.226*** -0.0458 -2.386*** -1.453* 
 (0.137) (0.131) (0.318) (0.0434) (0.135) (0.782) 
Total migrants ~ 0.582*** 0.592*** 1.339*** 0.498*** 1.608*** 1.200*** 
 (0.141) (0.126) (0.426) (0.113) (0.263) (0.326) 
Ratio ~ 0.0170** 0.0209* 0.297*** -0.00128 0.143*** 0.0861* 
 (0.00782) (0.0117) (0.0365) (0.00225) (0.0120) (0.0502) 
       
Manufacturing ~ 0.739*** 0.738*** 0.675*** 0.606*** 0.316** 0.422*** 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.244) (0.0629) (0.126) (0.114) 
Urban Share ~ 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.450*** 0.350*** 0.658*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0456) (0.105) (0.0239) (0.0761) (0.0977) 
Literacy ~ 0.479*** 0.488*** 1.142*** 0.478*** 0.765** 0.662** 
 (0.0881) (0.0937) (0.382) (0.0810) (0.300) (0.274) 
Unemployment ~ 0.103** 0.101** -0.0368 0.635*** 1.623*** 1.212** 
 (0.0464) (0.0448) (0.0491) (0.145) (0.341) (0.495) 
Black Population ~ 0.367*** 0.372*** 0.755*** 0.213*** 0.738*** 0.532*** 
 (0.0989) (0.104) (0.246) (0.0640) (0.0892) (0.206) 
Fem. Participation ~ 1.147*** 1.169*** 2.726*** 0.988*** 1.342*** 1.192*** 
 (0.186) (0.199) (0.383) (0.115) (0.246) (0.174) 
       
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,851 2,851 2,843 3,120 2,950 2,942 
R-squared 0.6625 - - 0.5661 - - 
First-stage F-stat - 54.19 42.78 - 173.09 14.18 
~ Variables date reflect the respective year of migration: 1880 or 1910. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When considering the long-term impact of women migrants, wealth influencing 
controls for both the time of migration as well as 10 years prior to the dependent 
variable – the natural log of income per capita in 2010 – are included in Model 1. 
Table 6-5 reports the results for 1880 (results for 1910 are presented in Appendix 6D).  
When taking the whole US county sample into account, OLS estimations for both base 
years display insignificant coefficients for the main variable of interest (Column 1). 
While overall levels of migration remain positively and significantly associated with 
higher income per capita levels 100 to 130 years later, large shares of migrant women 
settling in a given US county around the turn of the 20th century seem to have no 
184 
 
bearing on current levels of county development. This hints at a potential waning of 
the very strong initial negative impact of female migration numbers over time. Similar 
findings are obtained for the ratio between female and male migrants. Despite very 
high significance levels in the short-term displayed in Table 6-4, the wealth declining 
effect of high imbalances between men and women migrants all but disappears in the 
long-term.
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TABLE 6-5 THE DIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE LONG-TERM, 1880 
Dep. Var.: 
Income per capita 2010 (ln) 
 OLS   IV  
(1) 
Whole sample 
(2) 
Female migration ≥ 10% 
Whole sample Female migration ≥ 10% 
(3)  
Married 
(4)  
Urban share 
(5)  
Married 
(6) 
Urban share 
Female Migrants ~ -0.0336 -0.0652** -1.063*** -0.562** -0.838*** -1.008** 
 (0.0234) (0.0297) (0.284) (0.236) (0.189) (0.491) 
Total migrants ~ 0.234*** 0.284*** 0.467*** 0.353*** 0.395*** 0.420*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0650) (0.0739) (0.0757) (0.0473) (0.0933) 
Ratio ~ 0.00288 0.00386 0.0745*** 0.0397** 0.0486*** 0.0584* 
 (0.00279) (0.00287) (0.0228) (0.0176) (0.0136) (0.0311) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.0919* -0.117*** -0.0989*** -0.0896** 
 (0.0253) (0.0318) (0.0471) (0.0300) (0.0343) (0.0386) 
Education 2000 0.0113*** 0.0108*** 0.0120*** 0.0117*** 0.0114*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.000912) (0.00100) (0.00111) (0.000913) (0.000995) (0.000962) 
Female 2000 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0155*** 0.0154*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00181) (0.00241) (0.00178) (0.00238) (0.00260) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0220*** -0.0249*** -0.0206*** -0.0213*** -0.0230*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00436) (0.00421) (0.00445) (0.00401) (0.00378) (0.00368) 
Black Population 2000 -0.00104*** -0.00100*** -0.00197*** -0.00152*** -0.00101*** -0.00102** 
 (0.000344) (0.000342) (0.000440) (0.000332) (0.000392) (0.000437) 
Fem. Participation 2000 0.00112 0.00121 0.00485** 0.00304** 0.00239* 0.00265* 
 (0.00107) (0.00127) (0.00208) (0.00139) (0.00143) (0.00145) 
Income ~ 0.0157 -0.0204 -0.113** -0.0504 -0.120*** -0.141* 
 (0.0240) (0.0219) (0.0550) (0.0418) (0.0395) (0.0736) 
Manufacturing ~ -0.0118 0.00540 0.117 0.0544 0.0750 0.0902 
 (0.0588) (0.0710) (0.103) (0.0829) (0.0891) (0.105) 
Literacy ~ 0.167*** 0.247*** 0.421*** 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0617) (0.0862) (0.0739) (0.0572) (0.0696) 
Unemployment ~ -0.00510 0.0139 -0.0104 -0.00783 0.00442 0.00235 
 (0.0123) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0142) (0.0266) (0.0280) 
Black Population ~ 0.233*** 0.284*** 0.360*** 0.298*** 0.186*** 0.164** 
 (0.0358) (0.0450) (0.0613) (0.0482) (0.0619) (0.0785) 
Fem. Participation ~ -0.0872 -0.129 0.645*** 0.289 0.256 0.340 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.250) (0.237) (0.210) (0.359) 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,444 1,998 2,444 2,444 1,998 1,998 
R-squared 
First stage F-statistic 
0.684 
– 
0.684 
– 
– 
10.84 
– 
26.32 
– 
39.10 
– 
12.40 
~ Variables date from respective year of migration, 1880   |   Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level   |   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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If one assumes, however, that a minimum critical mass of migrant women could be 
necessary in order to leave a long-lasting territorial imprint on the regions where they 
settled, we reach different results. Column (2) in Table 6-5 displays the results for 
those counties where the share of migrant women in the total foreign-born population 
was at least 10 percent in 1880. In contrast to the whole sample regressions, the 
coefficient of female migration remains negative but becomes significant at the 5 
percent level for 1880 and at the 10 percent level for 1910 respectively (see Appendix 
6D). Both the coefficients for total migration as well as for the ratio of migrant women 
to migrant men remains nearly unchanged. Hence, female migration seems to be 
significantly and negatively associated with economic development in the long-term 
only if the number of migrant women settling in any given county surpasses a 10 
percent threshold. Below this threshold, it can be assumed that women migrants were 
simply too few in number to leave a direct long-lasting legacy on economic growth.  
As would be expected, most of the year 2000 controls are significant (with the 
exception of the share of black population in the 1910 base year regressions and female 
participation in the labour force across both base years) and show the expected signs. 
While the share of population with a college degree and the share of women in a 
county’s population are positively associated with economic development, a high 
unemployment rate, a large black population, and high employment in manufacturing 
are negatively linked to economic growth.  
The base year controls, which display significant associations with income per capita 
100 to 130 years later are the literacy rate, the percentage of black population, and 
employment in manufacturing; the latter however only for 1910. The only 1880 or 
1910 variable with a strong and significant positive association across all samples and 
base years over the very long time is the share of total migrants, supporting earlier 
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work in this area (Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2014). The previously highly 
significant coefficient of initial female participation in the labour force fails to leave a 
long-lasting effect and becomes irrelevant for the determination of income per capita 
levels in 2010. A simple enlargement of the labour force by migrant women adding 
their manpower to the aggregate production function seems to leave no long-lasting 
positive impact on regional economic growth.  
As a means to address potential endogeneity issues involving models including both 
migration and income per capita variables, we perform an IV estimation using again 
the share of married individuals residing in any given county and the share of 
population living in urban areas. The results for 1880 are displayed in Table 6-5 
columns (3) through (6); those for 1910 in Appendix 6D. We use the same two samples 
as in the OLS analysis, focusing first on the whole county sample and then limiting it 
to those with a minimum critical mass of 10 percent women migrants in the two 
historical US Censuses.  
The coefficients for women migrants in both base years prove to be robust to 
correcting for endogeneity and potentially biased estimators and replicate the short-
term results. A large presence of foreign-born women at the turn of the 20th century 
seems to have a significant and negative impact on county income per capita levels in 
2010. Consequently, the results suggest that counties where large numbers of foreign-
born women established themselves during the Age of Mass Migration have endured 
a substantially worse economic trajectory over the last 100 to 130 years than those 
which had been largely bypassed by female migration. In contrast to the OLS 
regressions, the coefficient of the ratio of women to men migrants is positive and 
significant for all IV regressions in Table 6-5. As in the short-term, these coefficients 
allude to the fact that a higher gender balance in the migrant community served as a 
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powerful driver of economic dynamism over the very long-term. Counties largely 
dominated by male migrants (equivalent to a very low ratio of female to male 
migrants) have consequently had a worse economic trajectory than those with a greater 
gender balance amongst migrants. The coefficients for both sets of control variables 
in the IV regressions largely coincide with those obtained using OLS.  
 
 
6.5.2 THE INDIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN 
 
A seemingly negative direct impact of female immigration on officially recorded 
levels of economic development does not necessarily mean that women did not have 
other channels to influence economic outcomes. The second part of the analysis 
focuses on whether migrant women became drivers of development indirectly via their 
children in a society that, at the time, shunned their direct contribution to the economy. 
To do that, we apply Model 2, focusing on the main variable of interest ‘children with 
a foreign mother’, including again the two sets of control variables. Table 6-6 reports 
the results for both base years 1880 and 1910. 
The results confirm the hypothesis of the role of the migrant mother as ‘cultural 
carrier’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989) of the ethnic capital and mentality of the 
migrant. Across both base years, the OLS coefficients of our main variable of interest 
is significant at the 1 percent level for 1880 and at the 10 percent level for 1910 
respectively (Columns 1 and 2). A large share of children with a foreign mother and 
an American father is positively associated with higher levels of income per capita in 
2010, relative to the base category: children with two foreign parents. Children with a 
foreign-born father, by contrast, and an American mother seem to contribute no more 
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to the long-term economic development of a county than the presence of children with 
two foreign parents. Counties with a higher share of children born to two American 
parents have, by contrast, performed decisively worse over the long-term. One 
possible explanation for this result might be that migrant women marrying American 
men seem to have been the most successful in securing both a better future for 
themselves – through marriage to Americans who, on average, had higher wages than 
migrants (Abramitzky et al., 2014) – and for their communities of adoption through 
their capacity to transmit the spirit of the migrant and their ‘cultural baggage’ to their 
children coupled with their ability to become assimilated in the society of their 
receiving region. One might speculate that the dynamism of the migrant transferred 
onto the first American-born generation by their migrant mother was thus reinforced 
by the inter-cultural character of the relation between migrant mothers and American 
fathers. 
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TABLE 6-6 THE INDIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE LONG TERM, 1880 
AND 1910 
Dep. Var.:  
Income per capita 2010 (ln) 
OLS IV  
(1) 
1880 
(2) (3)  (4)  
1910 1880 1910 
     
Children with foreign mother ~ 0.195*** 0.110* 0.219* 0.138** 
 (0.0603) (0.0598) (0.121) (0.0542) 
Children with American 
parents ~ 
-0.142*** -0.0790* -0.144*** -0.0757* 
 (0.0366) (0.0427) (0.0225) (0.0409) 
Children with foreign father ~ -0.0568 0.00892 -0.0580 0.0120 
 (0.0694) (0.0448) (0.0550) (0.0445) 
     
Manufacturing 2000  -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0286) (0.0240) (0.0279) 
Education 2000 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.000910) (0.000907) (0.000665) (0.000885) 
Female 2000 0.0154*** 0.0159*** 0.0154*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00163) (0.00151) (0.00158) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0207*** -0.0208*** -0.0207*** -0.0207*** 
 (0.00432) (0.00435) (0.00319) (0.00423) 
Black Population 2000 -0.00118*** 0.000137 -0.00118*** 0.000136 
 (0.000348) (0.000415) (0.000330) (0.000406) 
Fem. Participation 2000 0.000882 0.00192* 0.000880 0.00192* 
 (0.00107) (0.00110) (0.000749) (0.00108) 
     
Income ~ 0.0376 0.0302 0.0377** 0.0303* 
 (0.0288) (0.0187) (0.0164) (0.0182) 
Manufacturing ~ -0.0306 -0.0962** -0.0305 -0.0960** 
 (0.0605) (0.0398) (0.0350) (0.0388) 
Literacy ~ 0.166*** 0.144 0.166*** 0.143 
 (0.0511) (0.0900) (0.0310) (0.0881) 
Unemployment ~ 0.000466 0.0281 0.000484 0.0288 
 (0.0146) (0.134) (0.0123) (0.131) 
Black Population ~ 0.249*** 0.144*** 0.250*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0437) (0.0370) (0.0426) 
Fem. Participation ~ -0.169 0.0392 -0.170** 0.0382 
 (0.157) (0.0646) (0.0863) (0.0634) 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,437 2,617 2,437 2,617 
R-squared 0.685 0.672 – – 
First stage F-statistic – – 188.22 276.60 
~ Variables date from respective year of migration 1880 or 1910 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level  |  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
To further test these results while correcting for potential issues of endogeneity and to 
check whether the effect of the first American-born generation on long-term economic 
development is causal, rather than a mere association, we conduct an IV estimation 
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using the calculated supply-push as instrument. The results of the analysis are 
displayed in Table 6-6, columns (3) and (4).  
The outcomes confirm the results of the OLS analysis. The results suggest once again 
that a large share of children of migrant women marrying American men have a 
distinctly higher impact on long-term county economic growth than those born to 
women marrying other migrants or foreign men marrying American women. The 
presence of higher shares of children with two American-born parents leaves the 
lowest long-term imprint on economic development of the four different groups 
considered. 
In short, rather than directly, our retrieved findings suggest that migrant women played 
an important role in the long-term economic development of US counties indirectly, 
via their children, when successfully integrating in the receiving community. We 
assume that once actively integrated into the community of their chosen county, 
‘melting’ into US society and marrying native-born Americans, migrant women 
transmitted the migrant mentality and cultural baggage to their children which set up 
the foundation for long-term economic dynamism wherever they settled. In line with 
this way of argumentation, counties endowed with a large share of children born to 
migrant women and American men more than 100 years ago are significantly better 
off today than those where the share of children born to women migrants was 
substantially lower. One way to explain this result is to refer to the ability of migrant 
women to integrate by establishing inter-cultural ties, paired with their skill to transmit 
the spirit of the migrant being more dynamic, more entrepreneurial, and risk-seeking 
onto their children. This ability might have acted as a long-term growth accelerator for 
those regions which not only succeeded in attracting female migration but also 
managed to successfully integrate foreign-born women into their communities. While 
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our research clearly shows the long term impact onto economic development, more 
qualitative research is needed to accurately prove the assumed transfer mechanism.   
 
 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Despite a large body of research on migration and economic development, at least two 
important factors have been neglected. First, the macroeconomic impact of the gender 
dimension has been overlooked, under the implicit assumption that the economic 
effects of migration are identical for both men and women. Second, the long-term 
impact of migration attracted limited attention – perhaps because short-term impacts 
are politically more urgent. This chapter has aimed to fill both gaps. 
We have assumed that women migrants have a two-fold impact on economic 
development: a) a direct one, triggered by large concentrations of migrant women, and 
b) an indirect one, via their children. With this fundamental assumption in mind, we 
analysed two research questions: (1) What has been the short- and long-term territorial 
economic impact of large shares of migrant women settling in the US around the turn 
of the 20th century? and (2) Do migrant women have a different direct and indirect 
effect than the migrant in general? The analysis confirms that migrant women have 
indeed exerted an important and differential direct and indirect effect on the short- and 
long-term economic development of US counties.  
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This impact, however, is not always in line with expectations. The concentration of 
migrant women in specific counties at the turn of the 20th century proved to be 
connected with significantly lower levels of regional economic development both 
immediately after settling in the US as well as many decades later. Regions which 
were largely bypassed by female migration have performed significantly better over 
the following 130 years than those heavily targeted by migrant women. This seems to 
be mainly due to the low female participation rate in the official labour force. 
Consequential to large numbers of ‘homemakers’ and migrant women employed in 
the shadow economy, the yield of the average migrant woman’s work remained 
unrecorded in traditional measures of economic activity. 
The positive influence of women on long-term economic development has come in an 
indirect manner: via their children. Counties where migrant mothers bore more 
children – especially those married to American fathers – and which have successfully 
managed to integrate them into their communities, have been more dynamic over the 
next century than specifically those where the majority of children were born to two 
American parents. Communities where large clusters of children were born to foreign-
born mothers and American-born fathers more than 100 years ago have become a 
motor of local economic development. This economic legacy of migrant women is 
also significantly stronger than that of foreign-born fathers.  
Consequently, migrant women have been a distinct force for development in the US 
since at least the late 19th century. While habits and customs – early, often arranged, 
marriages which generally led to child bearing and exclusion from the labour market 
– prevented them from making a measurable,30 positive contribution, their economic 
                                                     
30 The average migrant woman’s work was not recorded in traditional measures of economic activity. 
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contribution came in more intricate and indirect ways: via their capacity to shape the 
gender ratio between foreign-born women and men, via their ability to integrate into 
their chosen communities and, especially, via their children. We assume women 
migrants, more than migrant men, to have transferred the risk seeking, hardworking, 
entrepreneurial spirit of the migrant and the culture of their places of origin to their 
offspring. Following this line of thought, this transmission might have contributed to 
trigger an economic dynamism within the children of women migrants that could have 
become etched in the institutions of the places where they settled. This impact was 
strongest amongst the more integrated of women migrants: those who married locals. 
Whereas many foreign women at the time came to America following kin or as a 
consequence of pre-arranged marriages to men from their villages that had already 
made the transatlantic crossing, those marrying locals were more independent and 
determined to make a future for themselves.  
Our results, even though embedded into the particular historical and geographical 
context of the later 19th and early 20th century America, have important policy 
implications for the present. In times of increasing aversion to mass migration, special 
attention needs to be paid to policies that lead to inequalities generating male 
dominated migrant inflows.31 Huge gender imbalances in the migrant population not 
only have serious social consequences but, as this chapter shows, important short- and 
long-term negative economic effects. The results show the need to establish 
mechanisms to quickly integrate migrant women into society, both by encouraging 
their labour force participation and by creating the mechanisms to allow them to make 
free choices in issues such as marriage. Successfully absorbing and integrating women 
migrants will guarantee current and future economic prosperity. Failing to achieve this 
                                                     
31 For an analysis of inequalities, migration and government policies, see McGovern (2012) 
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integration would, in all likelihood, undermine the positive economic influence of 
migration for decades to come. 
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6.8 APPENDIX 6A 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6-5 GENDER RATIO OF FEMALE TO MALE MIGRATION, 1880 AND 1910 
Data source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration  
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6.9 APPENDIX 6B  
 
 
 
FIGURE 6-6 FEMALE & MALE MIGRANT SETTLEMENT PATTERN (% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-STOCK), 1910 
Data source: Ruggles et al., 2015; own elaboration
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6.10 APPENDIX 6C 
 
TABLE 6-7 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
Main variables of interest 
 
 
Dependent variables: 
 
 
Income per capita 2010 (ln) 
 
 
 
 
Mean income 1880/1910 (ln) 
Income levels of county i in year t and t0 
respectively* 
• 2010: Income per capita data in current 
dollars - not adjusted for inflation, as 
natural log 
• 1880, 1910: Constructed mean income 
score on county level. Individual income 
levels assigned to occupational data on 
the basis of median total income per 
occupation in hundreds of 1950 dollars, 
as natural log in t0. Basis for construction 
is total size of population in 1880/1910 
US BEA 
 
 
IPUMS USA 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Independent variables (Model 1):  
   
Femig 
Female migrants 
Share of female foreign-born individuals of total 
population in county i in year t0 constructed from 
individual data 
IPUMS USA 
   
Mig 
Total migrants 
Share of total number of foreign-born individuals 
of total population in county i in year t0 
constructed from individual data 
IPUMS USA 
   
Ratio Ratio of female to male foreign-born population in 
county i in year t0 constructed from individual data 
 
IPUMS USA 
Independent variables (Model 2):  
   
Mforeign  
Children with foreign mother 
Share of individuals below the age of 16 with 
foreign-born mother and native-born father in 
county i relative to the total number of children 
below the age of sixteen in the same county at time 
t0 
IPUMS USA 
   
Fforeign  
Children with foreign father 
Share of individuals below the age of 16 with 
foreign-born father and native-born mother in 
county i relative to the total number of children 
below the age of sixteen in the same county at time 
t0 
 
IPUMS USA 
   
Aparents 
Children with American 
parents 
Share of individuals below the age of 16 with both 
American-born parents in county i relative to the 
total number of children below the age of sixteen 
in the same county at time t0 
IPUMS USA 
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Variable Description Source 
   
Instruments 
  
   
Married  Percentage of married population in county i 
relative to total county population in year t0 
constructed from individual data 
 
IPUMS USA 
Generations Average number of distinct generations living  
in one household in county i in year t0  
constructed from individual data 
 
IPUMS USA 
Urban share Share of population of county i living in urban 
areas in 1910 
 
ICPSR 
   
Controls included in X and Z 
 
 
Education 
 
Percentage of population of county i with college 
degree in year t-k* 
ICPSR 
 
   
Literacy Literacy rate in county i in 1880, 1910 constructed 
from individual data 
IPUMS USA 
   
Manufacturing Percentage of labour force employed in 
manufacturing in county i; for 1880 and 1910 
constructed from individual data  
US BLS and 
IPUMS USA 
   
Black Population Percentage of black population in county i  ICPSR and 
Census 2000 
summary 
files 
Female  Percentage of female population in county i Census 2000 
summary 
files 
 
Female Participation 
 
Female participation rate in the labour force in 
county i; for 1880 and 1910 constructed from 
individual data 
ICPSR and 
IPUMS USA 
 
Unemployment Unemployment rate in county i; for 1880 and 1910 
constructed from individual data (‘Months 
unemployed last year’ used as proxy in 1880 as 
unemployment rate not available) 
IPUMS and 
US BLS 
State Controls State dummies 
  
Own 
construction 
211 
 
6.11 APPENDIX 6D 
 
TABLE 6-8 THE DIRECT IMPACT OF MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE LONG-TERM, 1910 
Dep. Var.: 
Income per capita 2010 
(ln) 
OLS IV 
(1) 
Whole sample 
(2) 
Female migration ≥ 
10% 
Whole sample Female migration ≥ 10% 
(3) 
Married 
(4) 
Urban share 
(5) 
Married 
(6) 
Urban share 
Female migrants ~ -0.00400 -0.0504* -0.394 -0.453*** -1.344* -0.648*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0266) (0.338) (0.141) (0.717) (0.211) 
Total migrants ~ 0.217** 0.287*** 0.426** 0.458*** 0.349*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0817) (0.209) (0.102) (0.0887) (0.0728) 
Ratio ~ -0.000231 0.00135 0.0238 0.0274*** 0.0595* 0.0282*** 
 (0.00165) (0.00152) (0.0206) (0.00952) (0.0332) (0.0105) 
       
Manufacturing 2000 -0.147*** -0.108*** -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.0147 -0.0648 
 (0.0285) (0.0377) (0.0318) (0.0301) (0.0890) (0.0488) 
Education 2000 0.0112*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0108*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.000905) (0.00120) (0.000879) (0.000893) (0.00141) (0.00122) 
Female 2000 0.0161*** 0.0151*** 0.0180*** 0.0183*** 0.0156*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.00159) (0.00262) (0.00239) (0.00211) (0.00350) (0.00280) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0211*** -0.0221*** -0.0230*** -0.0233*** -0.0247*** -0.0233*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00597) (0.00498) (0.00441) (0.00714) (0.00572) 
Black Population 2000 0.000202 0.000309 0.000291 0.000304 0.000777 0.000525 
 (0.000415) (0.000725) (0.000327) (0.000303) (0.000760) (0.000674) 
Fem. Part. 2000 0.00204* 0.00100 0.00326** 0.00344*** 0.00177 0.00136 
 (0.00110) (0.00147) (0.00141) (0.00116) (0.00164) (0.00146) 
       
Income ~ 0.00151 -0.00246 -0.00128 -0.00169 -0.0243* -0.0125*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00349) (0.00429) (0.00324) (0.0130) (0.00402) 
Manufacturing ~ -0.0931** -0.0834** -0.0903*** -0.0899*** -0.0649 -0.0749** 
 (0.0374) (0.0404) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0461) (0.0355) 
Literacy ~ 0.174* 0.281** 0.248** 0.259*** 0.387*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0866) (0.115) (0.115) (0.0982) (0.102) (0.0987) 
Unemployment ~ 0.0364 -0.166 0.311 0.352** 0.130 -0.0294 
 (0.131) (0.128) (0.246) (0.176) (0.276) (0.145) 
Black Population ~ 0.147*** 0.215 0.220*** 0.231*** 0.388* 0.295** 
 (0.0436) (0.129) (0.0781) (0.0454) (0.203) (0.125) 
Fem. Participation ~ 0.0667 0.0893 0.187 0.205** 0.558* 0.306*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0794) (0.153) (0.0993) (0.296) (0.110) 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,618 1,692 2,618 2,618 1,692 1,692 
R-squared 
First stage F-statistic 
0.672 
– 
0.644 
– 
– 
6.72 
– 
29.84 
– 
5.07 
– 
26.26 
 
~ Variables date from respective year of migration, 1910 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level   |   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7 INTERNAL MIGRATION AND ITS LONG-TERM 
IMPACT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“For we began as explorers, empire builders, pilgrims and refugees, and we have been 
moving, moving ever since.”  George Wilson Pierson (2011:91) 
 
In 2015, the United Nations estimated that the number of international migrants was 
244 million worldwide (United Nations, 2016). The size of global internal migration, 
however, was reckoned to be more than three times larger: around 763 million people 
or 11.7 percent of the world’s population are assumed to live within the boundaries of 
their native country but outside their region of birth (Kuhn, 2015). Yet, despite this 
imbalance in size, our knowledge about the economic impact of domestic migration is 
more limited than that of international migrants. Many argue that measurement 
difficulties, coupled with the relative lack of popularity of internal compared to 
international movements, have kept the study of domestic migrants pinned to the 
bottom of the academic agenda.  
Past research has focused mainly on the determinants of internal migration, the 
migrants’ characteristics, the individual returns of the migration decision and the effect 
of remittances, but the macroeconomic impact of internal migrants on their receiving 
region still remains poorly understood. The few insights on this topic focus on the 
short- to medium-time frame, barely extending further than 10 to 20 years. To the best 
of our knowledge, the understanding of the long-lasting economic impact of domestic 
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migrants is virtually non-existent. Is the settlement pattern of historical internal 
migrants relevant for current disparities in development? Has domestic migration, 
taking place more than 100 years ago, left a long-lasting influence on the economic 
development of the places where migrants settled? And can this impact still be traced 
today?  
The chapter intends to make up for these shortcomings in the literature by focusing on 
a country often considered as an exceptional case of internal migration – the United 
States (US). US citizens have traditionally displayed geographical mobility rates 
nearly double those of other advanced societies; almost one in three Americans lives 
outside their state of birth and over 30 million Americans change place of residence 
every year (Molloy et al., 2011; US Census Bureau, 2016). The annual geographical 
mobility rate in the US is about three times as large that of the EU15, EU27, or Canada 
and about one and a half times that of Australia (Gill and Raiser, 2012). These high 
internal migration rates are a legacy of the country’s history. Already throughout the 
19th century – a time of massive expansion towards the west – almost 60 percent of 
the US male population above the age of 30 had moved across county or state lines, 
often covering vast distances in their migration (Ferrie, 2005). By 1880, more than a 
third of the US population – a number previously unforeseen in US history – consisted 
of American-born internal migrants (Ruggels et al., 2015; own calculations). 
Using a county level dataset for domestic migration in the late 19th and early 20th 
century covering the 48 US continental states, this chapter first assesses the effect of 
historical internal migration on long-term economic development. It evaluates whether 
large shares of domestic migrants have left a long-lasting trace on the territories where 
they settled. Second, it examines whether the distance covered by American-born 
migrants more than a century ago matters for current levels of development.  
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We assume that a vibrant domestic migrant population has the capacity to galvanise 
growth over the long-term, leaving a long-lasting economic impact that is largely 
determined by the geographical distance covered by internal migrants before settling 
down. We assume large numbers of risk-seeking and economically active internal 
migrants travelling over large distances to be able to transform counties of destination 
by increasing diversity levels, altering local institutions, and reshaping economic 
activity. The hypothesis driving this chapter is that the distance covered by internal 
migrants affects future local economic performance: the bigger the distance travelled 
by internal migrants more than 100 years ago, the larger the differences between new 
arrivals and locals, the higher the population diversity levels, the greater the local 
economic dynamism, and the stronger their long-term economic legacy. 
To demonstrate whether this is the case, the chapter adopts the following structure: 
First, the historical background of internal migration in the US at the turn of the 
century is described in section 7.2. Section 7.3 summarises the literature on internal 
migration and economic development, while section 7.4 provides a description of the 
empirical approach and the data used in the analysis. The discussion of the results can 
be found in section 7.5. Section 7.6 concludes. 
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7.2 INTERNAL MIGRATION AT THE TURN OF THE 19TH TO 
THE 20TH CENTURY 
 
Many of the facets that characterise the American population today are deeply rooted 
in the country’s past. One decisive feature is exceptionally high geographical 
population mobility. Its origins can be traced back to the 19th century, an era in which 
the US grew not only in size and population but also economically and, ultimately, in 
global significance and power. Between 1774 and 1909, a 3.9 percent average annual 
growth led to a 175-fold increase of real gross national product. Rapid economic 
expansion was fundamentally the result of increased supply in two production factors: 
land and labour. Over the span of a few decades, the US territory expanded 3.5 times 
to encompass around 7.8 million km2 by 1900. The population grew almost forty-fold 
over the same timeframe as a consequence of both natural increase and immigration 
(Gallman, 2000). 
During this period, geographic mobility quickly increased to previously unforeseen 
levels. Ferrie (2005) estimates that nearly two-thirds of American men above the age 
of 30 migrated across county or state lines during their lifetime – sometimes even more 
than once. By 1850, the share of American-born population living outside their place 
of birth was almost 25 percent (Haines, 2000). By 1880, it had reached 33 percent 
(Ruggles et al., 2015; own calculations). “The American population was a restless one, 
continually uprooting and moving to a new location […] ‘every day was moving day’” 
(Atack and Passell, 1994: 237).  
The chief impetus behind rapid territorial mobility was finely engrained in the 
expansion of the country. Migration predominantly happened from east to west 
(Ferrie, 2005). Beginning with the Louisiana purchase in 1803, settlers from the 
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northeast started crossing the Appalachian Mountains and poured across the 
Mississippi River by 1850 (Atack et al., 2000). By 1860 they were pushing further 
westward. The northern plains were transformed into an enormous grain and feed 
producing area, while the southern plains became major cattle breeding grounds 
(Merck, 1978). News of mineral resources and animal stock in the far west set in 
motion thousands, rushing to places such as California, Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, 
Idaho, and Montana. By 1900, the US settlement stretched from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific (Gallman, 2000)32.  
Table 7-1 portrays the population redistribution over time. In 1790, no population (see 
footnote 32) is recorded in the Midwest. By 1830, 12.5 percent of the US population 
settled in this area and by 1860 one-third of all Americans lived in the region. The 
west coast population grew at a similar rate, but later. In 1860 only about half a million 
people lived in the Pacific and mountain states. By 1890 it was nearly 5 percent of the 
American population and, by 1910, the share had almost reached 10 percent. The 
geographical centre of the US population continuously shifted further to the west (see 
e.g. Plane and Rogerson, 2015). Alexis de Tocqueville wrote at the time, “[m]illions 
of men are marching at once towards the same horizon; […] their manners differ, their 
object is the same […] to the West they bend their course” (de Tocqueville, 1839: 
292).
                                                     
32 The history of American geographical mobility ultimately starts with Native Americans. Historians 
estimate more than around 143 ‘language families’ to have lived on the territory to the north of Mexico 
prior to the arrival of the Europeans (Spickard, 2007). Thus, the American continent was far from 
‘empty’ and American expansion to the west was by no means a peaceful undertaking. Unfortunately, 
as data on settlement patterns or economic fundamentals of the native tribes is unavailable, we are 
unable to include this important part of the American population in the analysis. 
217 
 
TABLE 7-1 POPULATION BY REGION (IN THOUSANDS), 1790-1910  
Region 
1790 1830 1860 1890 1910 
N % N % N % N % N % 
New England 1.009 25,7 1.955 15,2 3.135 10,0 4.701 7,5 6.553 7,1 
Middle Atlantic 959 24,4 3.588 27,9 7.459 23,7 12.706 20,2 19.316 20,9 
East North Central  –   –  1.470 11,4 6.927 22,0 13.478 21,4 18.251 19,8 
West North Central  –   –  140 1,1 2.170 6,9 8.932 14,2 11.638 12,6 
South Atlantic 1.852 47,1 3.646 28,3 5.365 17,1 8.858 14,1 12.195 13,2 
East South Central 109 2,8 1.816 14,1 4.021 12,8 6.429 10,2 8.410 9,1 
West South Central  –   –  246 1,9 1.748 5,6 4.741 7,5 8.785 9,5 
Mountain  –   –   –   –  175 0,6 1.214 1,9 2.634 2,9 
Pacific  –   –   –   –  444 1,4 1.920 3,0 4.449 4,8 
Total 3.929 100 12.861 100 31.444 100 62.979 100 92.228 100 
     Data source: US Bureau of the Census, 1972 
 
Settlement patterns were far from random. Topography, climate, and natural 
amenities, such as water supply, climate, soil quality, timber, and animal stock 
availability determined settler flows (Merck, 1978). Internal migration along the same 
latitude was the most frequent. Remaining within known climatic bands proved most 
rational as migrants sought to “maximise the value of their human and physical 
capital” (Atack et al., 2000: 324). Appendix 7A displays the settlement pattern of 
domestic migrants, measured as the share of a county’s total American-born resident 
population in 1880. A clear east-west divide emerges. The lowest numbers of internal 
migrants are found in the original thirteen states. The share of domestic migrants rises 
rapidly toward the west. In 1880, states in the Midwest and westerm mountain regions 
had the largest proportion of internal migrants.  
In the late 19th century most domestic migrants travelled short distances: in 1880, 80 
percent of all internal migrants settled less than 500km away from their place of birth. 
For example, in 1850, 67 percent of Pennsylvanian born migrants lived in Ohio, 
Indiana, or Illinois; 77 percent of South Carolina migrants settled in Georgia, 
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Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee (Haines, 2000). The remaining 20 percent 
covered much larger distances, in some cases up to 4,500 km (Ruggles et al., 2015; 
own calculations). Figure 7-1 displays the average distance travelled by domestic 
migrants in 1880. Not surprisingly, the further west, the larger the distance covered. 
Distances were shortest in the northeast, exceeded 500 km in the Midwest, and reached 
1,500 km in the western part of the Great Plains. The average distance travelled by an 
internal migrant living on a Pacific coast county ranged between 2,500 and 4,000  km. 
 
 
FIGURE 7-1 AVERAGE DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY AMERICAN-BORN MIGRANTS (IN 
KM), 1880 
Data source: Ruggles, et al. 2015; own elaboration 
 
The migrant catchment areas varied widely in size: in 1880 the average internal 
migrant living in New York City was born around 460 km away; an internal migrant 
living in Harris County (Houston, Texas) had travelled 1,200 km; while in San 
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Francisco City s/he had covered more than three times the distance – 3,700 km 
(Appendix 7B).  
The profile of the domestic migrant changed during the period in question. At the 
outset of the 19th century, the probability to migrate was highest among Southerners. 
From 1870 onwards, it was those born in the Midwest that moved the most 
(Rosenbloom and Sundstrom, 2004). Throughout the century North-Easterners 
displayed the lowest inclination to migrate. Internal migrants came from all walks of 
life, although literate Americans had a higher propensity to migrate. Women were less 
likely to move, and whites moved more than blacks (Rosenbloom and Sundstrom, 
2004). Internal migration rates were highest among the young, both for short- as well 
as long-distances (Table 7-2).  
 
TABLE 7-2 19TH CENTURY GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF WHITE, NATIVE-BORN MEN (% 
OF COHORT) 
  Intercounty migrants    Interstate migrants 
       
Age 20-29 in initial year     
     1850-1860  49,5  26,2 
     1860-1870  38,2  17,8 
     1870-1880  54,7  30,1 
     
Age 45-59 in initial year     
     1850-1860  21,2  10,6 
     1860-1870  20,5  8,4 
     1870-1880  43,5  21,5 
Source: Ferrie, 2005 
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7.3 INTERNAL MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Uncovering the link between internal migration and development is difficult. 
Researchers analysing domestic migration face two challenges: the inconsistent and 
difficult conceptualisation and subsequent measurement of internal migration on the 
one hand, and its limited popularity on the other. Problems related to defining, 
measuring, and collecting data on domestic population flows have hindered research 
on internal migration. Many different conceptualisations of internal migration, 
employing a variety of temporal intervals and spatial entities, have been coined (i.e. 
Petersen, 1986; Rees et al., 2000; Rogers et al., 2003). However, “the size and shape 
of the spatial areas between which migration is measured are not uniform either within 
or between countries” (Greenwood, 2015: 443). Nor is there an internationally agreed 
standard for measuring internal migration, leading either to a count of migrations or a 
count of migrants depending on the data source. Drawing robust conclusions, 
identifying implications, or even calculating internal migration flows is hence a 
difficult undertaking. The field of internal migration studies is, as a consequence, 
limited in size (i.e. Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2008; Bell et al., 2015).  
The second challenge relates to the popularity of migration flows across international 
borders, which has detracted attention from internal migration. Even though the bulk 
of global geographical mobility takes place within national borders, many might argue 
that the analysis of international migration has dominated both social sciences and the 
majority of policy discussions (Skeldon, 2006; Ellis, 2012). Studies on “population 
movements involving changes of residence within countries remain poorly developed” 
(Bell, et al., 2015: 33). The word ‘migration’ often seems to have been altered in 
meaning to refer almost exclusively to international migration. Internal migrants are 
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often subsumed under a ‘residential mobility’ or ‘population distribution’ category 
(Skeldon, 2006). According to many, the interest in internal migration is simply not 
proportional to the amount of people it concerns. Hence, the impact of domestic 
migration on economic development seems to remain “relatively understudied, 
undermeasured, and misunderstood” (Kuhn, 2015: 433). 
Much of the substantive literature delving into internal migration dates from the 1980s 
and earlier (i.e. Thomas, 1936, 1941; Thomas and Kuznets, 1957; Åkerman, 1975; 
Masnick, 1986). This literature predominantly focuses on the patterns, streams, and 
changes across time in internal migration. Emphasising in particular the move between 
agricultural and urban as well as industrial areas, this research concentrates on social 
change. The insights we have gained on internal migrants over the more recent decades 
can be divided into three research strands – the individual level, the regional 
perspective, and migratory patterns. Most studies have converged on the individual, 
analysing the determinants of migration, the migrants’ characteristics, and individual 
returns. Individual features, such as age, schooling, marital status, health, job tenure, 
poverty or employment status, earnings, or retirement status have been analysed 
mainly in the context of individual utility maximisation models (i.e. Plane, 1993; 
Greenwood, 1997; Jung et al., 2004; Bell et al., 2015; Mohanty et al., 2016). Generally, 
internal migration is found to lead to positive individual returns in terms of earnings 
and employment opportunities (i.e. Yap, 1976; Lucas, 2004; Molloy et al., 2011) 
without necessarily improving subjective wellbeing (i.e. De Jong et al., 2002; Nowok 
et al., 2013; Sloan and Morrison, 2016).  
A second group of studies adopts a regional perspective. Many focus on movements 
between rural and urban areas, evaluating social costs, brain drain, and integration 
issues (i.e. Huning and Huetl, 2012; Lerch, 2014; Eliasson et al., 2015; Rupasingha et 
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al., 2015). Place specific pull and push factors, such as the employment rate, wage 
differentials, tax rates, public services, local government quality, social capital, 
climate, and other local amenities are also covered (i.e. Hunter, 1998; Delisle and 
Shearmur, 2010; Biagi et al., 2011; Shen, 2013; Kuhn, 2015).  
The final group evaluates the size, patterns, and trends of internal geographical 
mobility (i.e. Mueser, 1989; Borjas et al., 1992; Newbold and Bell, 2001; Molloy et 
al., 2011). Internal migration rates are calculated and compared across time and space, 
leading to policy recommendations (i.e. Shen, 2013; Aking and Dokmeci, 2015). 
The macroeconomic consequences of internal migration and their economic impact, 
however, remain – to the best of our knowledge – largely overlooked by recent 
scientific research (White and Lindstrom, 2005). The few contemporary studies on 
domestic migration deliver inconsistent results. For some, internal migration leads to 
higher incomes, lower inequality, modernisation, and growth (e.g. Yap, 1976; IOM, 
2005; Berker, 2011; Kuhn, 2015). Some specific internal migrant groups, such as, for 
example, college graduates, strongly improve macroeconomic outcomes (Moretti, 
2012; Diamond, 2016). Other studies show that domestic population movements result 
in regional divergence and widening inequality, creating poverty traps, harming social 
ties, deteriorating the provision of public goods, and significantly lowering growth 
(i.e. Rodríguez Vignoli, 2008; Molloy et al., 2011). A third group fails to find any 
robust relationship between both factors (i.e. White and Lindstrom, 2005). In short, 
the limited research and wide range of findings in the literature on the macroeconomic 
impact of domestic migrants leaves us with no clear answers as to how internal 
migration shapes the economic growth trajectory of the receiving regions. 
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In order to establish a hypothesis about the potential link between internal migration 
and economic development, we therefore need to resort to the literature on 
international migration (Ellis, 2012). Pryor (1981), King and Skeldon (2010), and Ellis 
(2012) question the dichotomy in the field of migration studies between internal and 
international migration pushing towards an integrated system embracing the 
similarities: when analysing internal population flows in the simplest way, they could 
be defined, from a basic labour economics standpoint, as “a major mechanism through 
which labour resources are redistributed geographically” (Greenwood, 1997: 648). If 
we assume that the economic effect of internal migration mirrors that of international 
migration, domestic migrants will have a generally growth enhancing effect (i.e. 
Borjas, 1995; Card, 2005). The transmission channels identified by the international 
migration literature include the mere expansion of the labour force (i.e. Ortega and 
Peri, 2009), increasing returns to scale (i.e. Borjas, 1995), adjustments in the local 
market’s skill and labour composition (i.e. Lundborg and Segerström, 2002), increases 
in wages (i.e. Carter and Sutch, 2006; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006), and the stimulation 
of productivity by means of innovation and skill set extensions (i.e. Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005; Gordon and McCann, 2005; Partridge and Furtan, 2008). Further 
growth potential can be derived from the increased population diversity as a result of 
labour inflows (Jacobs, 1969; Florida, 2002; Saxenian, 2006). Consequently, 
following Pryor (1981), King and Skeldon (2010), and Ellis (2012), internal migrants 
are expected – similarly to their international counterparts – to positively affect the 
growth trajectory of receiving territories.  
Traditional migration literature tends to emphasise that one of the differentiating 
factors between international and internal migrants is the level of diversity in the 
receiving region. As migration research defines diversity mostly referring to birth 
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countries, ethnicities, or languages spoken (i.e. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), internal 
migrants are generally considered not to increase population diversity. Domestic 
migrants are ultimately native-born. They share the same birth country and often 
ethnicity and language with the local population in the receiving region. But these 
similarities do not necessarily mean that internal migrants do not enhance diversity. 
We beg to differ in this regard. Greater diversity within societies welcoming internal 
migrant inflows is related to the distance covered by internal migrants from point of 
origin to destination. Internal migrants come from the same country but often from 
faraway cities and regions, frequently with different habits and customs. While an 
Oregonian in Washington State will have had a short trip, a New Yorker in the same 
place would have covered more than 2,500 miles. This geographical distance and the 
diversity in places of origin – in spite of the fact that both domestic migrants speak the 
same language, share the same country of birth and possibly ethnic traits – 
distinguishes them. Hence the distance travelled represents an indicator of 
(dis)similarity in the institutional baggage internal migrants bring from home – 
individual traditions, customs, habits, and different mindsets are shaped by the place 
of birth. In his groundbreaking work on Italy, Putnam (1993) demonstrates that 
institutional constructs are highly place specific and vary greatly from one region to 
another. The closer two regions are, the greater the similarity between institutional 
constructs; the further away, the greater the difference (Arbia et al., 2010). A New 
Yorker in Washington State – especially in historical times – will have brought 
institutional constructs significantly different from those of the local Washingtonian. 
The institutional baggage brought by an Oregonian would have been less different. A 
New Yorker in Washington State would therefore have raised population diversity 
levels to a greater extent than an Oregonian. Hence, it could be hypothesised that the 
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geographical distance travelled by internal migrants affects the degree of 
(dis)similarity in a given place. 
Population diversity itself is generally seen as central driver of innovation and 
creativity, positively influencing economic growth (Jacobs, 1961, 1969, Florida, 2002, 
2012; Saxenian, 2006). A large variety of population groups stemming from a 
multitude of locations brings different skill sets, ideas, abilities, and experiences to 
their destinations. Population diversity thus becomes an important input factor in the 
process of economic growth: it promotes technological progress, productivity, and 
employment (Audretsch et al., 2010; Özgen et al., 2011; Kemeny and Cooke, 2017).   
In brief, the geographical distance travelled by the internal migrant affects population 
diversity in the areas of destination, shaping their economic prospects. The greater the 
distance travelled by migrants, the greater the population diversity at destination, and, 
consequently, the higher the growth prospects of receiving territories. Large numbers 
of American-born settlers travelling over long distances would hence have contributed 
to transform the economic fortunes of receiving areas and, through their influence on 
local diversity levels, positively affected growth. 
Geographical distance per se has only rarely been evaluated in migration research. 
Only a few studies calculate the distance travelled between place of origin and 
destination (e.g. White and Lindstrom, 2005). Data and definition inconsistencies, 
coupled with accuracy issues of distance measures, hamper once again the retrieval of 
robust results (Niedomysl et al., 2017). Apart from a few international comparisons 
(i.e. Long, et al., 1988), geographical distance has mostly been connected to migration 
when evaluating long distance in comparison to short distance migration. Dynamics, 
characteristics of migrants, and causes of migration were found to vary widely with 
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distance (i.e. Biagi et al., 2011; Pendakur and Young, 2013; Niedomysl and Fransson, 
2014). Most studies report that distance is negatively correlated to the size of migration 
(i.e. Greenwood, 1997; Hipp and Boessen, 2016). Furthermore, while long distance 
moves are usually motivated by economic opportunities, short distance moves are 
more correlated with improvements in quality of life (Morrison and Clark 2011; 
Niedomysl, 2011). The effect of distance, however, on the macroeconomic impact of 
internal migration has been, in any case, neglected by the social science literature. 
Moreover, past research has put the emphasis on the short- to medium-term impact of 
both internal and international migration. The focus has traditionally been on the 
immediate economic effects, covering a maximum of two decades since arrival of the 
migrant. Whether or how past migration affects regional economic performance after 
these initial years remains a black box. Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) 
provide one of the few exceptions. They analyse 19th century international migrants 
and their impact on US economic development more than a century later, finding that 
migration improves the long-term development prospects of recipient areas.33   
The persistence of growth enhancing effects of migration over the very long-term is 
often associated with the role of institutions in recipient areas (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Duranton et al., 2009; Tabellini, 2010). According to these studies, migrants convey 
their institutional constructs, “[…] in the way of culture, religion, social networks and 
links with the society of origin” (Joly, 2000: 30) from their place of origin to the 
destination region, preserving customs, traditions, habits, and mentality (Rice and 
Feldman, 1997). As Putnam (1993), Acemoglu et al. (2001), or Duranton et al. (2009) 
indicate, institutional frameworks persist in time, becoming engraved in the territory. 
                                                     
33 Sequeira et al. (2017) support these findings. 
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Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014, 2015) theorise that the institutional 
frameworks derived from 19th century migration inflows into the US still shape 
current economic growth in the recipient areas. Whether the diversity of institutional 
constructs brought to places of destinations by short- and long-distance internal 
migrants has created a similarly positive and long-lasting economic effect remains an 
open question.  
In this chapter, we tackle the aforementioned gaps in internal migration research by 
establishing a connection between shares of domestic migrants in a region’s 
population, the distance covered by migrants, and economic development over the 
long-term. Two different research questions are examined: a) Do internal migrants 
shape long-term economic development in the same way as external ones? b) Does 
the distance covered by migrants matter for the influence they have on the subsequent 
growth of receiving regions? 
 
7.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
7.4.1 THE MODEL  
 
 
We estimate two different models to answer our research questions. Model 1, focusing 
on different migrant population shares, takes the following form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖,𝑡0 +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜃𝑍𝑖,𝑡0 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
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Where y is the natural log of income per capita of county i in period t (t=2010); Mig 
is our main variable of interest representing different specifications of the migrant 
population composition in a given county i at t0 (t0=1880 or 1910); X represents a 
vector of factors linked to income per capita levels of county i at time t-k (k=10) and 
Z corresponds to a vector of similar factors associated to the level of economic 
development of county i at time t0, shaping the attractiveness of the county at the time 
of migration. Lastly, state represents state specific fixed effects controlling for 
arbitrary spatial correlations between counties within any given state and ε describes 
robust standard errors.  
We estimate Model 1 in five different specifications, each using a variation of Mig. 
We first run (1) focusing on the share of total migrants – internal and external (foreign-
born) – in a given county i at time t0 (specification 1) measured as percentage of total 
county population. Subsequently, (1) is estimated distinguishing between the share of 
domestic migrants (IntMig), measured as the percentage of American-born residents 
having crossed state lines between their birthplace and current place of residence, and 
the share of external migrants (ExtMig), measured as the percentage of foreign-born 
in a county’s population, as our two variables of interest (specification 2). 
Specifications 3, 4, and 5 focus on different American-born groups in county i’s 
population at time t0 while controlling for the share of external migrants. The 
American-born county population is divided into ‘stayers’, i.e. those born in the same 
state (specification 3), internal migrants from any neighbouring state (specification 4), 
and internal migrants from any other non-adjacent state (specification 5). Each group 
is measured as the percentage of total American-born population living in the county. 
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Model 2 estimates the direct relevance of the distance travelled by migrants on 
economic development 100 to 130 years later. Dependent and control variables remain 
the same as in Model 1. The independent variable of interest, however, changes to 
Distance, representing the average distance travelled by all migrants – both external 
and internal – of a given county i’s population at time t0 between their birthplace and 
current county of residence (specification 1) and the distance covered by domestic 
migrants – American-born residents having crossed state lines – only (specification 
2). The model takes the following form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡0 +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜃𝑍𝑖,𝑡0 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (2) 
 
7.4.2 THE DATA 
 
The migration data used in the main variables of interest in Model 1 were constructed 
using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series USA database (IPUMS) Version 6.0 
(Ruggles et al., 2015). This database comprises representative population weighted 
samples covering US Censuses and American Community Surveys between 1850 and 
2015.34 Starting from 1850, the US Census included information on individual 
birthplaces, noted as either the country of birth for the foreign-born or the state of birth 
for the domestic population. Complete birthplace and current residence data for all 
continental US states are available only from 1880 onwards, allowing us to trace 
‘lifetime migration’ (put simply, the migration between an individual’s birthplace and 
his place of residence at the time of the Census). 1880 is thus selected as the main base 
year for the analysis – a 130-year timeframe between dependent and main independent 
                                                     
34 The American Community Survey was only initiated in 2005. 
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variable of interest. The population data variable for 1910 is chosen to test the 
robustness of the 1880 results. As in 1910, the population and industry structure across 
the US already differed considerably from that of 1880, the 1910 sample represents an 
ideal candidate to validate the 1880 results, while keeping the long-term dimension. 
Unfortunately, neither inter-county or inter-state moves, nor the date of the location 
change, nor the duration of residence were recorded prior to 1935. These factors could 
unfortunately not be incorporated into our analysis. 
In order to construct the main variables of interest, we use a sample of 5,791,531 
individuals in 1880 representing 11.5 percent of the total US population at the time 
and 923,153 individuals in 1910 representing 1 percent of the population. All 
individual data were matched to the specific county of residence and aggregated at the 
county level. We define all US residents not born in the US as ‘external migrants’. All 
American-born with a birthplace different from their state of residence are classified 
as ‘internal or domestic migrants’. 
Due to changes in size, geography and quantity of US counties over the period of 
analysis, counties in 1880 and 1910 were matched to their 2010 equivalent using 
cartographic boundary files provided by the US Census of the 48 continental states. 
All county boundaries were normalised to their 2010 borders, historical county 
averages were calculated and weighted by the population density at the time of the 
boundary change. This method allowed us to attribute historical county features to all 
counties of the 48 continental US states in 2010 (with the exception of 1880 values for 
Oklahoma).35 
                                                     
35 Oklahoma only became organised territory in 1890. 
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The second set of independent variables of interest – the average distance covered by 
the migrant population living in a given county – was constructed using GIS software 
calculating the point-distance matrix between the centroids of all US counties of 
residence and the centroids of the 48 continental states (weighted by the population 
density at the time of migration), as well as all countries named as birthplaces by the 
foreign-born population. The individual distance travelled by each migrant was then 
allocated to the given county of residence and aggregated at county level. Two 
different specifications – average distance covered by all migrants (both external and 
internal) and average distance covered by internal migrants only – are calculated. As 
within state migration is not recorded in the data, all individuals within the population 
of a county who were born in the same state as their current county of residence are 
assumed to either having moved only across county lines or not at all. 
The dependent variable (income per capita levels in 2010 in US dollars) as well as 
vector X, containing data for 2000, employ information extracted from the US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) database, the Current Population Survey (CPS) tables 
of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the 2000 Census Summary files. 
Vector X is measured 10 years before the dependent variable and is included in the 
model to control for county level characteristics directly affecting the level of income 
per capita of a given US county. X is included as a means of avoiding that recent 
county features could transfer their individual association to current levels of 
economic development onto the variable of interest. This would potentially lead to 
over- or underestimating its effect. The factors considered include educational 
attainment (share of people with college education), the unemployment rate, the share 
of black and female population, overall population size (as natural log), the share of 
the labour force employed in manufacturing, the infant mortality rate as a proxy for 
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levels of public health, and the women’s participation rate in the labour force. All 
variables included in vector X are lagged by 10 years with respect to the period 
considered in our dependent variable to minimise problems of simultaneity between 
county features and income per capita. The descriptive statistics for all variables are 
provided in Appendix 7C. 
Vector Z, the second vector of control variables, dates from 1880 and 1910, 
respectively. It consists of county features that may have influenced the county’s level 
of economic prosperity at the time of migration. Simultaneously, these characteristics 
may have served as pull factors to migrants determining the level of attractiveness of 
a county in that period. The inclusion of Z follows a similar reasoning as X. By 
controlling for county features at the time of migration, we extract their potentially 
confounding influence on the regression results from the error term and include it 
explicitly in the regression. Their potential impact on economic development today 
can therefore not be transferred onto the internal migration variables. Vector Z 
includes, whenever possible,36 the same variables as vector X.  Educational attainment, 
however, is measured as the literacy rate. Furthermore, we control for the initial county 
level average income at the time of migration. As income per capita data were not 
collected at the time, a proxy is constructed with individual data on median total 
income per occupation in hundreds of 1950 dollars using the size of the total county 
population in 1880/1910 as base. All of the historical variables are constructed using 
the IPUMS USA and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research databases (ICPSR). All individual data were aggregated at the county level, 
                                                     
36 Issues with data availability imply that not all variables can be reproduced exactly.  
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employing the same method used when constructing the migration variables. A 
description of all variables and sources is provided in Appendix 7D. 
 
7.4.3 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
 
Any analysis of long-term migration data is prone to endogeneity issues. Potential 
spatial sorting, omitted variables, or reverse causality issues can pose threats to the 
internal validity and hence distort retrieved OLS results. In order to identify the true 
underlying linkage of internal migration and economic development, possible 
endogeneity biases in the least-squares estimates are addressed using an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation. For both models, geography serves as an exogenous source 
of variation. Two instruments are selected: topography – as instrument for internal 
migration (Model 1) – and size of the water area in a county – instrumenting the 
average distance travelled (Model 2). Both instruments satisfy the relevance criterion 
of IV analysis as both retrieve sufficiently large first stage F-statistics based on the 
Staiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments in combination with the Stock and 
Yogo (2005) critical values.  
In Model 1, topography is instrumented for internal migrants. The topography variable 
is extracted from the National Atlas of the USA (US Geological Survey), published as 
part of the US Natural Amenities Scale of the US Department of Agriculture (see 
detailed description in Appendix 7E). The 21-level scale categorises land surface 
forms at county level, ranging from flat plains and tablelands to hillsides and 
mountains. Topography is exogenous to income per capita in 2010 and hence highly 
likely to be fully uncorrelated with the error term. We assume that topography affects 
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economic development at county level via the settlement pattern of internal migrants. 
Topography was a crucial factor behind domestic migrant settlement patterns over 100 
years ago. The interaction of topography with climate and vegetation affected soil 
quality and served as a crucial pull factor, raising incentives for migrants to pack up 
and move. Fresh good quality soils “[drew] migrants from worn-out lands in the East 
to virgin lands in the West” (Merk, 1978: 229). Cattle farmers, hunters, trappers, and 
miners were attracted by the vast lands of plateaus and hill sides. Grain, pork farmers, 
and wool producers settled in the plains, while fur traders saw high potential in the 
plateaus and basins of the northwest. The Gulf plains to the south attracted internal 
migrants focusing on cotton and sugar production. Rough mountains and sterile hills, 
by contrast, were avoided by migrants (Merk, 1978). 
The variation in the average distance travelled by migrants (Model 2) is instrumented 
using the size of water areas within a county. The data, measured in square miles, were 
retrieved from the TIGER Geodatabases by the US Census Geography division. Water 
areas, again exogenous to income per capita levels in 2010, were a decisive element 
for the migrant settlement pattern in the 19th century as well as decisive in determining 
the distance travelled by migrants. Navigable rivers provided important infrastructure 
as well as vital access to drinking water and irrigation of nearby lands. The better the 
waterways and water supply, the farther the migrant travelled. Waterways shaped long 
distance migrant routes which, in turn, gave rise to migrant settlements along the way. 
Mountain ranges or rough landscapes such as the Appalachians or the Rocky 
Mountains could only be crossed following rivers, cutting deep canyons and valleys 
into the abrupt terrain. The main migrant trails across the country, such as the Oregon 
trail in the northwest crossing the northern part of the Rockies, followed tightly knit 
river systems. Even when the railroad network had considerably grown in size and 
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efficiency, waterways remained a fundamental element in the country’s infrastructure 
for both transport as well as internal migrant settlement (Merk, 1978). Waterways 
facilitated the journey, enlarged the distances travelled, and made quick progress 
possible. A lack of water, however, shortened migration routes considerably. 
7.5 ANALYSIS 
 
The first part of the analysis focuses on whether internal migrants criss-crossing the 
US during the 19th century left a significant and long-lasting impact on their receiving 
territories. Model 1 is employed first using ordinary least squares (OLS), followed by 
an instrumental variable (IV) estimation as a robustness check of our results. Table 7-
3 displays the OLS results of Model 1 specifications (1) through (5) for 1880, each 
time altering the main variable of interest.  
In line with expectations, migration is positively associated with income per capita 
levels in specification (1). A large share of migrants in 1880, regardless of birthplace, 
is strongly and positively connected to county level GDP per capita in 2010. When 
splitting the migrant stock of a county into internal and external migrants 
(specification 2), the coefficients for both types of migrants remain positive and highly 
significant. Hence, counties that attracted large inflows of US and foreign settlers are 
significantly more prosperous today than those largely bypassed by migration. The 
coefficient for external migrants is, however, larger than that for domestic migrants. 
The more than four-fold difference between both coefficients, statistically significant 
below the 1% level, hints at foreign migrants as a more powerful influence on the 
long-term prosperity of US counties than their American-born counterparts.  
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Regressions (3) to (5) shed light on the connection between different American-born 
population groups within a given county in 1880 and GDP per capita in 2010, using 
the share of external migrants as control variable. We first focus on the share of the 
population living in their state of birth in 1880 (regression 3), including both 
individuals living in their county of birth and those who migrated within state borders. 
Data unavailability on intra-state moves means that these two groups have to be 
merged. As the group of stayers dominates over intra-state migrants, the results 
predominantly reflect the impact of a large group of locals on income per capita more 
than a century later. Regression (3) reveals that counties with a large percentage of 
‘stayers’ in 1880 had lower GDP per capita levels 130 years later: counties bypassed 
by migration – other than intra-state – more than a century ago were significantly 
poorer in 2010. Hence, a largely homogenous county population in 1880 has 
represented a serious barrier for long-term development.  
Regressions (4) and (5) in Table 7-3 focus on domestic inter-state migration, 
distinguishing between migration from neighbouring states on the one hand and from 
non-adjacent states on the other. The former is displayed in regression (4). No 
significant relation between the share of a county’s population from neighbouring 
states and average income per capita in 2010 is found. One possible explanation for 
this result may be the similarities in institutional baggage, culture, traditions, customs 
and mentality between locals and migrants from adjacent states. One might argue, this 
type of migrant not be adding sufficient diversity, not to be sufficiently risk-taking to 
trigger additional economic dynamism.  
Regression (5) focuses on interstate migration from non-adjacent states. The results 
point to a strong positive and significant relation between the current economic 
development of US counties and the presence of domestic migrants from more distant 
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locations in 1880. Compared to our main variables of interest in regressions (3) and 
(4), the significance level and the size of the coefficient are largest in (5). Domestic 
migrants travelling farther seem to have left a positive and enduring effect on the 
economic development of their receiving counties. A more heterogeneous and thus 
more diverse population composition in the receiving territory is connected to higher 
economic development levels. In this respect, American-born migrants moving over 
long distances seem to have left a similar economic imprint on local economic 
development than that of external migrants. The economic legacy of locals and 
migrants from neighbouring states is, in contrast, much more limited.  
These results hint to the fact that the distance travelled by migrants has a considerable 
effect on long-term county economic growth. By dividing internal migrants into three 
groups – ‘stayers’ and within-state migrants, migrants from adjacent states, and long-
distance migrants – domestic migrants have been implicitly grouped by distance 
travelled between birthplace and current residence. The results indicate that the bigger 
the distance travelled, the greater the long-term economic legacy of internal migration.  
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TABLE 7-3 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION, OLS 1880 
Dep. Var.: income per 
capita 2010 (ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
All migrants 1880 0.138***     
 (0.0251)     
Internal migrants 1880  0.0587**    
  (0.0282)    
Pop. same state 1880   -0.0587**   
   (0.0282)   
Pop. neighbour state 1880    -0.0489  
    (0.0360)  
Pop. rest of country 1880     0.134*** 
     (0.0388) 
External migrants 1880  0.260*** 0.260*** 0.239*** 0.279*** 
  (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0400) (0.0399) 
      
Education 2000 0.0114*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.000756) (0.000750) (0.000750) (0.000751) (0.000749) 
Population 2000 (ln) 0.00388 0.00367 0.00367 0.00344 0.00340 
 (0.00363) (0.00366) (0.00366) (0.00367) (0.00365) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0243) 
Black population 2000 -0.00110*** -0.00101*** -0.00101*** -0.000950*** -0.00102*** 
 (0.000345) (0.000340) (0.000340) (0.000339) (0.000339) 
Female 2000 0.0148*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00152) 
Female part. 2000 0.00121 0.00112 0.00112 0.00106 0.00114 
 (0.000786) (0.000782) (0.000782) (0.000779) (0.000781) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0203*** -0.0222*** -0.0222*** -0.0225*** -0.0220*** 
 (0.00320) (0.00327) (0.00327) (0.00324) (0.00327) 
Infant mortality 2000 0.000201 0.000211 0.000211 0.000242 0.000214 
 (0.000434) (0.000444) (0.000444) (0.000449) (0.000439) 
      
Income 1880 (ln) 0.0133 0.0125 0.0125 0.0161 0.00295 
 (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
Literacy 1880 0.133*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.170*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0311) 
Population 1880 (ln) -0.00996** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00454) (0.00447) 
Manufacturing 1880 0.0105 -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0175 -0.0114 
 (0.0388) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0372) 
Black population 1880 0.230*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0376) 
Female 1880 0.101 0.113 0.113 0.0761 0.179 
 (0.118) (0.116) (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) 
Female part. 1880 -0.0667 -0.0621 -0.0621 -0.0462 -0.0482 
 (0.0988) (0.0974) (0.0974) (0.0964) (0.0956) 
Unemployment 1880 -0.00237 -0.00460 -0.00460 -0.00503 -0.00431 
 (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0115) 
      
Observations 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.682 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.688 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     |     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The significance levels and signs of the control variables reinforce the validity of the 
results. All variables included in the two vectors controlling for wealth influencing 
factors both at the time of migration as well as today show the expected signs. The 
lagged controls indicate that counties with a more educated, gender-balanced 
population, less employment in manufacturing, a smaller share of black inhabitants, 
and a lower unemployment rate were richer in 2010 than those with a less educated, 
largely male population, with a high share of black people, large employment in 
manufacturing, and a high unemployment rate.  
Most 1880 control factors are insignificant, meaning that whatever influence they had 
on economic development a century ago has waned or disappeared altogether. The 
coefficient for the initial income level – one of the potentially strongest pull factors at 
the time of migration – is insignificant. There are some exceptions, though. Literacy 
and the size of the black population of a county in 1880 are strongly positively 
connected to current levels of development. By contrast, the size of a county’s 
population more than a century ago is associated with lower levels of development. 
We assume the black population variable to serve as proxy for the economic structure 
of the largely agrarian counties of the South, rather than indicating the effect of a 
polarised county population into black and white. The coefficient of the share of black 
population is highly likely to capture the path to convergence of the poor regions of 
the South to the richer regions in the North (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1990, 1995). 
 
The OLS results reported above could nevertheless be affected by endogeneity issues 
caused by reverse causality, sorting, or omitted variable bias. In order to address these 
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issues, two robustness checks are undertaken. We first shift the base migration year 
by 30 years to 1910, estimating again Model 1, including all five specifications of the 
independent variable of interest. The results are displayed in Appendix 7F. Apart from 
slightly weaker significance levels, the coefficients for the different groups of internal 
migrants largely coincide with those obtained when using 1880 as base year. Both a 
large share of internal as well as external migrants – taken together in regression (1) 
and apart in regression (2) – is significantly associated with higher levels of economic 
development one century later. A large percentage of Americans still living in their 
state of birth is negatively connected to long-term growth (regression (3)). The 
coefficient for the relationship between income per capita levels in 2010 and the share 
of internal migrants from neighbouring states in 1910 remains insignificant (regression 
4). Again, the largest and most significant coefficient of the internal migrant subgroups 
pertains to the group of internal migrants from non-adjacent states (5).  
A second robustness check, an IV estimation is performed, employing topography as 
an instrument for the five different migrant population subgroups in a given US county 
in 1880. Table 7-4 displays the results.37  
When using topography as IV to retrieve the underlying effect of past internal 
migration flows on income per capita levels more than 100 years later, the large 
majority of the OLS results are validated. Internal as well as external migration are 
confirmed as growth enhancing factors over the very long-term – either taken together 
as in regression (1) or apart as displayed in regression (2) of Table 7-4. Consequently, 
counties which attracted large inflows of both foreign and American-born migrants at 
the end of the 19th century display significantly larger income per capita levels in 2010 
                                                     
37 The following discussion of the results is equally valid for the IV analysis shifting our base year to 
1910. Similar results for 1910 to those displayed in Table 7-4 can be found in Appendix 7G. 
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than those that lacked a strong migrant pool at the time. Large numbers of migrants, 
regardless of origin, have become an essential factor behind county level economic 
development for more than a century.  
The results of the OLS analysis are, once again, largely validated when focusing on 
the different American-born population groups in regressions (3) to (5) in Table 7-4. 
Counties bypassed by out-of-state domestic migration more than a century ago are 
poorer today than those that attracted migrants in considerable numbers (regression 
(3)). Having a large percentage of locals, and therefore low population diversity levels, 
has been detrimental for long-term economic growth. By contrast, any type of cross-
border internal migration has resulted in greater long-term economic dynamism and 
wealth at county level. This applies for both migrants from neighbouring states 
(regression 4) and from farther away (regression (5)). The sway of domestic migrants 
crossing at least two state lines in their journey to a better future remains in any case 
considerably higher, as indicated by the coefficient in regression (5). Distance thus 
seems to largely explain the relation between internal migrants and long-term 
economic performance. The larger the distance travelled by internal migrants, the 
stronger their long-term impact on county income per capita levels. 
242 
 
TABLE 7-4 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION, IV 1880 
Dep. Var.: income per 
capita 2010 (ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
All migrants 1880 1.123***     
 (0.258)     
Internal migrants 1880  1.497***    
  (0.433)    
Pop. same state 1880   -1.497***   
   (0.433)   
Pop. neighbour state 1880    2.299***  
    (0.787)  
Pop. rest of country 1880     4.291* 
     (2.297) 
External migrants 1880  0.730*** 0.730*** 0.341*** 1.456** 
  (0.151) (0.151) (0.0743) (0.647) 
      
Education 2000 0.0109*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0121*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.000820) (0.000895) (0.000895) (0.00102) (0.00154) 
Population 2000 (ln) 0.00550 0.00622 0.00622 0.0107 -0.00214 
 (0.00493) (0.00520) (0.00520) (0.00695) (0.0114) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.163*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.170** 
 (0.0346) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0441) (0.0750) 
Black population 2000 -0.00170*** -0.00212*** -0.00212*** -0.00173*** -0.00284** 
 (0.000472) (0.000589) (0.000589) (0.000578) (0.00125) 
Female 2000 0.0128*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.00990*** 0.0131*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00286) (0.00409) 
Female part. 2000 0.00172 0.00209* 0.00209* 0.00145 0.00330 
 (0.00108) (0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00127) (0.00247) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0231*** -0.0162*** -0.0162*** -0.0197*** -0.00985 
 (0.00525) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00507) (0.0115) 
Infant mortality 2000 -0.000213 -0.000283 -0.000283 -0.000255 -0.000335 
 (0.000601) (0.000654) (0.000654) (0.000752) (0.00138) 
      
Income 1880 (ln) -0.0995** -0.104** -0.104** 0.0760 -0.441* 
 (0.0401) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0552) (0.258) 
Literacy 1880 0.0225 -0.0934 -0.0934 0.276*** -0.784 
 (0.0603) (0.0942) (0.0942) (0.0729) (0.542) 
Population 1880 (ln) -0.0285*** -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.00272 -0.0487* 
 (0.00774) (0.00687) (0.00687) (0.0106) (0.0256) 
Manufacturing 1880 -0.103 0.000230 0.000230 -0.132 0.247 
 (0.0700) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0849) (0.193) 
Black population 1880 0.417*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.596*** 0.00586 
 (0.0672) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.130) (0.172) 
Female 1880 1.106*** 1.135*** 1.135*** -0.128 3.493* 
 (0.321) (0.370) (0.370) (0.251) (1.888) 
Female part. 1880 -0.235* -0.258* -0.258* -0.473** 0.145 
 (0.134) (0.154) (0.154) (0.237) (0.319) 
Unemployment 1880 -0.00383 0.00460 0.00460 -0.00180 0.0165 
 (0.0167) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0192) (0.0426) 
      
Observations 2,435 2,435 2,435 2,435 2,435 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-stat 36.29 20.45 20.45 15.00 8.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     |    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In order to assess in a more accurate way the extent to which the average distance 
covered by internal migrants affects the link between migration and long-term regional 
economic growth, Model 2 is run in its two different specifications focusing on, first, 
the average distance travelled by the entire migrant population – both foreign and 
American-born – of a given county in 1880 and, second, on the average distance 
covered exclusively by domestic migrants who have crossed state lines between their 
state of birth and destination. Table 7-5 reports the results for the OLS (regressions 1 
and 2) as well as IV estimations (regressions (3) and (4)) for the base year 1880. 
Regression (1) shows that the average distance travelled by the entire migrant 
population in a county has a positive and highly significant impact on long-term 
economic development: the farther a migrant travelled before settling down, the 
stronger the impact. As this positive effect can be driven by the presence of 
international migrants having travelled for thousands of kilometres, in a second step 
the analysis is performed focusing exclusively on American-born migrants having 
crossed state lines. Regression (2) displays the results.38 Again, the connection 
between the average distance travelled by internal migrants and the long-term 
economic performance of the receiving counties is positive and strongly significant 
(regression (2)). Consequently, the more a county managed to attract large shares of 
internal migrants from faraway places, the higher the diversity in its population and 
the higher its income per capita 130 years later.  
The coefficients for both sets of controls are in line with those reported for the previous 
analysis.  
                                                     
38 As birthplace data are not available at county level, within state migration is not considered in the 
analysis as a separate category. In those cases, the migration distance between birth state and destination 
is assumed to be zero. 
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TABLE 7-5 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF AVERAGE MIGRATION DISTANCE, 1880 
Dep. Var.: income per capita 
2010 (ln) 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All  
Migrants 
Internal 
migrants 
All  
migrants 
Internal 
migrants 
     
Distance all mig (ln) 1880 0.0376***  0.199***  
 (0.00550)  (0.0509)  
Distance int. mig (ln) 1880  0.0312***  0.485*** 
  (0.0102)  (0.122) 
     
Education 2000 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.000758) (0.000764) (0.000790) (0.000946) 
Population 2000 (ln) 0.00261 0.00324 -0.00346 -0.00745 
 (0.00361) (0.00364) (0.00447) (0.00528) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.112*** -0.0910** 
 (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0332) (0.0389) 
Black population 2000  -0.000986*** -0.00101*** -0.000748* -0.000841* 
 (0.000343) (0.000344) (0.000423) (0.000489) 
Female 2000 0.0157*** 0.0153*** 0.0176*** 0.0171*** 
 (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00192) (0.00206) 
Female participation 2000 0.000834 0.00116 -0.000292 0.00220** 
 (0.000778) (0.000786) (0.000929) (0.00104) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0195*** -0.0197*** -0.0178*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.00312) (0.00313) (0.00375) (0.00440) 
Infant mortality 2000 0.000229 0.000268 0.000115 0.000478 
 (0.000442) (0.000436) (0.000538) (0.000546) 
     
Income 1880 (ln) 0.0150 0.0226 -0.0467 -0.0788** 
 (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0285) (0.0367) 
Literacy 1880  0.120*** 0.137*** 0.0108 0.0111 
 (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0487) (0.0547) 
Population 1880 (ln) -0.00864* -0.00669 -0.0127*** 0.00555 
 (0.00442) (0.00451) (0.00488) (0.00633) 
Manufacturing 1880 0.00203 0.0326 -0.105** 0.116** 
 (0.0373) (0.0402) (0.0487) (0.0560) 
Black population 1880 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.107** 0.0257 
 (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0517) (0.0686) 
Female 1880 -0.0468 -0.0277 -0.0698 0.164 
 (0.112) (0.115) (0.113) (0.135) 
Female participation 1880 -0.0509 -0.0441 -0.0935 -0.0130 
 (0.0975) (0.0984) (0.111) (0.130) 
Unemployment 1880 -0.00598 -0.00391 -0.0144 -0.0192 
 (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0143) (0.0161) 
     
Observations 2,444 2,441 2,444 2,441 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.684 0.678 - - 
First stage F-stat - - 24.35 28.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  |  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Two robustness checks are undertaken to validate these results. Firstly, as in the 
analysis of Model 1, we shift our base year by 30 years and run Model 2 based on 
1910 migrants and average distances travelled. The results are displayed in Appendix 
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7H and present an almost carbon copy of those reported for 1880. Average distance 
travelled by the migrant population of any given US county in 1910 is in both cases 
highly significant and positively associated with income per capita levels in 2010. No 
matter which base year, it seems that long distance migrants leave a greater economic 
trace than short distance ones.  
Secondly, to address potential endogeneity issues, an IV estimation is conducted. In 
Model 2, we use the size of water areas in a given county as instrument for the average 
distance travelled by migrants. The results, displayed in regressions (3) and (4) of 
Table 7-5, reconfirm the findings of the OLS analysis: the average distance travelled 
by the migrant population of any given county in 1880 between birthplace and current 
residence has a positive impact on long-term economic growth. Both the average 
distance travelled by the total migrant population as well as by the internal migrant 
subgroup display positive and highly significant coefficients. The presence of a higher 
share of long-distance domestic migrants in 1880 has therefore been strongly 
beneficial for long-term economic growth at the county level.  
In short, US domestic 19th century migrants have been highly beneficial for the long-
term economic development of their receiving counties. A larger share of internal 
migrants more than 100 years ago has determined the economic fortunes of US 
counties in a way that is still evident today. Distance is shown to act as crucial factor 
in this relationship. The larger the average distance travelled by the average internal 
migrant, the longer lasting the positive economic effect of migration. Simply crossing 
county lines does not do the trick. The biggest benefits were reaped by counties that 
attracted migrants travelling over long distances, precisely those who, on the one hand, 
are more likely to bring a different institutional baggage from that of the local 
population and, on the other hand, are more risk-taking and economically dynamic. A 
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more heterogeneous population, marked by the adventurous and entrepreneurial spirit 
of the long distance traveller seeking a new life in a faraway place, seems to have 
generated the seed of long-term economic development. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
 
With international migration high on the priority list of current policy discussions, the 
big majority of migration research has bypassed within-country migration. The 
complexity in the definition of what constitutes internal migration in conjunction with 
measurement issues has further contributed to the small number of contemporary 
studies on the macroeconomic effect of domestic migrants. The limited knowledge 
gained has generally focused on the individual, analysing the migrants’ characteristics, 
the determinants, and the returns of the migration decision. Regional-level research 
has emphasised push and pull factors, patterns, and trends of internal population 
movements, but the macroeconomic impact of internal migrants still remains poorly 
understood. Results – mainly focusing on the short-term impact – are far from 
conclusive: some have stressed that internal migrants promote economic prosperity, 
lower inequality, modernisation, and increased growth; others argue that migration 
fosters divergence in wages, income and employment, generating poverty traps and 
lowering growth. The study of the long-term impact of internal migration on regional 
economic development as well as the analysis of geographical distance covered as a 
crucial factor determining the long-term economic legacy of internal migration have, 
however, been neglected by past research. This chapter has addressed these important 
gaps in the literature, examining the impact of domestic US migration and the average 
distance covered by migrants in 1880 and 1910 on the wealth of US counties in 2010. 
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Two main research questions have driven the analysis: (1) Did late 19th century 
internal migrants transform the economy of their counties of destination in a way that 
can still be felt today? Was the settlement pattern of internal migrants more than 100 
years ago decisive for ensuing economic performance? and (2) Does geographical 
distance matter for the impact of internal migration on long-term economic 
development? Do internal migrants travelling longer distances have a different impact 
on regional economic development over the long-term than those from nearby 
counties and states? 
The findings confirm that internal migrants having crossed state lines between their 
birth state and destination exert a significant and positive long-term impact on the 
economic performance of their receiving regions. They leave a trace which is still 
evident more than 100 years after the settlement took place. Counties that attracted a 
large share of domestic migrants around the turn of the 20th century became and remain 
more prosperous in 2010 than those largely bypassed by internal out-of-state migration 
streams. Similar to their foreign-born counterparts (Rodríguez-Pose and Berlepsch, 
2014; Sequeira et al., 2017), 19th century internal migrants have been a powerful force 
in the subsequent economic dynamism of US counties.  
The geographical distance travelled by migrants is shown to have played a decisive 
role in this relationship. When analysing the average distance covered by internal 
migrants, the bigger the distance travelled, the greater the positive long-term economic 
legacy. Counties which attracted a large number of long distance migrants around the 
turn of the 20th century have been more dynamic over the next century. Large shares 
of population either born locally or in the same state have resulted in significantly 
lower regional economic development over the long-term.  
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Over the past century, internal migrants – and especially those having crossed vast 
distances to arrive at their final destination – have acted as decisive force for regional 
economic growth in the US. Unfortunately, we can only make assumptions about the 
exact mechanisms as to why and how this is the case. Bringing their habits, customs, 
and institutions from far-flung areas of the country to their receiving regions more than 
100 years ago, we speculate that they have increased regional diversity levels creating 
new heterogeneous societies. The venturesome, hard-working and risk-seeking spirit 
associated with the long-distance migrant brought novel ideas, experiences and 
abilities of the east to the otherwise quite homogenous local born populations of the 
western territories. Therefore, places which did not manage to attract internal long-
distance migrants – those which remained largely homogenous in their population 
composition – did not achieve a similar economic dynamism as they lacked the 
enlarged skillset, the different ideas, experiences and abilities long distance migrants 
brought along with them. They could not benefit from the economic boost elevated 
population diversity entails.  
Thus, internal long-distance migrants travelling over vast distances played a major 
role in raising local diversity levels, creating a fruitful soil for economic dynamism 
which lies at the root of a territorial prosperity that is much longer lived than could 
have been imagined. Consequently, historic internal migrants represented much more 
than pure increases in the local supply of labour or a mere population redistribution at 
one point in time. They planted the seeds of a remarkably resilient long-term 
prosperity – a legacy which has determined the economic dynamism and vibrancy of 
places in America for more than a century. However, further research following a case 
study approach will be needed to prove our assumptions and add further detail to 
properly evaluate these transfer mechanisms across time. 
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Ignoring this important legacy of worker mobility is dangerous. In a country made by 
migrants, short sighted and short-term migration policies may stymie the possibility 
of very important long-term economic impacts associated with facilitating the mobility 
of people looking for jobs and a better life for themselves and their children. Limiting 
this type of migration may consequently mean missing out on a huge economic 
potential and on a force for sustainable economic development which will be felt not 
just for years, but for decades and even centuries to come. 
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7.8 APPENDIX 7A 
 
 
FIGURE 7-2 AMERICAN-BORN INTERNAL MIGRANTS BY COUNTY, 1880  
(% OF TOTAL AMERICAN-BORN POPULATION) 
 
Source: Ruggles, et al. 2015; own elaboration 
263 
 
7.9 APPENDIX 7B 
 
 
FIGURE 7-3 AVERAGE MIGRATION DISTANCE RADIUS FROM HOUSTON, NEW YORK, 
SAN FRANCISCO, 1880 
Source: Ruggles, et al. 2015; own elaboration 
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7.10 APPENDIX 7C 
 
TABLE 7-6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEPENDENT AND MAIN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
      
Income per capita 2010 3142 34072,8 7764,75 16023 110956 
      
All migrants 1880 2858 0,37 0,2770218 
0,00288
4 1 
Internal migrants 1880 2921 0,33 0,2653268 0 1 
Population same state 1880 2921 0,67 0,2653268 0 1 
Population neighbour state 1880 2921 0,10 0,1005804 0 
0,85526
32 
Population rest of country 1880 2921 0,23 0,2465148 0 1 
Av. distance int. migrants 1880 (km) 2921 898,51 669,41 0 3855,5 
Av. distance all migrants 1880 (km) 2921 2.140,74 1.527,82 0 8875,2 
      
All migrants 1910 3131 0,33 0,2560091 
0,00022
3 1 
Internal migrants 1910 3135 0,26 0,2274818 0 1 
Population same state 1910 3135 0,74 0,2274818 0 1 
Population neighbour state 1910 3135 0,11 0,1028442 0 0,88 
Population rest of country 1910 3135 0,16 0,1847167 0 1 
Av. distance int. migrants 1910 (km) 3135 780, 45 560,64 0 3362,7 
Av. distance all migrants 1910 (km) 3135 2.138,44 1.710,03 0 9208,0 
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TABLE 7-7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CONTROL VARIABLES 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
      
Education 2000 3143 0,17 0,08 0,05 0,64 
Population 2000 3144 89920,43 292369,90 67 9519338 
Black population 2000 3120 0,09 0,145282 0 0,87 
Female 2000 3144 0,50 0,019063 0,33 0,57 
Female participation 2000 3142 0,55 0,065496 0,27 0,81 
Unemployment 2000 3141 0,04 0,016573 0,01 0,18 
Infant mortality 2000 3142 7 7,495610 0 93,8 
Manufacturing 2000 3049 0,14 0,104576 0,003 1 
      
Mean income 1880 2877 6,36 2,872315 1,75 30,27 
Literacy 1880 2921 0,74 0,227872 0 1 
Population 1880 3045 17799,95 39283,61 0 1206299 
Black population 1880 2994 0,14 0,215203 0 0,92 
Female 1880 2994 0,45 0,091157 0 0,88 
Female participation 1880 2921 0,06 0,060511 0 0,39 
Unemployment 1880 2918 0,16 0,295097 0 5 
Manufacturing 1880 2921 0,06 0,085532 0 0,91 
      
Mean income 1910  3128 6,82 2,132763 0 21,74 
Literacy 1910 3125 0,89 0,1183161 0,333333 1 
Population 1910 3138 31277,43 103795,6 0 2762522 
Black population 1910 3135 0,02 0,0827582 0 0,717431 
Female 1910 3135 0,47 0,0331056 0,278877 0,553718 
Female participation 1910 3125 0,10 0,0721319 0 0,449153 
Unemployment 1910 3128 0,06 0,0346171 0 0,484472 
Manufacturing 1910 3122 0,097 0,115119 0 0,75 
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7.11 APPENDIX 7D 
 
TABLE 7-8 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
 Main variables of interest 
 
 
Inc per cap 2010 (ln) Natural log of average income per capita 
levels in current US dollars on county 
level for county i in year t = 2010 
(unadjusted for inflation) 
 
US BEA 
 
 
 
   
All migrants~ Share of total migrants, both foreign-born 
and American-born, relative to total 
population in county i in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
   
Internal migrants~ Share of American-born internal migrants 
relative to total population in county i in 
year t0 (internal migrants refer to all 
current residents having crossed state-lines 
between birth state and current state of 
residence) 
IPUMS USA 
   
Population same state~ Fraction of American-born population in 
county i in year t0 relative to total 
American-born population with birth state 
equivalent to current state of residence 
 
IPUMS USA 
Population neighbour state~ Fraction of American-born population in 
county i in year t0 relative to total 
American-born population with birth state 
equivalent to any adjacent state of current 
state of residence 
IPUMS USA 
   
Population rest of country~ Fraction of American-born population in 
county i in year t0 relative to total 
American-born population with birth state 
equivalent to any non-adjacent state of 
current state of residence  
 
IPUMS USA 
External migrants~ Share of foreign-born migrants relative to 
total population in county i in year t0 
 
IPUMS USA 
Distance all mig (ln)~ Natural log of average distance travelled 
between birth state/birth country and 
current county of residence by all 
migrants, both foreign-born and 
American-born, living in county i in year 
t0 
 
IPUMS USA 
Distance int. mig (ln)~ Natural log of average distance travelled 
between birth state and current county of 
residence by American-born internal 
migrants living in county i in year t0 
IPUMS USA 
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Variable Description Source 
Instruments   
   
Topography  Scale variable extracted from the National 
Atlas of the United States of America of 
the U.S. Geological Survey (1970) 
published as part of the Natural Amenities 
Scale corresponding to topography type of 
county i with range [1-21] 
U.S. Department of 
Interior 
   
Water area Natural log of size of water areas within a 
county measured in square miles retrieved 
from the TIGER Geodatabases  
U.S. Census  
Geography division 
   
Control Variables 
 
  
Education 
 
 
Percentage of population of county i with 
college degree in t-k  
 
ICPSR 
 
 
Literacy~ Literacy rate in county i in t0 IPUMS USA 
Income~ Constructed mean income score on county 
level. Individual income levels assigned to 
occupational data on the basis of median 
total income per occupation in hundreds of 
1950 dollars, as natural log in t0. Basis for 
construction is total size of county 
population in 1880/1910  
 
IPUMS USA 
Population (ln)~ Natural log of total population of county i 
in t0 and t-k 
 
ICPSR 
 
Manufacturing~ Percentage of labour force employed in 
manufacturing in county i in t0 and t-k 
US BLS and  
IPUMS USA 
   
Black Population~ Percentage of black population in county i 
in t0 and t-k 
 
ICPSR  
 
Female~  Percentage of female population in county 
i in t0 and t-k 
Census 2000 summary 
files and IPUMS USA 
 
Female Participation~ Female participation rate in the labour 
force in county i in t0 and t-k 
ICPSR and  
IPUMS USA 
 
Unemployment~ 
 
Unemployment rate in county i in t0 and t-
k 
Proxy in 1880 (unemployment rate not 
available): Months unemployed last year 
 
IPUMS USA 
and US BLS 
 
Infant mortality~ Infant mortality rate in county i in t-k 
measured as number of deaths among 
infants aged <1 year per 1,000 live births 
 
CDC 
State Controls 
 
State dummies 
  
Own construction 
~ refers to respective year in question: 1880/1910 for variables of interest and 1880/1910/2000 for 
control variable 
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7.12 APPENDIX 7E 
 
Description of topography scale retrieved from The National Atlas of the United States of 
America 
 
TABLE 7-9 US LAND SURFACE TOPOGRAPHY CODES 
Category Code Land surface 
Plains 1 Flat plains 
 2 Smooth plains 
 3 Irregular plains, slight relief 
 4 Irregular plains 
Tablelands 5 Tablelands, moderate relief 
 6 Tablelands, considerable relief 
 7 Tablelands, high relief 
 8 Tablelands, very high relief 
Plains with Hills or Mountains 9 Plains with hills 
 10 Plains with high hills 
 11 Plains with low mountains 
 12 Plains with high mountains 
Open Hills and Mountains 13 Open low hills 
 14 Open hills  
 15 Open high hills 
 16 Open low mountains 
Hills and Mountains 18 Hills 
 19 High hills 
 20 Low mountains 
  21 High mountains 
  Source: U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, DC., 1970
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7.13 APPENDIX 7F 
TABLE 7-10 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION, OLS 1910 
Dep. Var.: income per 
capita 2010 (ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
All migrants 1910 0.0721***     
 (0.0220)     
Internal migrants 1910  0.0375*    
  (0.0215)    
Pop. same state 1910   -0.0375*   
   (0.0215)   
Pop. neighbour state 1910    -0.0149  
    (0.0337)  
Pop. rest of country 1910     0.0768** 
     (0.0327) 
External migrants 1910  0.198*** 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.205*** 
  (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0493) 
      
Education 2000 0.0116*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.000759) (0.000749) (0.000749) (0.000749) (0.000747) 
Population 2000 (ln) -0.000998 -0.000598 -0.000598 0.000321 -0.00113 
 (0.00468) (0.00468) (0.00468) (0.00461) (0.00465) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Black population 2000 0.000196 0.000278 0.000278 0.000299 0.000261 
 (0.000273) (0.000273) (0.000273) (0.000273) (0.000273) 
Female 2000 0.0163*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0168*** 0.0166*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) 
Female part. 2000 0.00214*** 0.00218*** 0.00218*** 0.00208*** 0.00217*** 
 (0.000761) (0.000763) (0.000763) (0.000764) (0.000761) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0221*** -0.0223*** -0.0223*** -0.0222*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00297) (0.00302) (0.00302) (0.00303) (0.00299) 
Infant mortality 2000 8.43e-05 7.11e-05 7.11e-05 6.59e-05 7.68e-05 
 (0.000419) (0.000418) (0.000418) (0.000421) (0.000418) 
      
Income 1910 (ln) -0.000805 7.27e-05 7.27e-05 0.00507 -0.00441 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0142) 
Literacy 1910 0.123*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.175*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0396) (0.0398) 
Population 1910 (ln) 7.61e-05 -0.00291 -0.00291 -0.00325 -0.00273 
 (0.00587) (0.00579) (0.00579) (0.00576) (0.00579) 
Manufacturing 1910 -0.0778*** -0.0918*** -0.0918*** -0.0929*** -0.0855*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0270) 
Black population 1910 0.127** 0.134** 0.134** 0.135** 0.135** 
 (0.0580) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0583) (0.0581) 
Female 1910 -0.609*** -0.513*** -0.513*** -0.570*** -0.500*** 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165) (0.162) 
Female part. 1910 0.122** 0.122** 0.122** 0.119** 0.125** 
 (0.0529) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0526) 
Unemployment 1910 0.0598 0.0515 0.0515 0.0560 0.0544 
 (0.0838) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0835) 
      
Observations 2,617 2,617 2,617 2,617 2,617 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.673 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.675 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     |     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7.14 APPENDIX 7G 
TABLE 7-11 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION, IV 1910 
Dep. Var.:  
income per capita 2010 
(ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
All migrants 1910 1.420***     
 (0.331)     
Internal migrants 1910  1.653***    
  (0.421)    
Pop. same state 1910   -1.653***   
   (0.421)   
Pop. neighbour state 1910    3.042***  
    (0.965)  
Pop. rest of country 1910     3.622** 
     (1.428) 
External migrants 1910  0.661*** 0.661*** 0.374*** 1.003*** 
  (0.142) (0.142) (0.105) (0.343) 
      
Education 2000 0.0120*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0123*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.000898) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00113) (0.00166) 
Population 2000 (ln) -0.0341*** -0.0371*** -0.0371*** -0.0136 -0.0651** 
 (0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0278) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.147*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136** -0.135*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0538) (0.0525) 
Black population 2000 -5.67e-05 -0.000573 -0.000573 0.000128 -0.00141 
 (0.000484) (0.000533) (0.000533) (0.000716) (0.000867) 
Female 2000 0.00910*** 0.00726** 0.00726** 0.00699 0.00759 
 (0.00306) (0.00358) (0.00358) (0.00443) (0.00512) 
Female part. 2000 0.00596*** 0.00575*** 0.00575*** 0.00593*** 0.00553** 
 (0.00148) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00199) (0.00219) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0260*** -0.0252*** -0.0252*** -0.0157*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00453) (0.00453) (0.00598) (0.00950) 
Infant mortality 2000 0.000211 0.000294 0.000294 5.97e-05 0.000573 
 (0.000620) (0.000671) (0.000671) (0.000845) (0.00108) 
      
Income 1910 (ln) -0.203*** -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.0182 -0.440** 
 (0.0605) (0.0666) (0.0666) (0.0421) (0.190) 
Literacy 1910 -0.0662 -0.313** -0.313** -0.0790 -0.592* 
 (0.0902) (0.136) (0.136) (0.120) (0.304) 
Population 1910 (ln) -0.00724 0.0111 0.0111 0.00241 0.0215 
 (0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0176) (0.0205) 
Manufacturing 1910 -0.0950* -0.00892 -0.00892 -0.262*** 0.292* 
 (0.0509) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0829) (0.169) 
Black population 1910 0.129 0.0901 0.0901 0.0812 0.101 
 (0.0790) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.120) (0.0950) 
Female 1910 2.138*** 1.587** 1.587** 0.947 2.350* 
 (0.754) (0.643) (0.643) (0.643) (1.292) 
Female part. 1910 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.153 0.413** 
 (0.0978) (0.104) (0.104) (0.117) (0.183) 
Unemployment 1910 -0.142 -0.0923 -0.0923 -0.196 0.0312 
 (0.165) (0.177) (0.177) (0.248) (0.291) 
Observations 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-stat 27.32 22.35 22.35 12.83 7.85 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   |   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7.15 APPENDIX 7H 
 
TABLE 7-12 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF AVERAGE MIGRATION DISTANCE, 1910 
Dep. Var.:  
income per capita 2010 (ln) 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All 
migrants 
Internal 
migrants 
All  
migrants 
Internal 
migrants 
     
Distance all mig (ln) 1910 0.0185***  0.230***  
 (0.00360)  (0.0559)  
Distance int. mig (ln) 1910  0.0411***  0.563*** 
  (0.0100)  (0.135) 
     
Education 2000 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0103*** 0.00986*** 
 (0.000763) (0.000775) (0.000991) (0.00102) 
Population 2000 (ln) 0.000480 -0.000660 -0.00289 -0.0104 
 (0.00459) (0.00484) (0.00594) (0.00678) 
Manufacturing 2000 -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.0664 
 (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0372) (0.0423) 
Black population 2000  0.000268 6.54e-06 0.000334 -0.00156*** 
 (0.000273) (0.000282) (0.000464) (0.000595) 
Female 2000 0.0169*** 0.0168*** 0.0177*** 0.0175*** 
 (0.00155) (0.00153) (0.00261) (0.00222) 
Female participation 2000 0.00181** 0.00210*** 0.00146 0.00209** 
 (0.000755) (0.000765) (0.00103) (0.00102) 
Unemployment 2000 -0.0213*** -0.0211*** -0.0184*** -0.0155*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00312) (0.00415) (0.00477) 
Infant mortality 2000 0.000141 0.000158 9.41e-05 0.000490 
 (0.000425) (0.000435) (0.000604) (0.000582) 
     
Income 1910 (ln) 0.00532 0.0161 -0.0538** -0.0484* 
 (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0263) (0.0266) 
Literacy 1910  0.149*** 0.111*** 0.205*** 0.101 
 (0.0392) (0.0395) (0.0681) (0.0678) 
Population 1910 (ln) -0.00214 0.00288 -0.0210** 0.0215** 
 (0.00590) (0.00653) (0.00952) (0.00964) 
Manufacturing 1910 -0.0805*** -0.0773*** -0.154*** 0.00390 
 (0.0255) (0.0265) (0.0426) (0.0446) 
Black population 1910 0.116** 0.126** 0.0901 0.106 
 (0.0583) (0.0585) (0.0927) (0.104) 
Female 1910 -0.681*** -0.747*** -0.0815 -0.124 
 (0.154) (0.161) (0.261) (0.279) 
Female participation 1910 0.118** 0.0988* 0.137 0.185** 
 (0.0516) (0.0537) (0.0842) (0.0864) 
Unemployment 1910 0.0516 0.0611 -0.191 -0.0810 
 (0.0857) (0.0860) (0.149) (0.127) 
     
Observations 2,588 2,501 2,588 2,501 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.677 0.678 - - 
First stage F-stat - - 23.51 25.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  |  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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8 MIGRATION-PRONE AND MIGRATION-AVERSE 
PLACES: PATH DEPENDENCE IN LONG-TERM 
MIGRATION 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The beginning of the 21st century marked a very important shift in the population 
composition of the United States (US). African Americans were replaced by Hispanics 
(or Latinos)39 as the largest ethnic minority. Today, Latinos make 18 percent of the 
US population and their economic, cultural, and political clout is growing rapidly. By 
2050, Latinos are expected to represent around 30 percent of the total US population 
(Bergad and Klein, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Despite a sizable Spanish-
speaking community traditionally established in what were former Mexican territories 
in the South West, the massive migration of Hispanics is a relatively new phenomenon 
in most parts of the US. It was not until the post-second World War years that 
Hispanics became the largest migrant group. In earlier migration waves they were only 
a small fraction of the incoming population. Migration to the US in the 19th and early 
20th centuries was dominated by Europeans.  
There is no shortage of literature aiming to understand the reasons why people migrate 
and the factors determining not only the volume but also the direction of migration 
                                                     
39 There are intense debates regarding whether it is more appropriate to use the term Hispanic or Latino 
(Taylor et al., 2012). However, following Sáenz and Morales (2015), the two terms are used 
indistinctively to refer to the population originating from Mexico, Spanish-speaking Caribbean islands, 
and Central and South America.  
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flows and the final settlement patterns. Much of this literature has revolved around 
socio-demographic, climatic, and cultural aspects influencing individual migration 
decisions (i.e. Pissarides and McMaster, 1990; Simon, 2004; Massey et al., 2005; 
Haapanen and Ritsilä, 2007; Partridge and Rickman, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose, Ketterer 
and Castells-Quintana, 2015).  
One migration-pull factor that has attracted considerable scientific attention is the 
presence of kinship and migrant networks at destination. Migrants go to where their 
relatives, friends, and co-nationals have previously settled. A large migrant network 
at destination decreases the costs of moving and raises the potential net gains. Ethnic, 
village, or even family ties are important attractions for migrants and lead to the 
establishment of distinctive migrant settlement patterns (i.e. Tassinopoulos and 
Kristensen, 1998; Epstein, 2002; Epstein and Gang, 2006; Radu, 2008; Jewell and 
Molina, 2009; Bodvarsson, Simpson and Sparber, 2014). But do migrant networks 
expand beyond kinship, ethnic, local, and national origins? Do migrants flock to places 
that have, over time, become ‘migration-prone’? And, more importantly, do migrants 
of different national origins and generations end up in the same places that welcomed 
historical migration once the diverse factors that make a place attractive to different 
migrant generations are controlled for? These are questions that have attracted little 
attention in migration research, which has predominantly focused on micro-personal 
ties and networks rather than long-term factors that make particular places migration-
prone or migration-averse.  
This chapter aims to answer these questions, using a dataset comprising county level 
data of foreign-born population shares during two major migration waves – the Age 
of Mass Migration at the turn of the 20th century and the period of Latin American 
immigration to the US from 1950/60 onwards. The objective of this research is to 
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ascertain if completely unrelated migration waves follow similar geographical patterns 
once the socio-economic factors affecting migration are controlled for. We assume 
that large numbers of migrants settling in a region at a given point in time leave an 
imprint on the territory – a ‘migration buzz’40 – which acts as pull factor for ensuing 
migrant waves, irrespective of ethnicity or origin. It will be argued that the migrants’ 
character, in particular their willingness to take risks, their entrepreneurialism, and 
their dynamism becomes engraved in particular territories, contributing to the creation 
of a long-lasting division between migration-prone and migration-averse places. 
The chapter adopts the following structure: Section 8.2 summarises main facts and 
presents descriptive data on the two migration waves in question. Section 8.3 reviews 
the relevant literature before presenting a discussion of the model and data in Section 
8.4. In Section 8.5 the regression results are examined, using a variety of different 
estimation techniques. Section 8.6 concludes and presents some preliminary policy 
implications. 
 
8.2 US MIGRATION PATTERNS – A BRIEF SKETCH 
 
The history of the US has been shaped by huge inflows of people seeking a better life 
for themselves and their families. Millions of people from all over the world have 
moved to the US, transforming the country into a ‘nation of immigrants’. According 
to Spickard (2007: 4), “More than 99 percent of the current US population can at least 
theoretically trace its ancestry back to people who came […] from somewhere else”.
                                                     
40 We use the word ‘buzz’ here in analogy to the path-breaking work by M. Storper and A. Venables 
(2004) 
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FIGURE 8-1 US MIGRANT POPULATION (ABSOLUTE AND SHARE OF TOTAL 
POPULATION), 1850-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Migration Policy Institute (2017); own elaboration 
 
Two episodes in US immigration history stand out: the Age of Mass Migration around 
the turn of the 20th century and the period between 1970 and 2010. During these 
periods immigrant numbers rose rapidly year-on-year just as immigrant population 
growth rates exceeded formerly known levels. Between 1850 and 1920, the absolute 
number of immigrants – defined as those people having a non-US birthplace but 
residing in the US – increased from 2 to 14 million (Figure 8-1). Between 1970 and 
2010, the foreign population in the US rose from nearly 10 million to 40 million. Such 
numbers represented close to 15 percent of the total population in historical and 13 
percent in modern times (Figure 8-1). Both migration waves differ, however, in 
composition and settlement pattern. Figure 8-2 depicts the shift in major sending 
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regions between 1880 and 1999. 
 
 
FIGURE 8-2 PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, 1880–1999 
Data source: US Department of Homeland Security (2011); own elaboration 
 
The first two columns of Figure 8-2 depict the US migrant population during the two 
peaks of the Age of Mass Migration. Between 1880 and 1889 close to 90 percent of 
the foreign-born population in the US was of European stock (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 
2006). Early migrant contingents involved Northern and Western Europeans, 
primarily from England, Ireland, Germany, or the Scandinavian countries. Later 
migrants had Southern and Eastern European roots: Italians, Poles, Russians, Greeks, 
or Portuguese (Alexander, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch, 2015). Migrants 
tended to be male, young, single, relatively poor, and unskilled, with limited 
knowledge of English. After entering the US mostly via the major ports of the eastern 
seaboard, migrants quickly followed in the footsteps of friends and relatives, forming 
a distinct migrant settlement pattern and creating marked migrant communities across 
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the country (Bruhn, 2005). Most migrants settled in what were then sparsely populated 
regions of the north and west of the country. Most southern states, by contrast, were 
avoided by migrants (Figure 8-3). 
 
 
FIGURE 8-3 FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1880 
Source: Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) 
 
Columns 3 and 4 in Figure 8-2 display a clear shift in demographic makeup of the 
foreign-born population in the US. Over the course of the second half of the 20th 
century, the proportion of Europeans drastically shrank and two ‘new’ major sending 
regions emerged – Asia and, to an even greater degree, Latin America. By 2000, 
migrants from Mexico, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and Central and South 
America made up more than 50 percent of the foreign-born population, Asians 
represented around one third, while the European share had decreased to just 14 
percent (Figure 8-2).  
Foreign stock (1880) 
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The foreign-born of the late 20th century adopted a somewhat different settlement 
pattern than their predecessors one hundred years earlier (see Appendix 8A). Late 20th 
and early 21st century migrants fundamentally resided in western states, such as 
Washington, Oregon, parts of Idaho, California, or Nevada and along the border with 
Mexico in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Historically attractive states around the 
Great Lakes and the Mid-West appealed to limited numbers of migrants. Additional 
concentrations were found in Florida and the north east. The states of the ‘Old South’ 
remained, at least until 1990, relatively migration free. 
These migration patterns have been mainly shaped by the largest migrant group: the 
Latinos (see Figure 8-4). Although migration from the ‘new world’ is by no means a 
new phenomenon, migrant flows from Latin America rapidly increased after WWII. 
The influx of Latinos was boosted by initiatives targeting labour shortages, such as the 
bracero program with Mexico (Daniels, 1990); by changing regulations in 
immigration law – replacing a system of national origin quotas by one giving 
preference to skills, occupations, refugee status, or facilitating family reunifications 
(Sáenz and Morales, 2015); and by political unrest in many Latin American countries, 
such as Castro’s ascent to power in Cuba or the later Mariel Crisis (Daniels, 1990; 
Bergad and Klein, 2010).  
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TABLE 8-1 LATIN AMERICANS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, 
1960-69, 2000-09,  BY COUNTRY OF LAST RESIDENCE 
Region and country of last residence 
1960 to 1969 2000 to 2009 
Total number Share Total number Share 
Latin America 1.241.044 100% 4.205.877 100% 
Mexico 441.824 36% 1.704.166 41% 
Caribbean 427.235 34% 1.053.969 25% 
Cuba  202.030 16% 271.742 6% 
Dominican Republic  83.552 7% 291.492 7% 
Haiti  28.992 2% 203.827 5% 
Jamaica 62.218 5% 172.523 4% 
Other Caribbean 50.443 4% 114.385 3% 
Central America 98.560 8% 591.130 14% 
Belize  4.185 0% 9.682 0% 
Costa Rica  17.975 1% 21.571 1% 
El Salvador  14.405 1% 251.237 6% 
Guatemala  14.357 1% 156.992 4% 
Honduras  15.078 1% 63.513 2% 
Nicaragua  10.383 1% 70.015 2% 
Panama 1 22.177 2% 18.120 0% 
Other Central America - - - - 
South America 250.754 20% 856.593 20% 
Argentina  49.384 4% 47.955 1% 
Bolivia  6.205 0% 21.921 1% 
Brazil  29.238 2% 115.404 3% 
Chile  12.384 1% 19.792 0% 
Colombia  68.371 6% 236.570 6% 
Ecuador  34.107 3% 107.977 3% 
Guyana  4.546 0% 70.373 2% 
Paraguay  1.249 0% 4.623 0% 
Peru  19.783 2% 137.614 3% 
Suriname  612 0% 2.363 0% 
Uruguay  4.089 0% 9.827 0% 
Venezuela  20.758 2% 82.087 2% 
Other South America  28 0% 87 0% 
Other America 22.671 2% 19 0% 
Source: own elaboration using data from the US Department of Homeland Security (2011) 
 
While in the early 1960s, the incoming Latino immigrants were overwhelmingly from 
Mexico, with relatively large Cuban and Puerto Rican41 contingents, by 2000, the 
Latino community grew massively in diversity (see Table 8-1).42 Caribbeans – both 
Spanish- as well as French- and English-speaking migrants – and Central and South 
                                                     
41 The Puerto Ricans are not shown in Table 8-1, as they are considered American-born since the Jones 
Act in 1917 (Bergad and Klein, 2010). 
42 Table 8-1 only captures the official extent of legal immigration. Undocumented migrants to the US 
are not included in these numbers, even though they became increasingly relevant from the 1960s 
onwards.  
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Americans – mainly from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, 
Peru, and Ecuador – accounted for almost 40 percent of immigration from the ‘new 
world’. Despite the differences in countries of origin and in traditions, backgrounds, 
and customs, the late 20th century Latin American migrant did not greatly differ from 
the late 19th century European migrant: young, poor, unskilled, pious, and from rural 
background. There was, however, a more balanced gender-ratio compared to their 
European precursors. Women immigrants, especially from South and Central 
America, were strongly represented in this migration wave (Bergad and Klein, 2010).  
Once in the US, Latino immigrants generally occupied the lowest levels of the social 
and economic scale. They tended to work in low-paying jobs within the “Latino 
immigrant occupational niche” (Sáenz and Morales, 2015: 109), such as “agriculture; 
meat, poultry, and seafood processing; construction; waiters/waitresses; cooks; maids 
and housekeeping cleaners; and janitors and building cleaners […]” (Douglas and 
Sáenz, 2008: 169). Although still overrepresented in agriculture, by 1990 over 90 
percent of Latinos lived in metropolitan areas. New York, Los Angeles, and Miami 
are the hubs of Latino culture in the US (Cafferty and Engstrom, 2000). Hispanic 
immigrants and their children have the highest high school dropout and the lowest 
tertiary education rates in the US population and, as a consequence, cluster at the lower 
end of the median annual income scale (Daniels, 1990).  
Prior to 2000, Latinos were concentrated in three states: Florida, California, and Texas. 
New York, New Mexico, Arizona, and parts of Nevada and Washington also had 
sizeable Latino populations (Figure 8-4a). From the 2000s onwards and following 
processes of industrial restructuring, variations in the geography of labour demand, 
and changes to immigration legislation and border policies, Latino immigrants fanned 
out beyond their traditional destinations (Donato et al., 2008). As depicted in Figure 
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8-4b, states such as Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming began to receive large Hispanic 
contingents. Areas without a history of immigration of any sort, such as North 
Carolina, Virginia, or Georgia, as well as some states in the Midwest lured growing 
numbers of Latino migrants, (i.e. Bailey, 2005; Bump, 2005; Hansen, 2005). Figure 
8-4 displays the geographic dispersion of Hispanic immigrants, which transformed 
Latin American population flows “from a regional to a national phenomenon” 
(Massey and Capoferro, 2008: 47).
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a) 
b) 
 
 
FIGURE 8-4 LATINO FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 
1990 AND 201043 
Data source: Minnesota Population Center (2016); own elaboration 
 
                                                     
43 As the relative size of the foreign-born Latino county population in 1990 or 2010 is of a different 
magnitude relative to that of the foreign-born population during the Age of Mass Migration, the map 
intervals are different from those in Figure 8-3.  
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8.3 WHY DO MIGRANTS END UP IN PARTICULAR PLACES 
AND NOT IN OTHERS? 
 
Many studies have aimed to understand why people migrate and what determines the 
volume of migration and settlement patterns. Traditional theory, such as the 
neoclassical economic framework, regards migration as a logical consequence of 
factor price differentials across geographic units generated by varying endowments in 
the supply and demand of labour. Assuming perfect competition, complete 
information, and prefect mobility of capital and labour, differences in factor prices 
represent the fundamental trigger for population mobility. Migrants thus move from 
low- to high-wage regions (i.e. Hicks, 1932; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 
1970; Ödberg, 1997). To the individual, the decision to migrate boils down to a simple 
income maximisation problem in which a rational individual moves if the calculation 
of relocation costs and benefits – mostly regarded solely in financial terms – generates 
a positive net return. Where a migrant decides to settle hinges on the maximisation of 
individual productivity, i.e. where the highest expected net income level can be 
attained relative to the acquired skill set and expected time horizon (Sjaastad, 1962; 
Todaro, 1969; Borjas, 1990). Migration-prone regions are, therefore, according to this 
theory, high productivity areas offering high wages (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; 
Greenwood, 1997; Ödberg, 1997). 
Many of the assumptions of traditional migration theories have, however, been 
challenged (e.g. Roy, 1951; Borjas, 1987; Borjas et al. 1992) . Greater attention has 
been paid to, among many others, how labour markets, globalisation, history, 
households, quality of life, absolute vs. relative income positioning and social capital 
influence the migration decision (see overviews in i.e. Massey et al., 1993, 2005; 
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Bodvarsson, Simpson and Sparber, 2014). Two strands have become particularly 
prominent – one analysing the regional characteristics behind a territory’s 
attractiveness to potential immigrants and another evaluating individual factors 
influencing the probability to migrate. A combination of both goes far in explaining 
not only the magnitude of migration but also the composition, direction, and final 
settlement pattern (Massey et al., 1993).44 
Key push and pull factors influencing population movements have been identified. On 
top of high wages, job availability, the possibility of job progress, and low 
unemployment and long-term unemployment ratios (Pissarides and McMaster, 1990; 
Ritsilä and Ovaskainen, 2001; Faggian and McCann, 2008; Biagi, Faggian and 
McCann, 2011), the size and composition of the economy are also a draw for 
immigrants (Piore, 1979; Partridge and Rickman, 1996; Simon, 2004). Regional 
market potential linked to agglomeration patterns can increase a place’s attractiveness 
(Ottaviano and Puga, 1998). Other relevant push factors are quasi-financial forms of 
income, such as social welfare spending and public amenities, as well as re-
distributional transfer mechanisms, providing insurance against income losses, and the 
availability of public goods and regional institutional quality (Day, 1992; Haapanen 
and Ritsilä, 2007; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). In short, economically 
dynamic regions with high levels of regional development, adequate financial 
incentives, and widely available employment opportunities generally act as magnets 
for immigrants.  
Beyond the purely economic factors, a raft of social aspects also captured the attention 
of researchers. A good education system and favourable human capital endowments 
                                                     
44 As this chapter deals with regional aspects, the focus in this theoretical section will predominantly 
lie on the characteristics of the region rather than on individual ones. 
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at destination have been shown to facilitate increases in migrant productivity as well 
as easing transitions into the job market. Highly educated individuals are also more 
likely to migrate (Greenwood, 1997; i.e. Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005; Zimmermann, 
2005), as “higher education reduces the risks of migration through a higher ability to 
collect and process information” (Zimmermann, 2005: 429). The demographic 
composition of the population in the receiving region further shapes migration flows. 
A predominantly young population, for example, is more likely to lead to larger 
population out-flows, once labour market conditions tighten (Cairns and Menz, 2009). 
Expected gains in lifetime income are significantly lower for older people than for the 
young, making the latter group more mobile (i.e. Bowles, 1970; Burda and Wyplosz, 
1992; Zimmermann, 2005). Urban and natural amenities, such as a region’s cultural 
life, its history, climate and natural environment, and quality of life, have also attracted 
the attention of migration research. Boosting a region’s amenities is increasingly 
regarded as an important pull factor for incoming skills and talent (Ferguson et al., 
2007; Rappaport, 2007; Partridge, 2010; Rodríguez‐Pose and Ketterer, 2012).  
Lastly, the territory’s existing stock of previous migrants within the same ‘reference 
or peer group’ of incoming population – those linked by kinship, ethnicity, or 
friendship who arrived earlier and established themselves in the receiving territory – 
plays a central part in the size and the origin of migrants. Research in economics, 
sociology, history, and political science has placed increasing emphasis on community 
ties stretching from place of origin to host region as a fundamental determinant of 
individual migration decisions and overall level of migration (i.e. Tassinopoulos and 
Kristensen, 1998; Epstein, 2002; Epstein and Gang, 2006; McGovern, 2007; Radu, 
2008; Jewell and Molina, 2009; Bodvarsson, Simpson and Sparber, 2014). Migration 
decisions therefore depend not only on the individual’s own actions and 
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characteristics, but also on the specific migration choices of the individual’s peer 
group. A large community of friends and family at destination (a so-called kinship 
network) reduces relocation costs and increases the expected return associated with 
migration. Having relatives in a foreign destination generates a self-perpetuating 
element as, “each act of migration creates additional social ties for future migrants, 
who in turn extend the range of social capital for further migrants” (McGovern, 2007: 
220). Similarly, large and well established groups of earlier migrants, sharing a 
common origin (known as a migrant network), generates an equally positive 
externality (Winters, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Bodvarsson, Simpson and 
Sparber, 2014). Once the kinship and migrant network in a territory reaches a critical 
mass, it affects new migrant settlement patterns by attracting more and more 
population from the shared region of origin. The result is a geographical clustering of 
immigrants from specific local, national, or ethnic backgrounds (Bauer, Epstein and 
Gang, 2007, 2009; Jaeger, 2007). 
Access to these networks lowers the psychological and information costs for the 
arriving individual and hence significantly affects the volume of migrants and their 
choice of destination (i.e. Yap, 1977; Hugo, 1981; Massey and España, 1987; Radu, 
2008). A large stock of migrants from the same origin generates social capital which 
reduces employment and housing search costs, lowers language barriers, offers 
protection from crime and income loss, provides temporary credit and lodging, and 
eases the individual’s settlement process. It therefore facilitates integration into what 
is initially an alien environment, administration, culture, and society (Marks, 1989; 
Daniels, 1990; Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996; Massey et al., 2005; 
Bodvarsson, Simpson and Sparber, 2014). This phenomenon implies that total moving 
costs are endogenous to the volume of previous migrants. “Once started, migration 
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develops momentum, as current migration reduces the cost of future migration […] 
[it] continues or even accelerates […] [and] is channelled in that migratory paths 
emerge” (Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996: 910). Many examples can 
be found to support these findings. Massey et al. (1987), for example, reported that 
nearly 40 percent of Mexicans found employment in the US via friends or relatives. 
Munshi (2003) calculated that established community ties led to significantly higher 
employment rates and income levels among Mexican immigrants in the US. 
‘Migration clubs’ managed by kith and kin among black southerners in the north, as 
well as soccer clubs involving Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, provided the 
linguistic and cultural cushion for the new arrivals (Massey et al., 1987; Carrington, 
Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996). Similarly, European migrants nearly a century 
earlier sent letters to family and friends with information on employment and the 
housing market in the US, often asking to join them and attaching money to pay for 
transatlantic trips (Daniels, 1990; Joly, 2000).  
Migrant as well as kinship networks can trigger path dependence or ‘herd behaviour’ 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998; Epstein, 2002) between place of origin 
and destination, thus affecting the volume and direction of migration flows. “Once the 
number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical threshold, migration 
becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration itself creates the social 
structure needed to sustain it” (Massey et al., 1993: 449). In short, a large, pre-
established migrant network impacts self-selection, decreases the costs of moving, 
raises the potential net gain for the would-be migrant, stimulates mobility, and steers 
migration flows into migration-prone regions, following ethnic, village, or even family 
ties (Shah and Menon, 1999; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2007; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2010; Simpson and Sparber, 2013).  
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One factor of particular importance in the migration network literature is the common 
birthplace. A shared geographical origin, ethnic bond, or common background is 
crucial for migrants to reap the benefits of networks and in determining a region’s 
appeal. The literature assumes that a common origin, a shared community-belonging, 
or family ties are the sources for the establishment of migrant networks and the 
development of path dependence. Membership of a shared community therefore acts 
as a pull factor for incoming migrants, determining the final migrant settlement 
pattern. However, one important question has not been explored: what if the migrant 
networks are not formed solely on the basis of a common ethnicity or birthplace, but 
simply on the presence of previous migration groups, regardless of origin? What if a 
large community of migrants in a given place creates a favourable environment for 
migrants which endures over time? Could the institutional setting established by 
previous generations of migrants transform a locality or region into a migration-prone 
area, welcoming to migrants for generations, regardless of origin? What if past 
migration begets future migration? In their work on the long-term impact of migration 
and its implications for regional development in the US, Rodríguez-Pose and von 
Berlepsch (2014, 2015) assume that the character of the migrant – more risk-seeking, 
entrepreneurial, and dynamic – becomes engraved in the territories where migrants 
settle. They posit that the presence of large groups of immigrants can generate a 
migration vibe in the receiving areas which transforms the institutional framework in 
ways that sends signals to future migrant generations.  
There is, however, limited empirical evidence to support or refute the claim that past 
migration patterns transform territories into migration-prone or migration-averse areas 
over long timeframes. This is precisely what this chapter aims to demonstrate: 
Comparing the settlement patterns of two migration waves of a very different nature 
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and separated by almost one century, this chapter analyses whether past migration 
waves in the US are determining the settlement pattern of current migration waves, 
irrespective of origin and ethnicity of migrant groups.  
 
8.4 MODEL AND DATA 
 
8.4.1 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
The model estimated to assess whether past migration waves shape the settlement 
pattern of completely unrelated later waves of migrants takes the following form: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡0 +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜃 𝑍𝑖,𝑡0 + 𝜇 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑋𝑖 + 𝜗 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Latinos is the share of total population born in a Latin American country45 in 
county i in period t (t=1970, 1980….2010); Migration, the variable of interest, 
represents the share of foreign-born population in county i at t0 (t0=1880 or 1910); X 
is a vector of economic and socio-demographic characteristics of county i which are 
assumed to serve as pull factors to recent migrants (at time t-k; k=10 years before the 
migrant account is taken) and Z corresponds to a vector at t0 which includes the same 
county characteristics as vector X that would have determined the appeal of the county 
to migrants more than a century ago. DistMX stands for the distance of any given 
county i to the Mexican-American border, while state represents state-specific fixed-
                                                     
45 The focus of the analysis lies only on the foreign-born Hispanic population. Other indicators recorded 
by the census, such as a Spanish last name, the usage of Spanish at home, or Hispanic origin were not 
consistently included in the questionnaires across the years and are therefore discarded.  
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effects controlling for potential spatial correlation between counties within a given 
state. ε describes robust standard errors. 
The model is run consecutively per decade between 1970 and 2010 for the 3,109 
continental counties of the US in 2010, covering a 40-year timeframe and shifting the 
dependent variable in each regression by 10 years. As any analysis involving economic 
and migration data is prone to endogeneity issues, introducing the dependent (Latinos) 
and explanatory variables (vector X) within the same time structure is highly 
problematic (Treyz et al., 1993; Özgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2011). Hence, all 
explanatory variables determining current migration flows are lagged by 10 years. 
This way, the risk of reverse causality is mitigated with, on the one hand, migration 
flows impacting regional economic features and, on the other, regional characteristics 
simultaneously directing migratory settlement patterns.  
Further endogeneity issues connected to omitted variable bias or spatial sorting are 
treated by means of three different robustness checks. First, the consecutive 
estimations are rerun, shifting the base migration year by 30 years, from 1880 to 1910. 
Both 1880 and 1910 depict peak years within the period of mass migration to the US: 
1880 represents the peak of the first wave of migrants, while 1910 that of the second 
wave. Two different migrant compositions are thus considered. As the main source of 
migration shifted around the turn of the century, the 1880 specification comprises 
mostly northern and western Europeans, predominantly from the British Isles, 
Germany, or Scandinavia. Using 1910 as base year, an entirely different composition 
of the foreign-born population is represented: mostly southern and eastern Europeans 
from Italy, Poland, the former Soviet Union, Portugal, or Greece (Hatton and 
Williamson, 1998). The shift in the composition of migrant groups between 1880 and 
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1910 minimises the risk of the results being driven by omitted variables connected to 
the character of the specific type of migrant. 
Second, an instrumental variable estimation is used in order to extract the underlying 
effect of historical on current migration waves. By capturing the exogenous variation 
in the migration variable of 1880, the potential endogeneity bias in the least-squares 
estimates is reduced. The discussion of the instruments used in the analysis is 
presented in section 8.4.3.  
Last, a third robustness check consists of reshaping the dataset into a quasi-panel 
structure. As the use of traditional FE-models is impossible, given that the analysis is 
built around a time-invariant variable of interest (Migration) and the probability of a 
high correlation between some of the time-varying variables and region-specific fixed-
effects, an alternative Hausman and Taylor (HT) (1981) instrumental variable 
estimator is used. This estimator allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
such as Z or distMX in a panel setting using the within transformation of time-varying 
variables to estimate consistent coefficients. It also accepts the potentiality of a 
correlation between some of the independent variables and individual specific effects. 
Individual means of the uncorrelated regressors, on the other hand, are employed to 
instrument for the endogenous variables (Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte, 2003; Baltagi, 
2008). Vector X contains the endogenous variables in our model. 
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8.4.2 DATA 
 
The migration data employed to construct the independent variable of interest 
Migration was extracted from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series USA 
database (IPUMS) Version 6.0 (Ruggles et al., 2015). This database provides US 
microdata covering censuses and American Community Surveys between 1790 and 
2010.46 Using a weighted sample of the US population including 5,791,531 individuals 
(11 percent of the total population in 1880) and 923,153 individuals (1 percent of the 
population in 1910), individual data points are matched to the respective county of 
residence at the time of the census and aggregated at county level. Following changes 
in county numbers, size, and boundaries between 1880 and 2010, cartographic 
boundary files of the 48 continental states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) provided by 
the US Census are used for every decade of analysis. In order to normalise borders to 
2010 county boundaries, averages weighted by population density at the time of the 
boundary change were calculated for each individual county in historical years. With 
the exception of Oklahoma in 1880,47 this method allowed to match historical county 
features to their 2010 equivalent.48 
The dependent variable, Latinos, was constructed using the National Historical 
Geographic Information System (NHGIS) Version 11.0 (Minnesota Population 
Center, 2016), which consists of data on US geographic units covering the population, 
housing, agriculture, and the economy from 1790 until today. The data on the Latino 
population at county level was extracted for the years between 1970 and 2010. As not 
                                                     
46 The American Community Survey was only initiated in 2005. 
47 Oklahoma only became an organized territory in 1890. 
48 The US territory comprised 2,875 counties or equivalent territorial units in the 48 contiguous states 
in 1880; 3,123 in 1910; and 3,109 in 2010. 
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all Latin American countries are listed independently within the NHGIS database, the 
share of Latin American population refers to Cubans, Mexicans, and all other people 
born in the Americas, excluding the US and Canada. 
Three different data sources were used to construct the county level database of control 
variables included in vector X. All county data for the years 1960 to 2000 was 
extracted from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database, the Social 
Explorer data collection, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR) historical databases. Vector X is included in the model to control 
for recent county level economic and socio-demographic characteristics, covering the 
relevant pull factors for migrant volume and settlement discussed in the literature. 
These are assumed to directly affect the settlement pattern of Latino migrants and the 
share of Latinos in the population of any given US county. Control factors include 
income per capita (as natural log), the share of population living in urban areas, the 
education level measured as the share of adults with tertiary education, the 
unemployment rate, the share of employment in agriculture as proxy for industry 
structure, female participation rates in the labour force, and the share of the black and 
female populations. All income variables were adjusted for inflation and converted to 
2010 dollars using the CPI inflation converter of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
The second vector of control variables, vector Z, dates from the time of the historical 
migration: 1880 and 1910 respectively. Vector Z comprises the historical equivalent 
of all variables included in vector X. It is used to control for historical economic and 
socio-demographic county features which may have influenced not only economic 
development levels but also the settlement pattern of migrants in 1880 and 1910 
respectively. These historic variables are either extracted from the ICPSR database or 
constructed using the IPUMS USA weighted population samples. In the latter case, 
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the same method as with the independent variable of interest is repeated, aggregating 
all individual data at county level. As income per capita data were not collected at the 
turn of the century, income proxies for 1880 and 1910 are constructed using the 
median total income per occupation category in 1950 dollars. These occupational 
income equivalents were allocated to an individual’s occupation in 1880 and 1910 and 
then aggregated at county level using the 1880/1910 total size of the county population 
as basis. 
The distance to Mexico (as natural log), included as further control, was constructed 
using GIS software, calculating the point-distance matrix between a county’s centroid 
and the nearest point on the continental border with Mexico. An exact description of 
all variables, including sources, is presented in Appendix 8B. 
 
8.4.3 INSTRUMENTATION STRATEGY 
 
Potential endogeneity bias in the least-squares estimates is tackled by means of 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations. Two instruments are used to assess the 
direction of causation and certify the exogenous variation of the variable of interest, 
Migration. The first is population density in 1880, extracted from the ICPSR database. 
The second is a measure of the endowment in public services, proxied by share of 
employment in the health and education sector as well as in public administration in 
any given county i in 1880 (or 1910). Data for the endowment in public services stem 
from the IPUMS USA individual data points, aggregated at the county level.  
The justification for the choice of both instruments is related to their role in 
determining migrant settlement patterns during the Age of Mass migration. Density 
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played a role as the newly arrived generally moved to places where their predecessors 
had already settled and where basic forms of infrastructure were already established. 
Public and often cultural organisations, such as churches, schools, newspapers, and 
meeting houses, became especially important in the settlement process, as they offered 
channels for information and knowledge exchange. German meeting houses, Swedish 
schools, or Irish churches facilitated settling down in previously unknown places 
(Daniels, 1990). Moreover, migrants valued access to markets and nearby settlements 
for basic supplies as well as the presence of community networks, schooling for their 
children, and the possibility of sustaining connections to their home countries. The 
presence of a post office was crucial in maintaining ties both with family and friends 
in the country of origin and with other migrant settlements across the US. Finally, 
high-density and an efficient public service increased security and reduced the 
perception of danger. Hence, population density and public services influenced 
migrant settlement decisions. As population density patterns and employment features 
drastically changed between 1880 (1910) and 2010, the exogeneity condition 
separating out the uncorrelated component of our endogenous variable, Migration, in 
the first stage regression is fulfilled. There is no significant correlation between 1880 
population density and public service endowments and the location pattern of Latinos 
more than 90 years later. This reinforces the exogeneity of the chosen instruments. 
From an econometric perspective, the essential relevance property for IV analysis is 
satisfied as the combination of both instruments retrieves sufficiently large first-stage 
F-statistics based on the Staiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments in 
combination with the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. A further validation test 
of the quality of our chosen instruments is undertaken when testing for overidentifying 
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restrictions employing the Anderson-Rubin test. This partial test of instrument 
exogeneity confirms, yet again, the quality of the instruments. 
8.5 ANALYSIS 
 
Table 8-2 reports the results of estimating the model for the settlement pattern of 
Latinos in the US between 1970 and 2010, employing a cross-sectional structure. 
Specifications (1) through (5) present the coefficients and significance levels, shifting 
the dependent variable (share of Latinos in a given county i) by 10 years in each 
regression.  
In line with our assumption, historical migration is positively associated with the 
dependent variable, Latinos, across all five decades of analysis ranging from 1970 to 
2010. A large share of migrants in 1880 is strongly and positively connected to the 
share of foreign-born Latino migrants in any given US county 90 to 130 years later. 
Hence, once other factors are controlled for, counties that attracted large inflows of 
European settlers at the end of the 19th century remain significantly more appealing to 
incoming Latino migrants over a century later, than those which were largely bypassed 
by European migration. Despite differences in time periods, backgrounds, and 
cultures, both migration waves are connected by place of settlement at significance 
levels of 5% and 1% respectively. Hence, the results of the analysis uncover a strong 
territorial dependency in US migration over the last century (Table 8-2). 
The coefficients of the lagged recent (t-10) control variables indicate that, for much of 
the late 20th century, Latino migration to the US did not follow traditional pull factors. 
Prior to 2000, economic factors mattered little for Latino migration. Latinos generally 
settled in areas of the US not particularly well off in terms of income or education 
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levels. These pull factors do not display any significant relation to the dependent 
variable of interest. Even more surprisingly, local unemployment levels were 
positively associated with the share of Latino immigrants in a county. Hispanic 
settlement areas had, on average, higher levels of unemployment than the rest of the 
country. Socio-demographic factors, such as ethnic and gender composition, also 
display non-significant coefficients. Before 2000, Latinos mainly settled in two types 
of counties: either in highly urbanised areas in and around Los Angeles, the Bay Area, 
El Paso, San Antonio, Miami, or Houston, or in rural areas with large employment in 
agriculture. A large participation of women in the labour force also lured Latino 
migrants. These findings are in line with the relevant literature emphasising the appeal 
of the cities with largest Latino concentrations, the rising contribution of Latinos to 
agricultural employment, and the gender balance in migration flows (Sáenz and 
Morales, 2015).  
In more recent decades (2000 and 2010), Latino migrant settlement increasingly 
responds to more traditional factors. Regional income levels are, in line with the 
relevant migration literature, positively and significantly associated with Latino 
population shares. This implies that the location of Latinos in the US has become more 
geographically diversified in recent decades (see Figure 8-4), moving towards more 
prosperous areas without eroding the relevance of distance to the Mexican border as a 
key marker for the location of Latino immigrants (Table 8-2).  
As could be expected, most 1880 controls are completely irrelevant to Latino 
settlement patterns 90 to 130 years later. There are two exceptions: regional income 
levels in 1880 are positively correlated to present day shares of Latino population, 
albeit with fluctuating significance levels. A higher female participation in the labour 
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force more than a century ago is, by contrast, associated with lower levels of Latino 
presence today.  
As the OLS results presented in Table 8-2 could be prone to potential endogeneity 
issues caused by omitted variable bias, spatial sorting, or reversed causality, a range 
of robustness checks is conducted. These imply, first, shifting the base year, second, 
resorting to IV estimation techniques and, last, using the dataset as a quasi-panel 
structure and estimating the model by means of a HT-estimator.
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TABLE 8-2 THE IMPACT OF HISTORICAL MIGRATION ON LATINO SETTLEMENT 
PATTERNS, OLS 1880 
Dep. Var: % of 
Latinos in county 
(1)  
1970 
(2)  
1980 
(3)  
1990 
(4)  
2000 
(5)  
2010 
      
Migration 1880 0.0109*** 0.0165*** 0.0198*** 0.0213** 0.0146** 
 (0.00315) (0.00524) (0.00726) (0.00944) (0.00696) 
      
Income pc (ln)~ 0.000664 0.00418 0.00272 0.0409*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.00134) (0.00273) (0.00374) (0.00807) (0.00487) 
Urban share~ 0.00411*** 0.00658*** 0.0118*** 0.0298*** 0.0449*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00179) (0.00231) (0.00338) (0.00272) 
Education~ -0.00294 -0.00263 -0.00629 -0.0604*** -0.122*** 
 (0.00282) (0.00571) (0.00726) (0.0112) (0.00983) 
Unemployment~ 0.0293** 0.0356** 0.0102 0.105*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0157) (0.0330) (0.0295) 
Empl. in agri~ 0.0102*** 0.0172*** 0.0231*** 0.0800*** 0.156*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00396) (0.00718) (0.0150) (0.0135) 
Fem. labforce~ 0.00808* 0.0141** 0.0233** -0.000482 0.0779*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00692) (0.0101) (0.00827) (0.0145) 
Female pop~ -0.0144 0.00253 -0.0354 -0.185*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0260) (0.0424) (0.0320) 
Black pop~ 0.000216 0.00472 0.0117** 0.0124 -0.0119 
 (0.00193) (0.00342) (0.00553) (0.00837) (0.00802) 
Distance to MX (ln) -0.0251*** -0.0386*** -0.0440*** -0.0465*** -0.0377*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00403) (0.00438) (0.00504) (0.00215) 
      
Income (ln) 1880 0.00525** 0.00811** 0.00859* 0.00461 0.0115*** 
 (0.00225) (0.00373) (0.00513) (0.00500) (0.00398) 
Urban share 1880 0.00382 0.00467 0.00657 0.0117* 0.0115** 
 (0.00257) (0.00420) (0.00561) (0.00666) (0.00480) 
Education 1880 -0.00107 -0.00395 0.00185 0.00634 0.00698 
 (0.00293) (0.00477) (0.00616) (0.00744) (0.00614) 
Unempl. 1880 -0.000149 0.00185 0.00162 0.00174 -0.000253 
 (0.00109) (0.00190) (0.00195) (0.00301) (0.00202) 
Empl. in agri 1880 0.00341** 0.00497* 0.00567 0.00627 0.00653 
 (0.00161) (0.00283) (0.00389) (0.00542) (0.00457) 
Fem. labforce 1880 -0.0182** -0.0355*** -0.0376** -0.0414** -0.0737*** 
 (0.00849) (0.0137) (0.0189) (0.0173) (0.0193) 
Female pop 1880 0.0172** 0.0275** 0.0260* 0.0301 0.0407** 
 (0.00717) (0.0122) (0.0158) (0.0217) (0.0164) 
Black pop 1880 0.000327 -0.000676 -0.00228 -0.00772 -0.00136 
 (0.00282) (0.00448) (0.00561) (0.00822) (0.00782) 
      
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,846 2,851 2,851 2,851 2,850 
R-squared 0.640 0.625 0.583 0.515 0.527 
~ Controls from 10 years prior to dependent variable 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix 8C displays the results for the regressions shifting the base year to 1910. 
Apart from temporal changes to the control variables (vector Z) and the Migration 
variable, all factors remain as before. The results are almost a carbon copy of those 
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presented in Table 8-2. Migration 1910 is positively and significantly associated with 
the presence of Latino immigrants 60 to 100 years later. Constant significance levels 
of below 1% underline the robustness of this link. This means that the settlement 
pattern of southern and eastern European migrants in 1910 is connected, in the same 
way as that of their northern and western European predecessors, to Hispanic 
migration to the US. Latino immigrants have followed in the footsteps of past 
migration waves, drawn into seemingly migrant-prone regions and bypassing areas of 
the country that developed a historical aversion to migration. 
The large majority of control variables reproduce the results of the regressions in Table 
8-2. A high income per capita, a large urban share, a strong agricultural sector, a large 
participation of women in the labour force, and close proximity to the Mexican border 
are, once again key for Latino immigrant settlement (Appendix 8C). The coefficients 
of traditional pull factors, such as high general education or low regional 
unemployment rates, yet again counter expectations.  
The control variables that affected migration waves in historical times are mostly 
insignificant. The only regional characteristic dating back to the Age of Mass 
Migration that is significantly connected to the settlement decisions of Latino migrants 
since the 1970s is the share of foreign-born population in 1910.  
In the second robustness check, IV estimation techniques are employed to extract the 
underlying effect of historical migration on current Latino migration waves. As 
mentioned earlier, Migration is instrumented using the combination of historical 
population density and public service endowment. Table 8-3 displays the results 
referring to both base years 1880 and 1910. 
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The use of IV estimation techniques – which minimise the potential influence of 
omitted variable bias on the regression coefficients – validates the results of the 
previous OLS regressions in Table 8-2. Nine out of ten regression outcomes, 
incorporating shifts between both decades of recent migration inflow and historical 
base years, confirm the territorial connection between past European and recent Latino 
migration flows. With significance levels mostly below 5% for 1880 and below 1% 
for 1910, counties that attracted migrants in 1880 have again become the chosen areas 
of settlement for Latino immigrants 60 to 130 later. The geography of US migration 
is therefore shaped by a strong path dependency, with different generations of 
migrants, regardless of national and/or ethnic origin, discriminating between areas that 
are more welcoming (migration-prone) and those that are more inimical to migrants 
(migration-averse). The estimated sign and significance of coefficients for both sets 
of controls are in line with those reported for the previous analysis (Table 8-3).
302 
 
TABLE 8-3 THE IMPACT OF HISTORICAL MIGRATION ON LATINO SETTLEMENT PATTERNS, IV 1880, 1910 
Dep. Var: % of Latinos  
in county 
1880 1910 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Migration #  0.0501** 0.0903** 0.0993** 0.109* 0.0562 0.127*** 0.231*** 0.382*** 0.470*** 0.451*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0377) (0.0488) (0.0571) (0.0606) (0.0299) (0.0536) (0.0708) (0.109) (0.129) 
Income pc (ln)~ -0.000423 0.00273 -0.000217 0.0353*** 0.0436*** -0.000842 0.000631 -0.00623 0.0122 0.0181 
 (0.00148) (0.00272) (0.00390) (0.00902) (0.00786) (0.00188) (0.00370) (0.00502) (0.0141) (0.0146) 
Urban share~ 0.00369*** 0.00704*** 0.0122*** 0.0302*** 0.0455*** 0.00282* 0.00598** 0.0150*** 0.0378*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.00137) (0.00199) (0.00246) (0.00353) (0.00365) (0.00169) (0.00263) (0.00387) (0.00534) (0.00533) 
Education~ -0.000232 0.00106 -0.00269 -0.0512*** -0.118*** 0.00910* 0.0112 0.00837 -0.0266 -0.113*** 
 (0.00365) (0.00679) (0.00812) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.00475) (0.00889) (0.0116) (0.0180) (0.0167) 
Unemployment~ 0.0314** 0.0355** 0.00229 0.101*** 0.191*** 0.0458*** 0.0724*** 0.0502* 0.152*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0188) (0.0343) (0.0385) (0.0152) (0.0222) (0.0286) (0.0424) (0.0530) 
Empl. in agri~ 0.00870*** 0.0161*** 0.0192** 0.0816*** 0.156*** 0.0117*** 0.0244*** 0.0375*** 0.117*** 0.175*** 
 (0.00240) (0.00437) (0.00764) (0.0151) (0.0201) (0.00296) (0.00590) (0.0108) (0.0203) (0.0265) 
Fem. labforce~ 0.0159** 0.0173** 0.0240** 0.00172 0.0768*** 0.0126* 0.0187* 0.0192 0.00566 0.102*** 
 (0.00668) (0.00774) (0.0108) (0.00855) (0.0149) (0.00643) (0.00996) (0.0166) (0.0123) (0.0215) 
Female pop~ -9.44e-05 0.0176 -0.00761 -0.153*** -0.220*** -0.000259 0.0370* 0.0215 -0.165*** -0.209*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0170) (0.0327) (0.0446) (0.0600) (0.0135) (0.0211) (0.0388) (0.0568) (0.0594) 
Black pop~ -0.000105 0.00426 0.0115** 0.0138* -0.00998 0.000972 0.00350 0.00813 0.00536 -0.0140* 
 (0.00189) (0.00334) (0.00535) (0.00828) (0.00879) (0.00227) (0.00368) (0.00533) (0.00747) (0.00835) 
Dist. to MX (ln) -0.0215*** -0.0316*** -0.0364*** -0.0379*** -0.0336*** -0.0183*** -0.0264*** -0.0228*** -0.0192** -0.0122 
 (0.00367) (0.00573) (0.00665) (0.00762) (0.00777) (0.00329) (0.00561) (0.00683) (0.00949) (0.0100) 
Income (ln) # 0.00558** 0.00892** 0.00929* 0.00552 0.0120* -0.00127 -0.00405 -0.00280 -0.000364 0.000301 
 (0.00233) (0.00397) (0.00527) (0.00511) (0.00698) (0.00143) (0.00273) (0.00432) (0.00563) (0.00603) 
Urban share # -0.000467 -0.00310 -0.00184 0.00353 0.00785 -0.00667** -0.0116** -0.0233*** -0.0290*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.00387) (0.00618) (0.00822) (0.00897) (0.00977) (0.00305) (0.00505) (0.00703) (0.0101) (0.0113) 
Education # 0.00247 0.00345 0.00935 0.0151 0.0111 0.0180** 0.0433*** 0.0812*** 0.109*** 0.127*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00576) (0.00678) (0.00955) (0.00925) (0.00780) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0276) (0.0318) 
Unemployment # 0.000384 0.00275 0.00270 0.00276 0.000195 -0.00854 -0.00791 -0.0134 -0.0260 -0.0391 
 (0.00120) (0.00226) (0.00236) (0.00332) (0.00303) (0.00837) (0.0136) (0.0203) (0.0257) (0.0299) 
Empl. in agri # 0.00857** 0.0145** 0.0155** 0.0173* 0.0117 0.00260 0.00787* 0.0195*** 0.0280*** 0.0258** 
 (0.00346) (0.00572) (0.00693) (0.00896) (0.00873) (0.00271) (0.00478) (0.00735) (0.00937) (0.0102) 
Fem. labforce # -0.0196** -0.0367*** -0.0385** -0.0432** -0.0740*** -0.00557 -0.00406 -0.00709 -0.0246 -0.0119 
 (0.00877) (0.0141) (0.0191) (0.0174) (0.0251) (0.00444) (0.00845) (0.0129) (0.0165) (0.0175) 
Female pop # 0.0279** 0.0495*** 0.0481** 0.0571** 0.0536* 0.124*** 0.209*** 0.372*** 0.503*** 0.450*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0192) (0.0235) (0.0279) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0591) (0.0862) (0.127) (0.148) 
Black pop # 0.00279 0.00455 0.00266 -0.00310 0.000262 0.00947*** 0.0150*** 0.0218*** 0.0149 0.0231* 
 (0.00295) (0.00476) (0.00590) (0.00900) (0.00891) (0.00218) (0.00434) (0.00715) (0.0118) (0.0139) 
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,844 2,849 2,849 2,849 2,848 3,118 3,120 3,120 3,120 3,119 
First stage F-stat 18.99 17.14 16.04 12.21 11.69 25.59 33.39 35.75 25.82 18.16 
~ Controls from 10 years prior to dependent variable   |   # respective base year 1880 or 1910   |   Robust standard errors in parentheses   |   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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After reshaping the database to a panel structure, the model is run again using a HT-
estimation technique. Exploiting the panel data structure while using time and regional 
fixed effects allows to control for omitted factors that do not change over time but 
could potentially cause biased regression coefficients. The results are presented in 
Table 8-4.  
For the third time, historical migration is confirmed as fundamental pull factor for 
ensuing migration waves. There is strong evidence, as indicated by coefficients 
significant at the 1 percent level, that past US migration patterns shape the geography 
of future migration in a path dependent way irrespective of origin or ethnicity. The 
result holds for both base years in question, 1880 and 1910 respectively (Table 8-4). 
Regardless of whether the focus falls on western and northern European migrants, 
forming the majority of the first migration wave, or on eastern and southern European 
migration inflows culminating in 1910, Latin American immigrants settling in the US 
in the second half of the 20th century and early 21st century were drawn – once other 
factors influencing recent migration are controlled for – to the exact same regions 
where their European predecessors settled over a century earlier.  
The control variables largely reproduce the results of the OLS and IV regressions. The 
only differences relate to income per capita which, once the characteristics of the panel 
structure controlling for regional and time fixed effects are exploited, turns out to be 
negatively associated to the presence of a large Latino community in any given US 
county from 1970 onwards. In contrast to the importance of historical migration 
settlement patterns, income and employment opportunities cannot be considered a key 
driver for the recent settlement of Hispanic populations in the US.  
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In short, all three robustness checks have confirmed the initial OLS results. 
Irrespective of the method, there is a consistent, positive, and strongly significant 
geographical link between past and current migrant stocks. Settlement patterns of 
predominantly European migrants around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century have 
had a strong influence on those of Latin American migrants a century later. The 
assumed transformation of territories by past migration seems to have turned these 
regions into magnets for subsequent migrant waves, serving as a long-lasting pull 
factor – a more important one than any other historical county characteristic. Entirely 
different backgrounds, ethnicities, and origins, fundamental differences in customs, 
traditions, and migration incentives, and a time gap of three to five generations have 
not managed to break the invisible cord linking both migration waves. One might 
argue that past migration waves have left an imprint that makes particular areas of the 
US attractive to new generations of migrants. This legacy, generated more than 100 
years ago, seems to have become engraved in the receiving territories and represents 
a fundamental but often ignored pull factor for current migrant inflows, creating a 
long-lasting division between migration-prone and migration-averse areas.
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TABLE 8-4 HT ESTIMATION EXPLOITING QUASI-PANEL STRUCTURE, 1880 AND 1910 
Dep. Var. Share of Latino 
population (1970-2010) 
(1)  
Migrants 1880 
(2) 
Migrants 1910 
   
Migration # 0.0202*** 0.0341*** 
 (0.00626) (0.00879) 
   
Income per capita (t-10) -0.0136*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00189) 
Urban share (t-10) 0.0258*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00277) 
Education (t-10) 0.0105** -0.000224 
 (0.00529) (0.00553) 
Unemployment (t-10) 0.0787*** 0.0770*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0104) 
Employment in agriculture (t-10) 0.0257*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00400) 
Fem. part. in the lab.force (t-10) 0.00250 0.00212 
 (0.00385) (0.00368) 
Female population (t-10) -0.188*** -0.190*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0347) 
Black population (t-10) -0.00139 -0.00238 
 (0.0110) (0.0108) 
Distance to Mexico (ln) -0.0365*** -0.0359*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00359) 
   
Income (ln) (t0) 0.00910** 0.00334 
 (0.00422) (0.00224) 
Urban share (t0) 0.00642 0.00114 
 (0.00500) (0.00342) 
Education (t0) 0.0114** 0.0240*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00662) 
Unemployment (t0) 0.00146 -0.0176 
 (0.00203) (0.0119) 
Employment in agriculture (t0) 0.00776** 0.00806*** 
 (0.00349) (0.00306) 
Fem. part in the lab. force (t0) -0.0423*** -0.0158* 
 (0.0153) (0.00931) 
Female population (t0) 0.0292** 0.0296 
 (0.0147) (0.0258) 
Black population (t0) 0.00356 0.00274 
 (0.00781) (0.00813) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 14,249 15,597 
Number of cnty2 2,851 3,120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses |  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | 
 # respective base year 1880 or 1910 
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8.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Over the course of two and a half centuries, the US has attracted millions of migrants. 
Those migrants have come from every part of the globe with the aim of building a 
better life for themselves and their families. Ninety-nine percent of the current US 
population can trace their ancestry to former migrant stock (Spickard, 2007). Whilst 
settlement patterns of migrants in the US have been highly uneven, and despite 
differences from migration wave to migration wave, certain areas of the country have 
proven more attractive to the foreign-born population than others. 
Why is this the case? Traditional migration theory has aimed to explain why migrants 
flock to particular areas using economic and socio-demographic characteristics as well 
as natural and cultural aspects as explanations. More recently, the focus has been on 
the presence of kinship and migrant networks at destination. The presence of a large 
migrant network, a shared geographical origin, ethnic connection, or common 
background between already established and newly arriving migrants in a particular 
place has been identified as a particularly crucial pull factor for new arrivals.  
Nevertheless, there is virtually no research on whether past migration serves – once 
networks based on nationality, ethnic origin, village or family ties have been 
accounted for – as significant pull factor for new migrants across centuries. This 
chapter has aimed to cover this gap in the literature by assessing the presence of path 
dependency in migration flows in the US in absence of a common ethnicity or 
birthplace. The research intended to ascertain if completely unrelated migration waves 
to the US, involving very different groups, separated by several generations, have 
followed similar geographical patterns, creating a division between migration-prone 
and migration-averse areas. The research has involved putting together a dataset 
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comprising county data on foreign-born individuals for two of the largest waves of 
migration to the US – the Age of Mass migration at the turn of the 19th to the 20th 
century and the large Latin American immigration to the US from the 1960s onwards.  
The regression analysis has led to a very clear conclusion: the settlement pattern of the 
predominantly European migrants at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century strongly 
influenced the geography of Latino migration to the US a century later. Counties 
which received large population inflows of European settlers at the end of the 19th 
century remain significantly more appealing to incoming population from Latin 
America today than those which were largely bypassed by migrant streams in the 
1900s. This result is robust to introducing a large number of controls and estimating 
the analysis with different econometric techniques. The differences in the composition 
of migrants between both waves and a considerable time gap has not altered what is a 
highly persistent geography of migration. Latino migrants have followed in their 
European predecessors’ footsteps 60 to 130 years later, creating a path dependency in 
migration that is stronger than any historical factor that may have shaped the prosperity 
of a given county in the US. Historical migration stocks act as important pull factor 
for subsequent generations of migrants in a more consistent way than many of the 
standard regional pull factors. Past income levels, historic unemployment rates or 
levels of education have not left a trace shaping future migration; past migration has. 
A county’s historical foreign-born migrant stock acts as a long-lasting magnet for 
future generations of migrants.  
The results stress that past migration in itself, beyond national or kinship networks, 
represents an important and long-lasting pull factor for future migrants. One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon might be that migrants indeed rework the territory 
where they settle in large numbers. Late 19th century European migrants seem to have 
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left a legacy in specific parts of the US which survives until today and still appeals to 
new generations of migrants. The migration buzz generated in historic times by 
Germans, Italians, Poles, or Irish settlers seems to have become engraved in the 
receiving territories and to persist well after the ‘original’ migrants are long gone and 
their descendants have long been assimilated and become American.  
The results of the analysis point to factors that have hitherto not been considered in 
migration policy and provide interesting food for thought for future migration and 
development policy design. Policies crafted to attract migrants into a specific region 
need to take into account not only the region’s economic and socio-demographic 
characteristics but also the territory’s migration history. Areas with a limited 
background in immigration history may lack an important pull factor for new 
migrants: ‘the buzz of past migration’. A lack of ‘migrant buzz’ would therefore have 
to be overcome by other means – i.e. better local amenities or additional economic 
incentives – in order to attract a similar magnitude of incoming migration.  
However, the mechanisms through which path dependent migration mechanisms are 
created remain a mystery. Further research is needed in this respect. In-depth analyses 
of migration-prone areas, such as New England, California, or the north west of the 
US, can provide crucial insights about the mechanisms that make regions consistently 
migration-prone. Similarly, studies of new destination areas without an important 
history of immigration, such as the South of the US, could lead to eye-opening results 
as to what factors can help overcome a lack of history in migration. Furthermore, there 
is a need to pinpoint what is exactly behind migration path dependence and a ‘regional 
migration buzz’. In-depth, more anthropological case studies can play an important 
role in understanding how this buzz is created, how it reproduces itself, and how 
exactly it affects the attractiveness of a place to newly arriving migrants. 
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Integration issues and challenges, in Goździak, E. M. and Martin, S. F. (eds) Beyond 
the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing America, 57–86. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Baltagi, B. (2008): Econometric analysis of panel data. 4th edn. Chichester, UK: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Baltagi, B., Bresson, G. and Pirotte, A. (2003): Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman–
Taylor? A pretest estimator, Economics Letters, 79(3), 361–369.  
Bauer, T., Epstein, G. and Gang, I. (2007): The influence of stocks and flows on migrants’ 
location choices, Research in Labor Economics, 26, 199–229.  
Bauer, T., Epstein, G. and Gang, I. (2009): Measuring ethnic linkages among migrants, 
International Journal of Manpower, 30(1/2), 56–69.  
Bauer, T. and Zimmermann, K. (1997): Network migration of ethnic Germans, The 
International Migration Review, 31(1), 143–149.  
Bergad, L. and Klein, H. (2010): Hispanics in the United States: a demographic, social, and 
economic history, 1980-2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bertocchi, G. and Strozzi, C. (2006): The age of mass migration: Economic and institutional 
determinants, Discussion paper Series, IZA Institute for the Study of Labour, 2499. 
Bonn, Germany. 
 
 
310 
 
Biagi, B., Faggian, A. and McCann, P. (2011): Long and short distance migration in Italy: The 
role of economic, social and environmental characteristics, Spatial Economic Analysis, 
6(1), 111–131.  
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1998): Learning from the behaviour of others: 
Conformity, fads, and informational cascades, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
12(3), 151–170. 
Bodvarsson, Ö., Simpson, N. and Sparber, C. (2014): Migration Theory, in Chiswick, B. and 
Miller, P. (eds) Handbook of the Economics of International Migration, 3–51. 
Burlington: Elsevier Science. 
Borjas, G. (1987): Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. American Economic Review, 
77, 531-553. 
Borjas, G. (1990): Friends or strangers: The impact of immigrants on the U.S. economy. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Borjas, G., Bronars, S. and Trejo, S. (1992): Self-selection and internal migration in the United 
States, Journal of Urban Economics, 32(2), 159-185. 
Bowles, S. (1970): Migration as investment: Empirical tests of the human investment 
approach to geographical mobility, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 52(4), 356–
362.  
Bruhn, J. (2005): The sociology of community connections. Boston, MA: Springer US.  
Bump, M. (2005): From temporary picking to permanent plucking: Hispanic newcomers, 
integration, and change in the Shenandoah Valley, in Goździak, E. M. and Martin, S. F. 
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8.8 APPENDIX 8A 
 
 
FIGURE 8-5 FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1990 
Data source: Minnesota Population Center (2016); own elaboration
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8.9 APPENDIX 8B 
 
TABLE 8-5 VARIABLES DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
 Main variables of interest 
 
 
   
Latinos  Share of foreign-born Latino migrants 
relative to total population in county i in 
year t*. Latino is defined if originating 
from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central 
and South American countries. 
 
NHGIS 
   
Migration 1880 / 1910 Share of foreign-born population relative 
to total population in county i in year t0* 
 
 
IPUMS USA 
 
 
 
   
Instruments   
   
Population density Population per square mile in county i in 
year 1880 
ICPSR 
   
Public good endowment Share of employment in health, education, 
and public administration relative to total 
employment in any given county i in 1880 
(or 1910) 
IPUMS USA 
   
Control Variables 
 
  
Income  Measure for county income: 
• Historical years: Constructed 
mean income score on county 
level. Individual income levels 
assigned to occupational data on 
the basis of median total income 
per occupation in hundreds of 
1950 dollars, as natural log in t0. 
Basis for construction is 
1880/1910 total size of county 
population 
• 1960-2000: Natural log of 
average income per capita levels 
in 2010 US dollars on county 
level for county i (adjusted for 
inflation using the BLS 
converter) 
 
 
 
IPUMS USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEA and  
Social Explorer  
 
Urban share Share of urban population relative to total 
population in county i in year t0 or t-k, 
respectively 
ICPSR and  
Social Explorer 
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Variable Description Source 
   
Education 
 
 
Percentage of population of county i with 
college degree in t-k  
 
Social Explorer 
 
 
Literacy Literacy rate in county i in t0  IPUMS USA 
Unemployment 
 
Unemployment rate in county i in t0 and t-
k 
Proxy in 1880 (unemployment rate not 
available): Months unemployed last year 
 
IPUMS USA 
and ICPSR 
 
Agriculture Percentage of labour force employed in 
agriculture in county i in t0 and t-k 
IPUMS USA  
and ICPSR 
   
Female Participation Female participation rate in the labour 
force in county i in t0 and t-k 
IPUMS USA  
and ICPSR 
 
Female  Percentage of female population in county 
i in t0 and t-k 
Social Explorer 
 
   
Black Population Percentage of black population in county i 
in t0 and t-k 
 
Social Explorer 
 
DistMX (ln) Distance in km between county i’s 
centroid and the nearest point on the 
continental border between the US and 
Mexico (as natural log) 
 
Own construction 
State  State dummies 
  
Own construction 
*t0 = 1880 or 1910 while t = 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010. k= 10 
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8.10 APPENDIX 8C 
 
TABLE 8-6 THE IMPACT OF HISTORICAL MIGRATION ON LATINO SETTLEMENT 
PATTERNS, OLS 1910 
Dep. Var: % of 
Latinos in county 
(1)  
1970 
(2)  
1980 
(3)  
1990 
(4)  
2000 
(5)  
2010 
      
Migration 1910 0.0159*** 0.0224*** 0.0279*** 0.0384*** 0.0370*** 
 (0.00460) (0.00778) (0.00969) (0.0122) (0.00822) 
      
Income pc (ln)~ 0.00121 0.00597*** 0.00340 0.0471*** 0.0553*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00229) (0.00302) (0.00690) (0.00462) 
Urban share~ 0.00320*** 0.00554*** 0.0130*** 0.0315*** 0.0483*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00181) (0.00240) (0.00382) (0.00281) 
Education~ -0.000553 -0.00174 -0.00409 -0.0679*** -0.137*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00542) (0.00687) (0.0103) (0.00942) 
Unemployment~ 0.0290** 0.0465*** 0.0214 0.125*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0299) (0.0290) 
Empl. in agri~ 0.0134*** 0.0210*** 0.0310*** 0.0760*** 0.144*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00362) (0.00577) (0.0125) (0.0119) 
Fem. labforce~ 0.00500 0.0111* 0.0238** 0.00323 0.0730*** 
 (0.00394) (0.00625) (0.00958) (0.00807) (0.0140) 
Female pop~ -0.0171 0.00528 -0.0491** -0.222*** -0.248*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0240) (0.0401) (0.0312) 
Black pop~ -0.00282 0.000354 0.00579 0.00645 -0.0159** 
 (0.00176) (0.00292) (0.00385) (0.00622) (0.00676) 
Distance to MX (ln) -0.0241*** -0.0380*** -0.0431*** -0.0467*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00365) (0.00411) (0.00483) (0.00204) 
      
Income (ln) 1910 -7.00e-05 -0.00250 1.51e-05 0.00301 0.00282 
 (0.000899) (0.00174) (0.00224) (0.00341) (0.00328) 
Urban share 1910 0.00192 0.00374* 0.00327 0.00289 -0.000822 
 (0.00138) (0.00223) (0.00305) (0.00488) (0.00395) 
Education 1910 -0.00453 -0.000543 0.00847 0.0157* 0.0385*** 
 (0.00334) (0.00560) (0.00716) (0.00889) (0.00795) 
Unemployment1910 -0.00304 -0.00178 -0.00476 -0.0158 -0.0273 
 (0.00623) (0.00949) (0.0123) (0.0168) (0.0186) 
Empl. in agri 1910 -0.00312** -0.00195 0.00313 0.00963** 0.00905* 
 (0.00135) (0.00246) (0.00312) (0.00465) (0.00465) 
Fem. labforce 1910 -0.00422 -0.00538 -0.0125* -0.0310*** -0.0214* 
 (0.00301) (0.00527) (0.00710) (0.0104) (0.0115) 
Female pop 1910 0.0168 0.000381 0.0145 0.0566 0.0143 
 (0.0115) (0.0213) (0.0270) (0.0367) (0.0325) 
Black pop 1910 0.00583*** 0.00476* 0.00321 -0.0123 0.000612 
 (0.00174) (0.00257) (0.00407) (0.00770) (0.0123) 
      
States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,118 3,120 3,120 3,120 3,119 
R-squared 0.639 0.614 0.573 0.514 0.523 
~ Controls from 10 years prior to dependent variable 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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9 CONCLUSION 
 
In a world that has struggled and continues to struggle with a lasting economic 
downturn, labour market and security issues, as well as increasing welfare burdens, 
rising population mobility and pressures by migrants on national borders have brought 
the analysis of the economic impact of migration to the very fore of the academic and 
political debate. From a purely scholarly perspective – and despite a few voices 
emphasizing the downsides of population mobility – the overwhelming majority of 
the migration economics literature considers inward migration growth-enhancing. 
Immigration fosters innovation, technological progress and a rise in productivity 
within the receiving countries.  
One crucial aspect of population mobility has, however, been largely overlooked: the 
long-term implications of inward migration. Migration research has generally focused 
on the impact migrants have on the receiving society in the short-term. The time 
horizon of most studies covers only a few years, with very few venturing into the 
impact of immigration over ten or twenty years. Hence, the potential far-reaching 
consequences of inward migration over longer periods of time have been largely 
neglected by the scientific community and, as a consequence, have been absent from 
the political as well as policy debate. 
Only recently has the long-term economic impact of migration on receiving regions 
begun to attract the attention it deserves. Less than a handful of studies so far have 
extended the traditional few years to one-generation type of analysis of migration to 
considerably longer time-frames. Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014), for 
example, have revealed that migration shocks leave a very long-lasting economic 
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impact: areas of the US that attracted important migration stocks more than 130 years 
ago were found to be significantly more prosperous today than those that were 
bypassed by successive migration waves. Sequeira et al. (2017) have confirmed these 
results. These findings point towards a need for further research analysing the reasons 
for this robust and enduring impact as well as evaluating the potential transmission 
channels. This dissertation has intended to fill a number of these gaps in our 
knowledge. 
The thesis has resorted to the analysis of historical migration stock and foreign-born 
settlement patterns in the US at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century and connected 
them with current levels of economic development. The first part of the research has 
focused on different compositional features of the migrant stock, such as diversity, 
gender, and distance travelled. The second part has delved into one potential 
transmission channel explaining the impact of historical migration across time: path 
dependence.  
Diversity was shown to be one of the decisive factors determining long-term regional 
economic development. Measured in its two dimensions – fractionalisation and 
polarisation – population diversity in US counties was found not only to affect local 
economic performance in the short-term, but also to leave an economic trace for 
decades well after the initial migration shock had taken place. Stretching the time 
dimension within the analysis from 20 to 130 years, it was found that counties that 
attracted migrants from a multitude of different national and international origins 
between 1880 and 1910 are significantly more prosperous today than those which were 
marked by more homogenous societies in the past. Migrant diversity, measured by 
population fractionalisation, is thus highly beneficial for long-term economic 
development.  
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The second employed measure of diversity – population polarisation – has, by 
contrast, long-lasting negative economic effects. Counties with highly polarised 
population compositions experienced a significant negative economic impact, 
lowering the county’s future growth path. Highly polarised US counties at the height 
of the great migration wave of the late 19th and early 20th centuries are considerably 
poorer today. More importantly though, the impact of both dimensions of diversity on 
county-level economic trajectories remains extremely robust over time. While the 
effect was higher in the initial 10 to 30 years after migration, past population diversity 
associated with inward migration of heterogeneous population groups remained a very 
robust predictor of territorial disparities in the US for more than 100 years. 
The analysis of the long-term impact of population diversity presented in Chapter 5 
thus exposes the relevance of diversity for the long-term prosperity of places. It also 
discovers how the relationship between diversity and economic performance can be 
double-edged, depending on the dimension of diversity considered. Migration-prone 
counties have significantly benefited from a diverse migrant inflow during the Age of 
Mass Migration. Bringing their variety of skill-sets, abilities, ideas, perspectives, and 
experiences along with them, the interaction of migrants in a common location spurred 
high levels of economic activity. This surge of new ideas triggered economic 
dynamism resulting not only in substantial short-term economic prosperity as 
predicted by Jacobs (1961, 1969), Florida (2002), or Saxenian (2006), among others. 
It also built the foundations for sustainable long-term regional wealth. This long run 
elevated growth path, however, is shown to hinge on one condition: the capacity to 
establish bridges across ethnic, cultural, and/or national groups. The presence of deep 
divides among migrant groups inevitably leads to polarisation, social tension, and even 
conflict. Once ‘bridging’ across groups ceases to exist, once a particular group 
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becomes too large and dominant, the positive externalities linked to diverse 
backgrounds, perspectives, and ideas fade away and become overshadowed by rising 
polarisation within the population. Paving the way for the formation of ghettos, rivalry 
and conflict, polarisation significantly undermines economic development – again, not 
only in the short term, but for decades to come. 
A different compositional feature of the migrant population was analysed in chapter 
6. The gender component of migration was shown to have a significant and ongoing 
macroeconomic impact. Contrary to expectations, high concentrations of immigrant 
women at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century were found to significantly lower 
county-level economic prospects, both over the short- as well as over the long-term. 
Areas marked by a lower presence of immigrant women, however, realised 
significantly higher levels of prosperity. These findings seem to be heavily influenced 
by the low levels of female participation in the official labour force, as one century 
ago the large majority of women left their jobs at a relatively young age, mostly 
following marriage, in order to become ‘homemakers’. Their active engagement in the 
shadow economy was not accounted for in traditional measures of economic activity. 
Immigrant women, however, influenced the prosperity of the territories where they 
settled in two ways: directly, via their contribution to creating large geographical 
concentrations of migrants (as shown above) and indirectly, via their children. 
Communities with large shares of children born to immigrant mothers during the Age 
of Mass Migration have coped significantly better over the past century than areas 
where the majority of children descended from two American-born parents. The 
highest economic development levels were achieved in counties where foreign-born 
mothers were more likely to have successfully integrated, usually by marrying 
American-born men. Children from ‘mixed’ foreign/American parentage contributed 
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to making their communities more dynamic, increasing economic activity and leaving 
a significantly beneficial imprint on their county’s long-term growth prospects. 
In the end, women managed to leave a positive long-term legacy for economic 
development. Even though the social norms of the past seriously dented their capacity 
to use their talent and entrepreneurship and transform their economic potential into 
official, recorded, economic activity, they left a positive economic trace in a more 
intricate and concealed way. By shaping the gender balance in the local migrant stock 
as well as in their role as ‘carriers of culture’ for their children (to name only one 
potential explanation), they became a fundamental transmission channel for medium- 
to long-term territorial prosperity. We speculate women immigrants to have passed 
the risk-seeking, hard-working, dynamic, and entrepreneurial character normally 
associated with immigrants to their children. They also left them the traditions, culture, 
and mentality of their place of origin in legacy. The more integrated these women 
became, the higher their indirect economic effect. One could assume that children born 
to immigrant women and locals grew into more independent and determined 
individuals, capable of building a better future for themselves and their offspring. 
Spurred on and supported by their ‘mixed’ families, this young, first-born American 
generation seems to have been at the base of an economic dynamism that seems to 
have become engraved in the very territories where they were born. This dynamism is 
still distinguishable in the economic development of the counties that attracted masses 
of immigrants more than a century ago and has not waned despite decades of high 
population mobility in the US.  
A similar strong and positive long-term impact has been identified for internal 
migrants in chapter 7. Counties that attracted a big inflow of US-born citizens in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries are considerably wealthier today (once other factors 
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are controlled for) than areas avoided by internal migrants. Hence, in a similar way to 
international immigrants, domestic migrants have proven to be a source of economic 
activity, raising the long-term economic growth path of territories. Demoting domestic 
migration therefore to a simple population redistribution mechanism at one moment 
in time, ignores an important factor behind the long-term economic dynamism of 
places. 
One decisive element in this interdependence was found to be the distance travelled 
by the migrant between outset and destination. Counties which attracted large shares 
of long-distance domestic migrants have been decidedly more dynamic over time. 
Large shares of population born locally and/or originating from the same state have 
not triggered the same levels of economic activity, resulting in significantly lower 
long-run economic development. A self-selection mechanism of internal migrants is 
assumed to be the root-cause behind this connection. Long-distance domestic migrants 
have transmitted a similar economic legacy as international migrants. Their attitude 
when taking high risks crossing hundreds of kilometres across often undeveloped or 
unorganized, often dangerous territory, wiping their slate clean to start all over is 
assumed to be at the root of the substantial economic dynamism of the areas where 
they settled. The internal migrants’ determination to seek a more promising future in 
combination with the institutional constructs they brought from their far-flung places 
of origin seem to have become etched in the places of destination, making them more 
resilient and prosperous in the long-term.  
But how can the economic dynamism spurred by large and diverse groups of ancient 
migrants still affect today’s economic performance? The institutional transfer 
mechanism from past migration to current levels of development is analysed in chapter 
8. This chapter seeks to answer whether the institutional imprint of past migration has 
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become embedded into the very territory, leading to the formation of migration-prone 
and migration-averse regions. By comparing the two largest waves of migration to the 
US – the European immigration of the 19th century and the Latino immigration from 
1970 until today – evidence is found to support the idea that migrants, regardless of 
origin and ethnicity and regardless of how much time has passed between their arrival, 
are connected across time by an invisible cord. Despite many apparent differences 
between the two migrant waves – different continents, different ethnicity, traditions, 
customs, and migration incentives – and the time gap between both movements – three 
to five generations – historical migration patterns have, to a large extent, determined 
recent migration destinations. Regions that received large stocks of European migrants 
more than 100 years ago have and are still attracting significantly more population 
from Latin America today than those areas of the US which did not appeal to migrants 
around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. Historical migration has thus acted as 
pull factor for current migrants in a stronger and more robust way than most of the 
traditional characteristics of the places of destination identified within the scientific 
literature. A high education level, low unemployment, or high levels of income have 
been less of a draw to Latin American immigrants than historical migration patterns. 
These findings provide additional evidence of the presence of an institutional imprint 
created by migrant settlement patterns more than 100 years ago. Immigrants to (and 
within) the US in the late 19th century seem to have radically transformed the territories 
where they settled. Large numbers of migrants created not only a macroeconomic 
shock for the labour market and local economy at the time, but shook established 
institutional frameworks to the bone. The surge in population diversity across many 
US communities coupled with the risk-seeking and entrepreneurial mentality of the 
migrant bringing along the cultural baggage from their home regions and countries, 
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altered local habits, values, traditions and customs. The (what we assume to be) 
migration ‘buzz’ in receiving areas seems to have become ingrained in the territories’ 
own institutional frameworks. It has acted as a pull factor for new migrant waves 
today, generating and perpetuating a path dependence which has extended over 
generations of migrants. Indeed, “as migrants settle, they rework the destination itself” 
(Silvey and Lawson 1999: 125). 
Overall, the findings presented in this dissertation have important policy implications. 
Even though conditions, circumstances and global challenges today are highly 
different from those prevailing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in times where 
the US as well as many other developed countries are trying to lower immigration 
numbers, build up restrictions that often allow them to hand-pick those who enter (e.g. 
McGovern, 2012), and refuse entry to immigrants from ‘unwanted’ countries, cultures 
or religions, the results of this research provide considerable food for thought about 
the economic and social implications of adopting these sort of measures.  
Restrictive migration policies are often justified by politicians proposing them as a 
way to ‘protect’ the locals or the ‘native’ population from the ills of lower wages and 
unemployment. While there is limited scientific evidence that preventing population 
mobility will achieve any of these goals, restricting migration will also have long-
term, often ignored, economic consequences. Curbing migration limits diversity levels 
and, thus, prevents potentially far-reaching, growth-enhancing economic mechanisms 
from materialising. The aging societies of the developed world, in particular, are 
especially vulnerable to this. In the long-term, they cannot afford to miss out on the 
variety of ideas, perspectives, skills and experiences that immigrants bring. Massively 
restraining migration would imply foregoing much-needed innovation and 
technological progress. And yet, it is exactly these countries that are trying to shield 
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themselves from these positive externalities associated to migration, on the basis of 
frequently ill-justified security, welfare or economic concerns related to migration. 
Restricting mobility and thus curtailing population diversity levels has negative 
economic consequences in the short-, medium- and long-term that societies 
increasingly relying on the innovative capacity of their populations cannot shun. 
Nevertheless, as the research has shown, facilitating population mobility is not a magic 
solution. More migration and a resulting rise in diversity will only lead to a surge in 
economic potential if the incoming population becomes rapidly integrated into the 
communities of the receiving areas. In order for the long-term growth enhancing 
mechanism associated with migration to kick off, a system to prevent the formation of 
ghettos and facilitate interaction, avoid the formation of deep divides between 
different population groups and foster a dialogue between the foreign and native 
populations has to be set in place. Placing emphasis on the long-lasting and growth-
enhancing impact of population diversity, while simultaneously nurturing the 
necessary integration mechanisms can prepare the ground for not only a short-term 
peaceful integration of migrants, but also for durable long-term regional prosperity. 
Migration policy should also pay special attention to the gender balance of the migrant 
population. Hugely male dominated migration flows can lead not only to detrimental 
social consequences, but entail short- and long-term undesirable economic effects. 
Migration policies (unintentionally) granting preferential entry to men due to, for 
example, placing emphasis solely on skill-levels and personal income, can end up in 
missing out on important positive economic influences of female migration. However, 
in order for female migrants not to impact negatively in economic terms, the results 
indicate that women need to become rapidly integrated into the receiving societies. 
Migration policy therefore needs to also pave the way for the participation of 
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immigrant women in local labour markets and societal structures. They need to be free 
to take their own decisions in issues such as education, employment and marriage. 
Only if integration is successful, women migrants can demonstrate their full positive 
economic potential, consistently boosting economic activity levels over very long time 
frames. 
The results of the dissertation also provide considerable food for thought for those 
involved in designing regional development strategies. Internal migrants stimulate 
economic activity at their places of destination. They leave a long-lasting positive 
impact for economic development. Hence, taking into account local push- and pull 
factors which determine the region’s attractiveness to domestic migrants is a must for 
local and regional development policy design. Cities and regions need to become and 
remain attractive for long-distance (internal and external) migrants. The more a place 
can attract immigrants from far flung areas, the more it will benefit economically in 
the short-, medium- and long-run. Simply relying on migrants from neighbouring 
areas will not do the trick.  
Regional policy design also needs to consider the region’s migration history, 
especially with regards to international migration. Migrant streams established in 
historical times shape the settlement pattern and direction of future migration waves, 
independent of the origin, ethnicity or culture of the migrants. Generating a ‘migration 
buzz’ and engraving it in the institutional framework of the territory represents the 
best guarantee for becoming a migration-prone region. Places that manage to create 
this welcoming and open migration vibe at any given point in time have the best 
chance of attracting future generations of migrants. This also assists in remaining 
ahead of the rest in wealth generation for long periods of time. Regions lacking this 
migration ‘buzz’, by contrast, will see their potential limited. 
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Finally, the research conducted in this dissertation brings to the fore the real 
importance of migration for economic development in the long-term. The composition 
of the migrant stock, their skills, cultural baggage, institutional constructs and historic 
settlement patterns carry long-term economic consequences that still affect economic 
development in the US (and possibly elsewhere) to this very day. Migration is, by far, 
the most important factor shaping long-term territorial growth in the US. Whether a 
county was rich or poor, more or less educated, or had a specific industrial structure 
100 years ago is inconsequential for current levels of development. However, whether 
it managed to attract migrants and integrate them has contributed to determine 
subsequent economic dynamism for more than a century. Hence, there is a need to 
trumpet that current migration policies, aimed at restricting overall migration numbers 
and, in some cases, at preventing certain population groups, nationalities or religious 
denominations from entering a country can entail very long-term and unintended 
negative economic implications. By restricting migration, individual regions as well 
as entire countries can miss out on the massive economic potential and substantial 
growth-enhancing dynamics that migration brings in the long-term. Election cycles, 
public opinion and short-term quick-fixes should not be the only pillars policy-making 
decisions about migration are based on. While burning issues should most definitely 
not be ignored, there is need to consider what lies beyond immediate challenges and 
look at migration from a big-picture perspective. Shutting our doors is not the solution 
and will end up in significantly negative economic implications for generations to 
come. 
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